In Re:Metro Life Ins

Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-13-2004

In Re:Metro Life Ins
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Precedential

Docket No. 02-4037

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Recommended Citation
"In Re:Metro Life Ins " (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 956.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2004/956

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 PRECEDENTIAL JEVVIFER PETERS; REX COLE;
DEBORAH COLE; FRANK C.
UNITED STATES COURT OF CONTINO; WILLIAMS E. CROFT;
APPEALS DEBORAH A. CROOK; DAVID W.
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT CUPEC; JEROME DANENBERG;
___________ GERTRUDE DANENBERG; ROBERT
DANENBERG; ALVIN DAVIS; MARY
No. 02-4037/4270 DAVIS; ANDREW DENUZZIO; JEAN
___________ DENUZZIO; MARIAN E. DESANTIS;
JOSEPH DILLA; KATHLEEN DILLA;
SPEROS DRELLES, ESTATE OF KATHRYN A. DIODATI; WILHELM
JAMES J. DONAHUE; MARIE DORFNER; JACQUELINE DORFNER;
DRELLES; MARY CATHERINE RENEE DRUMMOND-BROWN;
GRAY; HOWARD HALF; GEORGE NANCY I. ECK; EARL FAIRMAN;
KRESOVICH; MILDRED JEAN FERGUSON; RANDALL
KRESOVICH; MARY T. LASKO; FERRARI; HARRIET E. FITTS;
GEORGIANA TOY; KENNETH TOY; CAROL FRAM PTON; GILBERT J.
CHARLES J. ABBOTT; ESSIE FRAUENHEIM; KATHRYN A.
ADAM S; MARILYN ADAMS; GIBSON; ANTHONY E. GILL;
DEBORAH ALSTON; JOHN D BARBARA M. GLOVER; ROY G.
ANTONIONO; ROBERT GOFF; ALBERT GOTLEIB; MERYL
ARMSTRONG; PATRICIA GOTLEIB; BARRY GOVERNOR;
AUGUSTINE; HENRY AUGUSTINE; MARY GOVERNOR; STANLEY
GAY B. BANES; JOHN T. BARLEY; GRABOWSKI; LINDA GRABOWSKI;
JOHN T. BARLEY JR.; BARBARA DALE GREENAWALD; GLORIA
BARLEY; PAUL BAUER; RICHARD GREENAWALD; KARN L. GRUVER;
BAUER; MADELINE BAUER; RONALD J. GUINEY; WILLIAM A.
DONALD BECK; KIMBELY BECK; HAFEN; JOHN P. HAMMER;
EARL BRAEUDIGAM; JANICE MARGARET R. HAMMER; CHARLES
BRAEUDIGAM; OLIVE MAE BRICK; HARPER; IRENE HARPER; LOUISE
HERMAN BRICK; KATHLEEN HARRIS; SARAH HART; STEPHEN
BRYAN; ANDREW BRYAN; N. HAVRILLA, JR.; JOHN HELFRICH;
ROOSEVELT BYRANT; CAROL NORA HELFRICH; JOHN HOFFMAN;
BRONOUGH; AMY L. BUCHEIT; LOIS HOFFMAN; DOLORES
THOMAS BURTOFT; SUSAN HUMENIK; EDWARD HUMENIK;
BURTOFT; ANTHONY CALABRESE; STEVE HYRB; ANNA MARIE HYRB;
SHARON CALABRESE; SAMUEL JOHN IRWIN; VIRGINIA IRWIN;
CARUSO; DOLORES CARUSO; DALE JACKMAN; CONSTANCE
CLARENCE CLAUS; MARGARET JACKMAN; GEORGE JACKSON;
CLAUS; SANDRA CLAWSON; MARGARET JACKSON; KENNETH

