Lee v. Atty Gen USA

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

5-19-2004

Lee v. Atty Gen USA
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-4602

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 PRECEDENTIAL Counsel for Petitioners

UNITED STATES COURT OF Steven A. Morley (Argued)
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT Morley, Surin & Griffin, P.C.
Constitution Place
325 Chestnut Street, Suite 1305-P
No. 02-4602 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106

Counsel for Respondent
KI SE LEE; HYANG MAHN YANG,
Peter D. Keisler
Petitioners Assistant Attorney General
Civil Division
v. Linda S. Wernery
Senior Litigation Counsel
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General Office of Immigration Litigation
of the United States, Lyle D. Jentzer (Argued)
Trial Attorney
Respondent Douglas E. Ginsburg, Esq.
Michael P. Lindemann, Esq.
John M. McAdams Jr., Esq.
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN John D. Williams, Esq.
ORDER OF THE BOARD OF Office of Immigration Litigation
IMMIGRATION APPEALS Civil Division
(Nos. A38 656 406, A36 775 995) United States Department of Justice
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044-0878
Argued: December 5, 2003

Before: SLOVITER and ALITO,
Circuit Judges, and OBERDORFER,* OPINION OF THE COURT
District Judge

(Opinion Filed: May 19, 2004)
OBERDORFER, Senior District Judge:
In this appeal we consider the
question of whether a conviction for filing
a false tax return, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
*
The Honorable Louis F. § 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, is
Oberdorfer, Senior District Judge for the an “aggravated felony” as defined by
District of Columbia, sitting by s e c t i o n 1 0 1 ( a ) (4 3 ) ( M ) ( i ) o f t h e
designation. Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). We conclude information further alleged that, in the
that it is not, and, therefore, that the three tax years at issue, petitioners
petitioners’ convictions do not render them understated their income by $112,453,
removable. Accordingly, we will grant the causing a tax deficiency of $55,811.
Petition for Review of the decision and Departing downward substantially, each
vacate the order of removal against the petitioner was sentenced to three years
petitioners. probation, a condition of which was three
months h o me co n fi ne m en t, with
I. BACKGROUND
permission to leave for work, medical
The relevant facts are not services, etc., one hundred hours of
complicated. The petitioners, Ki Se Lee community service, and the payment of all
and Hyang Mahn Yang, are husband and taxes, interest and penalties due to the
wife. They are both natives and citizens of IRS.3 AR 110.
Korea, but they have resided in the United
Thereafter, in November 1997, the
States as lawful permanent residents since
the 1980s. 1 They have grown children
who are United States citizens.
under the penalties of
For many years, the petitioners perjury, and which he does
operated a dry cleaning business in not believe to be true and
Philadelphia. In May 1997, they pled correct as to every material
guilty to a three-count information, which matter
charged them with filing false income tax
returns for 1989, 1990 and 1991, all in ...
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). 2 The
shall be guilty of a felony
and, upon conviction
1
Petitioner Yang entered the thereof, shall be fined not
United States in 1980; petitioner Lee more than $100,000
entered in 1984. ($500,000 in the case of a
corporation), or imprisoned
2
In relevant part, section 7206 not more than 3 years, or
provides that both, together with the
costs of prosecution.
any person who . . . (1) . . .
Willfully makes and 26 U.S.C. § 7206.
subscribes any return,
3
statement, or other The petitioners’ Sentencing
document, which contains Guideline range was 4 to 10 months
or is verified by a written confinement, one year supervised
declaration that it is made release, and a $1,000 to $10,000 fine.

2
INS charged petitioners with being Revenue Code of 1986
removable for having been convicted of an (related to tax evasion) in
“aggravated felony,” as defined by section which the revenue loss to
101 (a)(43 )(M )(i) and (ii) of th e the Government exceeds
Immigration and Naturalization Act. See $10,000; . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M). Section
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) & (ii). The
101(a)(43)(M) includes in the felonies
petitioners moved to terminate removal
classified as “aggravated” for purposes of
proceedings on the ground that a
deportation:
conviction for violating section 7206(1) of
An offense that - the Internal Revenue Code was not an
aggravated felony under either subsection
(i) involves fraud or
(M)(i) or (M)(ii). The immigration judge
deceit in which the loss to
denied their motion, ruling in July 1998
the victim or victims
that petitioners’ convictions rendered them
exceeds $10,000; or
removable under either subsection. App.
(ii) is described in § 47. He ordered each petitioner “removed
4
7201[ ] of the Internal to the Republic of (South) Korea.” App.
48.

