Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-24-2004
USA v. Larwa
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-1553
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"USA v. Larwa" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 331.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-1553
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN LARWA,
a/k/a ALEX SARIS,
a/k/a ALEX FARIS,
a/k/a PAUL ROM ANAUSKAS,
a/k/a TIMOTHY BAUER
John Larwa,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 02-cr-00208
(Honorable Petrese B. Tucker)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 13, 2004
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, ALITO and AM BRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed September 24, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal by defendant John Larwa from a guilty plea entered into under a
bargained-for guilty plea to mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and to possession
of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Counsel for Larwa has filed a
brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, after careful review of
the record, he could not raise any meritorious issues and that the appeal is wholly
frivolous.1 We are satisfied that counsel has fulfilled his Anders obligations, and we
agree that the appeal is frivolous.
Nonetheless, counsel for Larwa identified two potentially non-frivolous
arguments: (1) whether four additional levels should have been added to the base offense
level under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C) because Larwa contends the loss to the victims
was not between $10,000 and $30,000; and (2) whether the court properly grouped all the
offenses under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1. Counsel accurately notes, however, that Larwa is
precluded from bringing an appeal pursuant to a waiver contained in his plea agreement.
The sentencing court reviewed this provision with Larwa concluding that he knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered into the agreement. We agree, as it was entered into
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and did not result in a miscarriage of justice. See
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 2001). Furthermore, in his
1
Larwa was given a copy of counsel’s brief and was allotted time to raise any
arguments in a pro se brief. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. He has not filed such a brief.
2
bargained-for plea agreement, Larwa stipulated that the loss to the victims was more than
$10,000 and less than $30,000, and that pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.1, neither the mail
fraud nor the odometer tampering offenses group with the firearms offense. We see no
reason why Larwa should not be held to the stipulations contained in the plea agreement.
See United States v. Cianci, 154 F.3d 106, 110 (3d Cir. 1998).
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
Defense counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.
3