1
JAROS; MICHAEL JOHNSON; RUBY KARLENE ORR; LILLIAN
JONES; O’NEAL JONES; MARLENE PARROTTO; WILLIAM PERLINGER;
C. JONES; RAYMOND E. CRESCENZO PETRILLI; RANDY A.
KALKBRENNER; FRIEDA KAM EL; PFEIFER; RAYMOND PIAGESSI;
JORDAN KAM POS; SHARON LEE ROY D. PIRAIN; MARY
KAMPOS; JAMES KASICKY; POLONCHAK; YVONNE BLYTHE;
ANDREW KASICKY; JOSEPH BARBARA J. POND; MARY JANE
KIZIOR; DOLORES KIZIOR; POTTER; ALLAN RANDOLPH;
MILDRED P. KOBAN; MARY JO ROSEMARY RANDOLPH;
KOCHERAN-DAPOS; ROSANNA HANUMANTHA RAO; STASHIA
KOCIAN; DENNIS KOCIAN; REEHER; JUDITH E. ROCKWELL;
ROSANNE KOCSIS; GEORGE S. LINDA ROMANELLI; JAMES
KOKUS; KENNETH KOTEWICZ; ROMANELLI; WALTER ROSE;
EVELYN KOTEWICZ; JAMES R. ALNETTA ROSE; EDWARD ROSE;
KREBBEL; SHARON R. KREUER; MARY ELLEN ROSE; SHIRLEY
BARBARA L. KRYNEVICH; SACHS; FRANK J. SAMPSON;
WILLIAM V. LACY; DONALD HELEN G. SCHABLIK; CHARLES
LADESIK; JEAN LADESIK; JOHN R. SCHU; LINDA SCHU; ELEANOR J.
LARKIN; DIANE LEBO; LUDMILLA SCHULTZ; THOMAS SHERIDAN;
A. LUKSIK; WILLIAM J. LUXON; KATHLEEN SHERIDAN; BONNIE
RAYMOND MACKEWICH; NANCY SHERWOOD; GEORGE SMITH;
MACKEWICH; JAMES MARAK; KATHLEEN SMITH; DONNA
BONITA MARAK; MARILYN E. SMORUL-KOTLINSKI; MELVIN
MERVOSH; LILLIAN Y. MERZLAK; SMULCZENSKI; LOIS
FREDERICK MEYER; ANDREA SMULCZENSKI; MARY SPARICO;
MEYER; RUTH MILLER; WILLIAM SAMUEL SPENCE; PRESLEY
MILLER; ALBERT MINKO; RUTH STAHL; ELIZABETH STAHL;
MINKO; THOMAS MOODY; ROBERTA STALLINGS; PRESTON
MICHOLAS MOODY; JEAN MORSE; STITT; ADRIENNE STITT; JOHN D.
CHARLES MURPHY; BARBARA STOKES; RONALD A. STOLTZ;
MURPHY; JAMES M . MYERS; ROSEMARY STOYANOFF; DAVID P.
JAMES H. MYERS; TIM McCARTHY; SULKOWSKI; GLEN A. SULLIVAN;
SANDRA McCARTHY; TERRENCE RICHARD L. TERHUNE; GERARD E.
McCONNELL; JOHN McGARVEY; TERWILLIGER; LOUISE
CINDY McGARVEY; JOHN F. THORNTON; DONALD TOOMEY;
McROBERTS; BONNIE SUE RITA TOOMEY; DERRICK J.
NEIDERHISER; MARY JEAN NEJAK; TUSCANO; LUCILLE TYLER; JOHN
JOSEPH NIST; THEODORE VENUS; VICTORIA MARIE VERI;
ORLOWSKI; CATHERINE THOMAS S. VIG; RITA VIG; ALVIN
ORLOWSKI; RONALD ORR; WEINBERG; LISA ANTIN; ALLEN

2
 WILTROUT; AGNES WILTROUT; ___________
DAVID WISE; ESTATE OF EDDIE
WRIGHT; ROBERT YAUCH; JENNIE Argued: December 12, 2003
YAUCHKEITH YOUNGER; BRENDA
YOUNGER, Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and
GARTH, Circuit Judges.