4
On December 2, 2002, the Board of
In relevant part, section 7201
Imm igration Appeals affirmed the
provides:
immigration judge’s decision without
opinion, making it the final agency
Attempt to evade or defeat
decision. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).
tax.
The petitioners seek review.

Any person who willfully II. DISCUSSION
attempts in any manner to
On appeal, the petitioners challenge
evade or defeat any tax
the immigration judge’s order of removal
imposed by this title or the
on the ground that their convictions for
payment thereof shall, in
violating 8 U.S.C. § 7206(1) do not qualify
addition to other penalties
as aggravated felonies under either 8
provided by law, be guilty
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) or (ii), and,
of a felony and, upon
therefore, that they are not removable
conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than
$100,000 ($500,000 in the
case of a corporation), or
imprisoned not more than 5 prosecution.
years, or both, together
with the costs of 26 U.S.C. § 7201.

3
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).5 are right, judicial review of the removal
As the government now concedes that orders is not precluded, and they will be
subsection (M)(ii) does not apply, we need vacated for failing to allege a removable
only consider whether the petitioners’ offense. If the petitioners are wrong, we
convictions meet the definition of lack jurisdiction to inquire any further into
aggravated felony in subsection (M)(i). the merits, and the removal order will
stand.
A. Jurisdiction
B. Have the Petitioners Been
As an initial matter, we consider the
Convicted of an Aggravated Felony?
government’s contention that under 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C) w e lack The petitioners argue that no
jurisdiction to review the petitioners’ order conviction under section 7206(1) for filing
of removal. That provision states that “no false tax returns can satisfy the definition
court shall have jurisdiction to review any of aggravated felony in 8 U.S.C. §
final order of removal against an alien who 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). We apply de novo
is removable by reason of having review to this purely legal question of
committed a criminal offense covered in statutory interpretation that governs our
section . . . 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).” As own jurisdiction. See Valansi, 278 F.3d at
recen tly explained, however, this 207.
jurisdiction-stripping provision comes into
“The first step in interpreting a
play only when two facts exist: “(1) the
statute is to determine ‘whether the
petitioner is an alien (2) who is deportable
language at issue has a plain and
by reason of having been convicted of one
unambiguous meaning with regard to the
of the enumerated offenses.” Drakes v.
particular dispute in the case.’” Id. at 209
Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001).
(quoting Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d
We necessarily have jurisdiction “to
184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)). If the statutory
determine whether these jurisdictional
meaning is clear, our inquiry is at an end.
facts are present.” Id.; see Valansi v.
Id. If the statutory meaning is not clear,
Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir.
we must try to discern Congress’ intent
2002). We are thus not precluded from
using the ordinary tools of statutory
reviewing the petitioners’ argument that
construction. See INS v.
they have not been convicted of an
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48
“enumerated offense.” If the petitioners
(1987). “If, by employing traditional tools
of statutory construction, we determine
5
In relevant part, section that Congress’ intent is clear, that is the
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides that “[a]ny end of the matter.” Valansi, 278 F.3d at
alien who is convicted of an aggravated 208 (quoting Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 90
felony at any time after admission is (2d Cir. 2000)). If we are unable to
deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § discern Congress’ intent using the normal
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). tools of statutory construction, we will

