Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
6-2-2004
USA v. Geddes
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-2802
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Recommended Citation
"USA v. Geddes" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 629.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/629
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 03-2802
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AARON GEDDES,
Appellant
________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
District Court Judge: The Honorable Mary L. Cooper
(D.C. No. 02-cr-00705)
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 6, 2004
BEFORE: SLOVITER and FUENTES, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK, District Judge.*
(Opinion Filed: June 2, 2004)
________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
________________________
* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
FUENTES, Circuit Judge:
In June 2002, New Jersey police arrested Appellant Aaron Geddes when they
observed him appearing to sell narcotics to an unidentified buyer, who was allowed to leave.
During the arrest, Geddes attempted to draw a Glock semi-automatic pistol from his
waistband, but the officers subdued Geddes and forcibly confiscated the firearm. Geddes
was arraigned on various state charges, as well as a federal charge of felon in possession of
a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); he was convicted by a jury on the federal charge in April 2003
and sentenced to 110 months imprisonment. Geddes now appeals on three grounds: 1) the
government did not provide sufficient evidence that the gun owned by Geddes had traveled
in interstate commerce; 2) the District Court erred in refusing to hold discovery on Geddes’s
claim that he was selectively prosecuted; and 3) the District Court improperly allowed the
government to enter into evidence the fact that Geddes was participating in a narcotics
transaction before being arrested.
None of these arguments has any merit. First, the government provided sufficient
evidence to satisfy § 922(g)’s requirement that Geddes possessed his firearm “in or affecting
commerce.” At trial, the government presented unrefuted evidence that Geddes’s pistol is
manufactured only in Austria, and is imported into the U.S. exclusively through a distributor
in Georgia. Geddes’s gun must have traveled in interstate commerce to reach New Jersey,
and the government therefore fulfilled its burden of proof. United States v. Singletary, 268
F.3d 196, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2001); accord United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 183-84 (3d
-2-
Cir. 2002). Second, the District Court properly denied Geddes’s request for an evidentiary
hearing on his selective prosecution claim because Geddes has not presented any evidence
that he was prosecuted more vigorously than similarly situated defendants on the basis of a
suspect classification. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996). Finally,
Geddes’s evidentiary appeal fails because evidence of the drug transaction was necessary to
explain to the jury why the police approached Geddes in the first place, and was not admitted
to “show a mere propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime.”
United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 395 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted); see
also United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2001) (evidence is admissible if
it is necessary background information rather than an attempt to impugn defendant’s
character). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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