Appellants in 02-4270 (Opinion Filed: December 24, 2003)
___________
v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY; GARY ANTONINO;
JOEL SHERMAN; RONALD SHRAM; B. John Pendleton, Jr. [ARGUED]
UNITED FOOD COMMERCIAL McCarter & English, LLP
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL 100 Mulberry St.
UNION; AFL-CIO, CLC; BRUCE A. Newark, N.J. 07102
REZNIK ASSOCIATES, L.P.;
METROPOLITAN INSURANCE AND Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee
ANNUITY COMPANY, a Delaware
Corporation; JEFFREY J. RODGERS; Leslie A. Brueckner [ARGUED]
ROBERT MARTINI; JONATHON Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, P.C.
HOLLY, Resident of Texas; JAMES 1717 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
SPANGLER; STEVEN ANASTASIA; Suite 800
THOMAS M. HYLAND; CHRISTINE Washington, DC 20036
DOVAN; JACK E. DUCKWORTH

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
Kenneth R. Behrend
Appellant in 02-4037 Behrend & Ernsberger, P.C.
________________________ Union National Bank Building
306 Fourth Ave.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED Suite 300
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE Pittsburgh, PA 15222
WESTERN DISTRICT OF
PENNSYLVANIA Counsel for Appellees/Cross-Appellants

District Court Judge:
The Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose
(Misc. Docket No. 96-179)

3
 _______________________ asserting any claim relating to the alleged
illegal nationwide practices, on the
OPINION OF THE COURT grounds that it would disturb, or even
_______________________ effectively relitigate, the MDL case that
was settled by Metlife in federal court.
The Magistrate Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation advising an
injunction on the grounds that Plaintiffs
were effectively relitigating the illegality
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: of the nationwide practices covered by
I. the MDL case settlement. Upon
In December 1999, Plaintiff- reconsideration, however, the Magistrate
Appellant Metropolitan Life (“Metlife”) Judge reversed his Recommendation:
settled an MDL federal class action (“the specifically, while Appellees may have
MDL case”) with plaintiffs who had filed abused Metlife through overbroad
actions over allegedly illegal sales discovery requests and allegations in
practices. In the case before us, their complaint, they nonetheless had
Appellees, all represented by the firm discrete individual claims, and thus it
Behrend and Ernsberger (“Behrend”), are was up to the state courts to decide
opt-out plaintiffs pursuing their own whether Appellees’ specific discovery
individual suits in Pennsylvania state requests were relevant to those claims.
courts against Metlife for allegedly The District Court adopted the Report
improper sales practices. In those state and Recommendation in its entirety.
court proceedings, Appellees1 have been II.
allowed to conduct discovery of A.
Metlife’s nationwide sales The Anti-Injunction Act dictates
practices–including information that a federal court “may not grant an
specifically related to litigants from the injunction to stay proceedings in a State
MDL case–on the grounds that the sales court except as expressly authorized by
practices are potentially relevant to Act of Congress, or where necessary in
Appellees’ individual claims. In October aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
2001, Metlife approached the District effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C. §
Court for an injunction barring Appellees 2283. Thus, federal courts are statutorily
from conducting such discovery, or from prohibited from enjoining state court
proceedings except in three narrowly
excepted categories of cases; the
1
Behrend’s opt-out clients are corresponding affirmative empowerment
plaintiffs in the state court suits, but are to issue injunctions in these three
defendants in this case; accordingly, to avoid categories of cases derives from the All-
confusion, we will refer to them as
Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). In re
“Appellees.”