4
generally give deference to the Board’s but look to the provisions of the whole
interpretation, so long as it is reasonable. law, and to its object and policy.”)
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
We thus begin our analysis with the Here, these broader considerations,
statutory language of subsection (M)(i). It specifically the presence of subsection
may be argued that the petitioners’ (M)(ii), preclude a conclusion that the
convictions under section 7206(1) for statutory language of subsection (M)(i)
filing false tax returns clearly involve clearly and unambiguously covers a
“fraud and deceit,” as required by section 7206(1) conviction. Subsections
subsection (M)(i), and that we need look (M )(i) and (M )(ii) were ena cted
no further. However, the precise question simultaneously in 1996. Subsection (M )(i)
before us is whether the statutory language has a general application – the gamut of
makes it plain and unambiguous that state and federal crimes involving fraud
subsection (M)(i) covers convictions for and deceit causing losses over $10,000.
violating section 7206(1). This question Subsection (M)(ii) zeroes in on the crime
cannot be answered solely by looking at of federal tax evasion, as described in
“the language itself”; we must also be section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
cognizant of “the specific context in which Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7201; it is silent about
that language is used, and the broader any other criminal tax offenses. Gross
context of the statute as a whole.” Id. at examination of (M) leaves obvious
209; cf. United States Nat’l Bank of questions: Why does subsection (M)
Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of include both a ge neral p rovisio n
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 encompassing “fraud and deceit” and
(1993) (“A statute’s plain meaning must be specific provision directed solely at the
enforced, of course, and the meaning of a offense of federal tax evasion? If
statute will typically heed the commands subsection M(i) applies to tax offenses,
of its punctuation. But a purported what is the purpose of subsection (M )(ii)?
plain-meaning analysis based only on Does the juxtaposition of subsections
punctuation is necessarily incomplete and (M)(i) and (M)(ii) signal an intent to
runs the risk of distorting a statute's true exclude other tax offenses from the
meaning. Along with punctuation, text definition of aggravated felonies in (M)(i)?
consists of words living ‘a communal That subsection (M)(i) raises these
existence,’ in Judge Learned Hand’s questions demonstrates that its language
phrase, the meaning of each word does not have a plain and unambiguous
informing the others and all in their meaning, at least not as applied to a
aggregate tak[ing] their purport from the conviction under section 7206(1) of the
setting in which they are used. Over and
over we have stressed that [i]n expounding
a statute, we must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence,

5
Internal Revenue Code. 6 Therefore, we tax evasion under section 7201, the
must turn to the traditional tools of Supreme Court has stated that an
statutory construction to see if they assist “affirmative willful attempt [to evade] may
in discerning Congress’ intent. be inferred from . . . any conduct, the
likely effect of which would be to mislead
We start with the principle that if at
or to conceal.” Spies v. United States, 317
all possible, we should ado pt a
U.S. 492, 499 (1943) (emphasis added).
construction which recognizes each
Accordingly, the goal of avoiding
element of the statute. See Acceptance
surplusage in construing a statute is
Ins. Co. v. Sloan, 263 F.3d 278, 283 (3d
satisfied only if subsection (M)(i) does not
Cir. 2001) (recognizing that it is an “axiom
apply to tax offenses.
of statutory construction that whenever
possible each word in a statutory provision Another “commonplace [rule] of
is to be given meaning and not to be statutory construction” is that the “specific
treated as surplusage”) (internal quotations governs the general.” Doe v. National Bd.
omitted). The only construction that of Medical Examiners, 199 F.3d 146, 154-
satisfies this principle is the one suggested 55 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Morales v.
by the petitioners: that subsection (M)(i) Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
does not apply to tax offenses. If the 384 (1992)); see also Fourco Glass Co. v.
government’s proposed construction were Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222,
adopted, and we were to hold that any tax 228 (1957) (“The law is settled that
offense involving fraud and deceit over however inclusive may be the general
$10,000 was an aggravated felony under language of a statute, it will not be held to
subsection (M)(i), subsection (M )(ii) apply to a matter specifically dealt with in
would be mere surplusage. We have another part of the same enactment.”),
considered the government’s contention quoted in Doe v. National Bd. of Medical
that there could be a case where a Examiners, 199 F.3d at 155. As explained
conviction for tax evasion would not by the Supreme Court, “where Congress
involve fraud or deceit, in which case includes particular language in one section
subsection (M)(ii) would exist simply to of the statute but omits it in another
catch any cases not covered by subsection section of the same act, it is generally
(M)(i), but the government has not presumed that Congress acts intentionally
identified, and we are unable to envision, and purposely in the disparate inclusion or
what that case might be. Indeed, in exclusion.” Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at
addressing what conduct might constitute 447-48; see also Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 273 (1994). Moreover, “[t]his
principle has special force when Congress
6
But see Abreu-Reyes v. INS, 292 has targeted specific problems with
F.3d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002) (denying specific solutions in the context of a
petition for review), withdrawn on other general statute.” Doe v. National Bd. of
grounds, 350 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2003). Medical Examiners, 199 F.3d at 155. And

