Opinions of the United
2003 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-12-2003
Hagner v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket 02-2731
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-2731
___________
WILLIAM HAGNER,
Appellant
v.
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security,
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 01-00239)
District Judge: The Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 23, 2003
BEFORE: NYGAARD, AMBRO, and LOURIE,* Circuit Judges.
(Filed February 12, 2003)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
*
Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, sitting by designation.
___________
LOURIE, Circuit Judge.
William Hagner appeals from the decision of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania affirming on summary judgment the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security that Mr. Hagner is not entitled to child=s insurance benefits
(ACIB@) or supplementary security income (ASSI@) under titles II and XVI, respectively, of
the Social Security Act (ASSA@). Hagner v. Massanari, No. 01-0239 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 29, 2002).
Because the Commissioner=s final decision was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm.
On January 23, 1997, Hagner applied for CIB and SSI benefits, alleging disability due
to a back injury for the period beginning January 2, 1994. The Commissioner denied both
his application and his request for reconsideration. After an administrative hearing at which
Hagner and a vocational expert testified, an administrative law judge (AALJ@) determined that
Hagner was able to perform a wide range of light exertional activity and that he therefore was
not disabled within the meaning of the SSA. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Hagner
was not entitled to CIB or SSI benefits. The Appeals Council denied Hagner=s request for
review, making the ALJ=s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Hagner instituted
a civil action in the district court to obtain review of that decision. Both parties moved for
summary judgment, and the court referred the case to a magistrate judge who filed a Report
and Recommendation proposing that Hagner=s appeal be denied. The court adopted the
magistrate judge=s Report and Recommendation as its opinion and granted the
Commissioner=s motion for summary judgment. Hagner timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291.
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We must uphold the district court=s decision if the Commissioner=s final decision was
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360
(3d Cir. 1999) (citing Monsour Medical Center v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir.
1986)). Substantial evidence is Amore than a mere scintilla.@ Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). It is not Aa large or considerable amount of evidence, but
rather >such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.=@ Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
On appeal, Hagner first argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to the reports
of his treating physician, Dr. Taylor. It is true that an ALJ must give a treating physician=s
opinion controlling weight if it Ais well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in
[the] case record.@ 20 C.F.R. ' 404.1527(d)(2). However, an ALJ may reject the opinion of a
treating physician if it is Aconclusory and unsupported by the medical evidence.@ Jones v.
Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991). Dr. Taylor opined that Hagner was temporarily
disabled and that he could stand and walk less than two hours and sit less than six hours in an
eight-hour workday. Nonetheless, the ALJ accorded Dr. Taylor=s opinions Aonly minimal
weight@ because they were offered on Acheck-the-box@ forms, were unsupported by objective
findings, and were inconsistent with the follow-up notes submitted by Dr. Taylor. Moreover,
the ALJ noted that another treating physician=s report, that of Dr. Jones, did not preclude all
substantial gainful activity and that the state agency physicians who reviewed Hagner=s medical
records concluded that he could generally perform light work activity. We therefore
3
conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ=s decision not to give Dr. Taylor=s
opinion controlling weight.
Hagner next argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ=s finding that
Hagner=s testimony regarding his back pain was not credible. Based on inconsistencies
between Hagner=s testimony and the record, the ALJ found Hagner=s allegation of
debilitating back pain to be Aexaggerated and not fully credible.@ In particular, the ALJ found
that objective medical evidence C including imaging studies of Hagner=s spine, four
physicians= reports, and the conservative course of medical treatment that Hagner underwent
C did not support Hagner=s allegation of debilitating pain. The ALJ also pointed to specific
discrepancies including Hagner=s lack of muscle atrophy, despite his claim that he could not
walk for more than five minutes at a time or lift anything, and Hagner=s weight gain despite
his testimony that he eats little due to his pain. We therefore conclude that there is
substantial evidence in the record from which the ALJ could find that Hagner=s testimony
regarding the severity of his back pain was not fully credible.
Finally, Hagner asserts that the ALJ=s hypothetical questions to the vocational expert
did not accurately portray Hagner=s individual limitations and impairments and therefore
could not provide substantial evidence for his decision. Specifically, Hagner contends that
the ALJ=s hypothetical questions neglected to include (1) the individual limitations set forth in
the treating physician=s functional capacity assessment; and (2) the psychological and pain
symptoms that affect Hagner=s concentration, sleep, memory, and ability to tolerate stress.
We disagree; the ALJ=s questions were fully in accordance with law. It is correct that
A[a] hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert >must reflect all of a claimant=s
impairments,=@ Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 123 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Chrupcala v.
4
Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added)), and that A[w]here there exists
in the record medically undisputed evidence of specific impairments not included in a
hypothetical question to a vocational expert, the expert=s response is not considered
substantial evidence,@ id. (citation omitted).
However, the ALJ asked the vocational expert to identify any jobs that would
accommodate the needs of a hypothetical person with Hagner=s age, education, and
vocational profile who could perform Alight exertion@ limited to Asimple, routine, repetitive,
low stress work.@ The ALJ also asked the expert to assume that the hypothetical person
required Aa sit/stand option.@ We conclude that those hypothetical questions accurately
portrayed Hagner=s impairments. First, with regard to Hagner=s functional capacity, we
reiterate that the ALJ properly accorded the treating physician=s report less than controlling
weight and rejected that physician=s functional capacity assessment. Instead, the ALJ
incorporated into his hypothetical questions a functional capacity limitation that was
supported by objective medical evidence: namely, that Hagner was capable of performing a
limited range of light work. Secondly, with regard to Hagner=s psychological and pain
symptoms, we restate that the ALJ found Hagner=s subjective claims of disabling pain to be
overstated. The ALJ also acknowledged a psychologist=s report indicating that Hagner=s
memory was intact and that Hagner=s depression, although it affected his concentration, was
not disabling. Again, the ALJ relied on the objective medical evidence in determining what
limitations to accord the hypothetical person and excluded Hagner=s exaggerated symptoms
of pain. The ALJ did take into account Hagner=s mental disorder and accordingly included
the limitation of Asimple, routine, repetitive, low stress work.@ We thus conclude that the
5
hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ accurately reflected Hagner=s physical and mental
impairments and were therefore properly relied on by the ALJ.
Because we find that substantial evidence supports the ALJ=s denial of CIB and SSI
benefits to Hagner, we affirm the district court=s decision.
6
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Judge Alan D. Lourie
Circuit Judge