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Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice any proceeding in state court “that is
Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 365 (3 rd Cir. 2001) based on, relates to or involves facts and
(hereinafter referred to as “Prudential I”). circumstances underlying the Released
Metlife argues that the District Court had Transactions in the Class Action.” Id. at
the authority to enjoin Appellees’ claims 363 (internal quotations omitted). Our
because the instant case falls into either Court affirmed this injunction under the
the second or third category of cases: Anti-Injunction and All-Writs Acts. Id.
namely, the injunction is either 1) at 369-70.
necessary in aid of the District Court’s Metlife argues that the instant
jurisdiction over the MDL case, or 2) case is virtually identical to Prudential I,
necessary to prevent relitigation of the as the injunctions sought and the state-
settled claims in the MDL case. court complaints at issue are extremely
Relying on Prudential I, Metlife similar in both cases. As the District
contends that Appellees can be enjoined Court recognized, however, the crucial
from making any claim or using any distinction between Prudential I and the
evidence related to the claims settled in case before us is that the Lowes were
the MDL case in order to keep the parties to the Prudential I settlement
settlement from being disturbed. In because they did not opt out all of their
Prudential I, the plaintiffs, the Lowes, claims. In contrast, Appellees did opt
had four policies with Prudential that fell out all of their claims, and were therefore
within the defined parameters of a not parties to the M DL case settlement.
nationwide class action against Metlife tries to downplay the salience of
Prudential that settled in October 1996 in this distinction, but a close reading of
the District of New Jersey. Id. at 359-61. Prudential I makes it clear that the
The Lowes chose to keep two policies Lowes’ participation in the settlement
within the class action, but to opt out was the dispositive factor in the case.
with the other two policies, meaning that Id. at 366 (“We must determine whether
they would reap the benefits of the settlement of claims the Lowes had under
settlement for two of their policies but the Class Policies precludes them from
still retain the option to litigate the other pursuing claims in Florida purportedly
two claims. Id. at 361. The Lowes’ arising from the [opted-out] Policies”),
state-court complaint based on the opted- 367 (“the Lowes clearly released
out policies contained numerous Prudential from any claims ‘based on,’
references to Prudential’s nationwide ‘connected with,’ ‘arising out of,’ ‘or
policy, and the Lowes sought discovery related to, in whole or in part’ their two
over those practices as relevant to the Class Policies”), 369 (“When the Lowes
opted-out individual claims. Id. at 362- reviewed the Release and the Class
63. Prudential obtained an injunction Notice, they surely must have realized
from the New Jersey District Court that, even though they could exclude
enjoining the Lowes from undertaking certain policies from the settlement while

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including others, doing so would Metlife observes that Appellees’
jeopardize their ability to prove claims complaint largely copies the class action
relating to the [opted-out] Policies. The complaint in the MDL case and describes
district court was not willing to release at length the allegations against Metlife
them from their bargain; neither are in the MDL case. To the extent that
we”). Appellees may try to bring in evidence of
Metlife urges the Court to look nationwide practices that are irrelevant to
beyond the specific facts of Prudential I their individual claims, however, Metlife
and embrace a larger goal of protecting is free to object to such evidence before
class action defendants from having to the appropriate state courts, who are the
repeatedly defend against allegations proper authorities to make such
relating to claims they have already evidentiary rulings. Allowing the
settled. Metlife claims that the preemptive approach espoused by
Prudential I court endorsed this larger Metlife here would essentially nullify
goal when it cautioned that state suits Appellee’s decision to opt out: “To
concerning the settled claim “could permit the settlement and release to vest
number in the millions.” Id. at 367. We a right in Metlife that it can assert against
believe, however, that Metlife takes this non-settling plaintiffs, and so to limit or
comment out of context; the Prudential I restrict those plaintiffs in the prosecution
court clearly confined that warning to the of state court suits, deprives them of the
context of state-court plaintiffs who had benefit of having opted out.” App. at 34.
already, like the Lowes and unlike In short, Metlife cannot point to
Appellees here, already signed on to the any caselaw authorizing an injunction
federal settlement. Id. (“allowing the against opt-out plaintiffs like Appellees,
Lowes to prosecute their civil claims in who consciously and purposefully
the Florida court would allow an end run refused to join a class action settlement.
around the Class settlement by affording The cases Metlife points to in support of
them (and other class members who its argument all deal with plaintiffs who
might later attempt the same strategy) an are distinguishable from Appellees. See
opportunity for relitigation of the generally In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of
released claims”) (internal quotations Am. Sales Practices Litig., 314 F.3d 99
omitted) (emphasis added). (3 rd Cir. 2002) (class members who
Metlife also asserts that the joined settlement tried to collaterally
injunction somehow prevents Appellees attack settlement in state court); In re
from relitigating the settled claims of the Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220 (3 rd Cir. 2002)
class plaintiffs. Appellees, however, are (plaintiffs were trying to opt entire
not relitigating the settled claims at all unnamed subclass out of nationwide
here; they are suing over their own class action); Prudential I, 261 F.3d 355
alleged mistreatment at the hands of (enjoined plaintiffs were party to settled
Metlife, not over someone else’s claim. class action); Carlough v. Amchem