6
it applies “particularly when the two no help in discerning Congress’ intent in
[provisions] are interrelated and closely enacting subsection (M)(i),8 the history
positioned, both in fact being parts of the and structure of the criminal tax laws
same statutory scheme.” Id. (internal persuade us that in enacting subsection
quotations omitted). (M)(ii), Congress intended to single out
tax evasion as the only tax crime that is a
The statutory section at issue here is
removable offense. See United States
a perfect example of this phenomenon.
Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of
Subsections (M)(i) and (M)(ii) were
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455 (1993)
adopted at the same time, appear adjacent
(“Statutory construction is a holistic
to each other, and are the only two parts of
endeavor and, at a minimum, must account
subsection (M), within a statute with
for a statute’s full text, language[,] as well
many, many subsections. Subsection
as punctuation, structure, and subject
(M)(i) is a general provision covering
matter.”) (internal quotations and citations
“fraud and deceit”; subsection (M)(ii) is a
omitted), quoted in Tineo v. Ashcroft, 350
very specific provision that only applies to
F.3d 382, 391 (3d Cir 2003).
federal tax evasion. Accordingly, the
principle that the specific governs the As the Supreme Court explained
general also favors the interpretation that many years ago, tax “evasion” is the
subsection (M)(ii) identifies the only “capstone” of tax law violations. See
removable tax offense, tax evasion, while Spies, 317 U.S. at 497. A felony since at
subsection (M)(i) does not apply to tax least 1903, it has long been recognized as
offenses.7 “the gravest of offenses against the
revenues.” Id. at 499. In his opinion for
While the legislative history of the
the Court in Spies, Justice Robert Jackson
Immigration and Naturalization Act offers
(a former General Counsel for the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, Assistant Attorney
7
See also Abreu-Reyes, 292 F.3d at General for the Tax Division, Solicitor
1037 (Paez, J., dissenting) (“That General, and Attorney General), after
Congress included a separate statutory
provision for tax evasion demonstrates
8
that it did not intend to include tax In 1996, Congress vastly
offenses within the “fraud or deceit” text. expanded the number and types of
Rather, as the statute reflects, Congress offenses that qualified as aggravated
drew a distinction between tax offenses felonies. See Illegal Immigration
and other crimes involving fraud and Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
deceit. Congress then targeted only the Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 104-208,
more egregious act of tax evasion, and 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). For the most part,
only when the loss to the government these changes were adopted without any
exceeds $10,000, as sufficiently serious discussion of their particular purpose.
to warrant removal.”)

7
outlining the then civil and criminal To the extent that any ambiguity lingers,
“penalties imposed by Congress to enforce we note that there is a “longstanding
the tax laws,” 9 id. at 495, concluded that principle of construing any lingering
“[t]he climax of this variety of sanctions is ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor
the serious and inclusive felony, defined to of the alien.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
consist of a willful attempt in any manner 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (principle is a
to evade or defeat the tax,” id. at 497 corollary to the rule of lenity that applies
(emphasis added). Thus, for Congress to in construing criminal statutes); see also
select tax evasion as the “aggravated” tax INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); see
felony, justifying removal of an alien who also Valansi (“This rule of construction . .
committed it, while sparing lesser tax . may be applied as a canon of last resort to
felons, is thoroughly consistent with the determine the intent of Congress on an
history and structure of criminal tax ambiguous issue.”). The facts of the
offenses. present case highlight the reason this
principle exists: it is a plain fact that in
In the end, after considering various
reality neither the prosecution, nor the
tools of statutory construction, we believe
sentencing judge involved in the
that Congress’ intent is clear: in enacting
prosecution, plea and sentencing of
subsection (M)(ii), it intended to specify
petitioners, treated their offense as
tax evasion as the only deportable tax
“aggravated.” The prosecution acquiesced
offense; it follows that it did not intend
in, if it did not negotiate, a plea agreement,
subsection (M)(i) to cover tax offenses.10
and the judge imposed a sentence
characteristic of a misdemeanor, not a
felony – much less an “aggravated one”
9
These sanctions ranged from civil (however it be defined). See Francis v.
delinquency penalties ranging from 5 to Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 170-71 (3d Cir. 2001)
25 percent to criminal penalties (noting that the importance of this
calibrated from misdemeanors (e.g. principle is highlighted “given the changes
former § 145(a)) to tax evasion, in immigration law effectuated by the
punishable as a felony and carrying a [1996 amendments to the Immigration and
maximum penalty of 5 years confinement
and a $5,000 fine (former § 145(b), now
§ 7201).
10
We note that if we had not opinion indicates only approval of the
reached this conclusion, we would outcome, not the immigration judge’s
confront the question of whether we reasoning), and where the meaning of the
should defer to the Board’s interpretation statutory provision depends, in part, on
in a situation where the Board itself has an understanding of the Internal Revenue
not ruled on the issue before us, see 8 Code, a subject on which the Board has
C.F.R. 1003.1(e)(4) (affirmance without no expertise.

