Opinions of the United
2004 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
2-5-2004
USA v. Benjamin
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 03-2623
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"USA v. Benjamin" (2004). 2004 Decisions. Paper 1020.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 03-2623
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE BENJAMIN
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 01-mc-00202)
District Court Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 27, 2004
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SLOVITER and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.*
(Filed: February 5, 2004)
OPINION OF THE COURT
*
When this case was first listed for disposition on January 16, 2004, the panel
consisted of Judges Sloviter, Rendell and Aldisert. Thereafter Judge Rendell recused
herself from participation. Chief Judge Scirica then appointed himself as the third judge.
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ALDISERT, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by George Benjamin requires us to decide whether his sentence
should be vacated and the proceedings remanded for a new sentencing hearing . He
argues that the district court erred in failing to credit him for admitting violations of the
conditions of supervised release. The district court had jurisdiction based on 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e). We have jurisdiction based on 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We will affirm.
I.
Because we write exclusively for the benefit of the parties, who are familiar with
the facts and the proceedings in the district court, our discussion of the background will
be limited. On August 15, 1997, Benjamin entered a guilty plea in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to engaging in a conspiracy to
commit mail fraud, wire fraud, credit card fraud and interstate transportation of stolen
property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. He later was sentenced to six months in prison
and three years on supervised release. His term of supervised release began on January
13, 2001 and was to end on January 12, 2004.
On December 11, 2001, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania (“the district court”) accepted jurisdiction over Benjamin’s supervised
release pursuant to a transfer order. On February 27, 2003, a United States probation
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officer filed a petition with the district court alleging that Benjamin had violated the
conditions of supervised release by committing violations of state law, using controlled
substances, failing to report to the probation officer and failing to complete a drug
treatment program. Benjamin admitted most of these allegations at a supervised release
revocation hearing before the district court on March 6, 2003.
The probation officer submitted a memorandum to the district court advising that
the Policy Statement set forth at U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) provided for a guideline range of
eight to 14 months imprisonment in a case of revocation of supervised release for a
defendant with Benjamin’s criminal history category and grade of violation. At the
revocation hearing, Benjamin asked the district court to extend supervised release and
allow him to enter a diagnostic treatment program.
The district court found that Benjamin had violated the conditions of supervised
release and revoked the term of supervised release, sentencing Benjamin to be
imprisoned for a term of 14 months. The district court stated on the record the following
reasons for its decision:
Mr. Benjamin has demonstrated substantial disregard for both the law and
the conditions of supervised release. While on supervised release Mr.
Benjamin used drugs and frequently did not report for drug testing as
directed. Mr. Benjamin was afforded ample opportunity to involve himself
in drug treatment and failed to successfully finish the program. Mr.
Benjamin involved himself in new criminal conduct while under
supervision. The 14 month sentence at the high end of the guideline is
believed necessary to sanction Mr. Benjamin for his violation behavior
while protecting the community and promoting respect for the law.
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(App. at 37-38.)
II.
We must determine whether the sentence imposed by the district court for
violation of the conditions of supervised release was “plainly unreasonable.” United
States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 894 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)
(establishing the “plainly unreasonable” standard of review for imposition of a sentence
“for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline”)).
III.
Benjamin contends that the district court’s sentence of 14 months imprisonment
was plainly unreasonable because the district court failed to take into account that
Benjamin admitted violating the conditions of supervised release and therefore relieved
the government of the burden of proving the violations while also relieving the district
court of the burden of an evidentiary hearing. His contention, however, is without merit.
For the reasons it stated on the record, the district court concluded that a sentence
of 14 months in prison was appropriate. The 14-month sentence did not exceed the
applicable two-year statutory limit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Although it was not
bound by the United States Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement regarding
revocation of supervised release, the district court nevertheless chose to impose a
sentence within the recommendation of U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Section 7B1.4(a) provides
that for a defendant such as Benjamin, who was charged with a Grade C violation of his
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supervised release and who had a criminal history category of VI, the recommended
range was eight to 14 months imprisonment. Measured against the plainly unreasonable
standard of review, we reject the contention that there was an error at sentencing that
requires the case to be remanded. See Blackston, 940 F.2d at 894 (holding that a
statutory maximum three-year imprisonment term was not a plainly unreasonable
sentence for a defendant who violated the conditions of supervised release, even though
the United States Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement recommended a maximum
sentence of 10 months).
We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude
that no further discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
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