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Prod., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 204 (3 rd Cir. in this court–even to the
1993) (enjoined plaintiffs had not yet extent of pleading
been given the opportunity to opt out, so allegations not applicable
state suit was premature).2 We therefore to the type of policy the
uphold the denial of the injunction. individual plaintiff bought
B. and is suing on. This, of
Finally, we address Appellees’ course, exposes M etLife to
contention that “the District Court erred discovery demands that,
in refusing to reject the Magistrate while they may relate to
Judge’s unsupported dictum stating that claims in the complaint,
the opt-out litigants have committed cannot relate to the actual
discovery and pleading ‘abuse’ in their case. Similarly, I believed
state court cases.” Appellees’ Br. at ii. MetLife was the recipient
Specifically, Appellees take issue with of unreasonably broad and
the following language from the duplicative discovery
Magistrate Judge’s report and requests in the state court
recommendation, adopted by the District cases. I believe this still.
Court: But the Report
I was convinced when the acknowledged, as I readily
[first] Report was issued continue to do, that these
that MetLife is being are matters for the state
abused by [Appellees] in courts to address, unless
their state court actions. very narrow conditions are
Illustrative of this abuse is present to allow this court
the fact that many of the to stop it.
state court complaints are
mere reiterations of the App. at 33. Appellees argue that the
class action complaint filed District Court did not have the legal
authority to criticize Appellees’ conduct
in state court, or alternatively that the
2
In its reply brief, Metlife cites to District Court’s criticisms are clearly
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, erroneous as a matter of fact. Metlife
123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003), for the proposition responds that the passage reflects well-
that Appellees cannot use evidence of based factual findings on the part of the
Metlife’s national practices in their District Court, and should not be
individual cases. Campbell, however, is stricken. As defined by this Court,
wholly inapposite, as it deals with the dictum is “a statement in a judicial
determination of whether a large punitive opinion that could have been deleted
damage award can be based on such without seriously impairing the analytical
evidence, not whether such evidence can be
foundations of the holding.” In re
at all relevant to an individual’s lawsuit.

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McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3 rd Cir.
2000). Magistrate Judge Benson’s
comments were clearly dicta under this
definition: his opinion of Behrend’s
tactics was, by his own admission, totally
unrelated to his decision to deny the
injunction, and he explicitly recognized
that the state courts were the appropriate
judge of the propriety of Behrend’s
tactics. Thus, there is no finding of fact
to review, let alone to declare clearly
erroneous.
In any case, even if the
Magistrate Judge’s remarks were
construed as findings of fact rather than
opinions, Appellees’ cross-appeal on this
issue would still not be appropriate, as
federal courts “have not recognized
standing to appeal where a party does not
seek reversal of the judgment but asks
only for review of unfavorable findings.”
Penda Corp. v. United States, 44 F.3d
967, 972 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Based on this
determination, Appellees’ arguments that
the Magistrate Judge’s comments
constitute a negative review of various
state court rulings in violation of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the
Younger absention doctrine are wholly
without merit. Consequently, we affirm
the District Court’s judgment in its
entirety.

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