8
Nationality Act]).” 11 order of the IJ is granted with directions to
vacate the removal orders with respect to
Accordingly, we conclude that the
the petitioners.
petitioners’ conviction for violating
section 7206(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code is not a removable offense under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). That decision
makes it unnecessary to consider the
petitioners’ argument that the record does
not establish a loss of $10,000.
III. CONCLUSION
The Petition for Review of the
decision of the BIA approving the removal

11
Our dissenting colleague
speculates that “If Congress had not
wanted subsection M(i) to apply to ‘tax
offenses,’ Congress surely would have
included some language in that provision
to signal that intention.” But Congress is
chargeable with knowledge of the same
well-established principles of statutory
construction which we feel compelled to
apply. If Congress had not intended us
to apply them, it surely would have
signaled to that effect.

Further, our colleague also
speculates that Congress may have
enacted M(ii) “simply to make certain
even at the risk of redundancy that tax
evasion qualifies as an ‘aggravated
felony.’” It may be that Congress will
wish to broaden the categories of
aggravated felony to include other or all
tax felonies. But we must interpret what
it has written by well-recognized rules of
statutory construction, unaided by
speculation.

9
Lee v. Ashcroft return and causing a tax loss of more than
$10,000 satisfies these elements. “Fraud”
No. 02-4602
or “deceit” is a necessary element of 26
ALITO, Circuit Judge, dissenting U.S.C. § 7206(1), which makes it a crime
to make or subscribe “any return,
I must respectfully dissent because
statement, or other document” that the
I believe that the offense of filing a false
defendant “does not believe to be true and
tax return and thereby causing a tax loss of
correct as to every material matter.” In
more than $10,000 falls squarely within
addition, causing a tax loss of more than
the definition of an “aggravated felony” in
$10,000 results in a qualifying “loss to the
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). Accord
victim,” i.e., the United States Treasury.
Abreu-Reyes v. INS, 292 F.3d 1029 (9 th
Cir. 2002), withdrawn on other ground,
350 F.3d 966 (9 th Cir. 2003). Despite the clarity of subsection
M(i), the majority concludes that this
The term “aggravated felony” is
provision does not apply to tax offenses.
defined to include:
Invoking two venerable canons of
(M) an offense that - statutory interpretation (viz., that statutes
should be read if possible to avoid
(i) involves fraud or
surplusage and that the specific should
deceit in which the loss to
take precedence over the general), the
the victim or victims
majority reasons as follows. The provision
exceeds $10,000; or
that directly follows subsection (M)(i), i.e.,
(ii) is described in 8 U.S.C. §1101(43)(M )(ii), specifically
section 7201 of Title 26 provides that the offense of tax evasion
(relating to tax evasion) in (26 U.S.C. § 7201) is an aggravated
which the revenue loss to felony. This specific provision would not
the Government exceeds have been needed if (M)(i) applied to tax
$10,000 . . . . offenses, because tax evasion is an offense
that involves fraud or deceit. Therefore,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(M)(emphasis added).
Congress must have intended that (M)(i)
Thus, subsection (M )(i) sets out two not apply to “tax offenses.”
requirements. First, the offense must
I must disagree with this analysis
“involve fraud or deceit.” This means that
for two reasons. First and most important,
the offense must include “fraud or deceit
this analysis fails to account for the
as a necessary component or element.”
language of subsection M(i). If Congress
Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
had not wanted subsection M(i) to apply to
Cir. 2002). Second, “the loss to the victim
“tax offenses,” Congress surely would
or victims” must exceed $10,000.
have included some language in that
The offense of filing a false tax provision to signal that intention. As

10
adopted, however, subsection M (i) evade or defeat any tax
contains no such hint. In order to argue imposed by this title or the
that the filing of a false tax return does not payment thereof shall, in
come within the language of subsection addition to other penalties
M(i), one would have to argue either that provided by law, be guilty
the term “victim” was not meant to apply of a felony . . . .
to the Treasury or that the term “loss” does
not include a tax loss. However, both of
these arguments fail to comport with 26 U.S.C. § 7201.
ordinary usage. See United States v.
Fleming, 128 F.3d 285, 288 (6 th Cir.
1997)(“In tax fraud cases, we consider the This offense has three elements: “1)
United States Treasury the victim.”); the existence of a tax deficiency, 2) an
U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1 (“Tax Loss” table). affirmative act constituting an attempt to
evade or defeat payment of the tax, and 3)
Second, the majority errs in
willfulness.” United State v. McGill, 964
inferring from subsection M(ii) that
F.2d 222, 229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506
Congress believed that subsection M(i) did
U.S. 1023 (1992). See also United States
not reach tax offenses. Subsection M(ii)
v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1089 (3d Cir.
may have been enacted simply to make
1996). In this context, willfulness requires
certain – even at the risk of redundancy –
proof that the defendant knew that his or
that tax evasion qualifies as an aggravated
her conduct was unlawful. Cheek v.
fe lo ny. W h i le goo d sta t u t o ry
United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
draftsmanship seeks to avoid surplusage,
other goals, such as certainty and the
avoidance of litigation, are sometimes
Neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is
more important. Here, those responsible
mentioned in the statute as a necessary
for drafting the provisions in question may
element of tax evasion. The statute applies
have had a measure of doubt that
to the willful attempt “in any manner to
subsection M(i) would be interpreted as
evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
covering all (or any) evasion cases, and
title or the payment thereof.” 26 U.S.C. §
subsection M(ii) may have been added to
7201 (emphasis added). Likewise, leading
dispel any such uncertainty.
cases interpreting this language do not
hold that fraud or deceit is an element of
the offense. In Spies v. United States, 317
The tax evasion statute provides in
U.S. 492 (1943), the Supreme Court
relevant part as follows:
emphasized the breadth of the statutory
language:
Any person who willfully
attempts in any manner to

11
 Congress did not define or that no defendant would ever be convicted
limit the methods by which of tax evasion without proof of fraudulent
a willful attempt to defeat or deceitful conduct, the drafters might
a n d evade m ight b e have been concerned that some courts
accomplished and perhaps would hold that tax evasion falls outside
did not define lest its effort the scope of subsection M(i) because
to do so result in some neither “fraud” nor “deceit” is a formal
unexpected limitation. Nor element of the offense. See Valansi, 278
would we by definition F.3d at 210 (in determining whether an
constrict the scope of the offense involves “fraud or deceit,” we look
Congressional provision that to the necessary elements of the offense of
it may be accomplished “in conviction). Thus, given the choice
any manner.” between (a) the risk that some or all tax
evasion cases would not be covered and
(b) the inclusion of a potentially redundant
Id. at 499.12 statutory provision, the drafters might have
selected the latter option.

In light of the statutory language
and the case law, cautious drafters might For these reasons, I think that it is
have concluded that it was prudent to add unwarranted to infer from subsection M (ii)
subsection M(ii) for at least two reasons. that subsection M(i) was not intended to
First, even if the drafters, like the majority reach “tax offenses.” I would heed the
in this case (see Maj. Op. at 9-10), could clear language of subsection M(i)13 and
not think of an evasion case that did not
involve fraudulent or deceitful conduct, 13
Even if the statutory language were
the drafters might not have trusted their
ambiguous, I would defer to the BIA’s
ability to anticipate every possible variety
reasonable interpretation that § 7206(1)
of evasion case and might have added
is an aggravated felony. See I.N.S. v.
subsection M(ii) just to be sure that no
Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424
evasion case fell outside the definition.
(1999)(“Because the Court of Appeals
Second, even if the drafters were certain
confronted questions implicating ‘[the
BIA’s] construction of the statute which
12
Although the Court went on to it administers,’ the court should have
provide a list of deceitful activities from applied the principles of deference
which an “affirmative willful attempt” described in Chevron”); Valansi, 278
could be inferred, the Court took pains to F.3d at 208 (“Despite our exercise of de
note that this list was furnished “[b]y novo review, we will give deference to
way of illustration, and not by way of the agency’s interpretation of the
limitation.” 317 U.S. at 499. aggravated felony definition if

12
hold that the offense of filing of a false tax
return and causing a tax loss of more than
$10,000 is an aggravated felony.

Congress’s intent is unclear”); Lukwago
v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir.
2003)(“W e must review the BIA’s
statutory interpretation of the INA under
the deferential standard of Chevron.”).
Appellants argue that when the INA is
ambiguous we should invoke the rule of
lenity and find in the alien’s favor. See,
e.g., I.N.S. v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 480
U.S., 421, 449 (1987); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr,
533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001). The rule of
lenity, however, is reserved for situations
in which the normal rules of statutory
interpretation are unhelpful. See St. Cyr,
533 U.S. at 320, n. 45 (“[T]he cases and
rules cited by Petitioner are
distinguishable because ‘[w]e only defer,
however, to agency interpretations of
statutes that, applying the normal “tools
of statutory construction,” are
ambiguous.’”)

13