Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-3-2005
Carlucci v. Holt
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2369
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Recommended Citation
"Carlucci v. Holt" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 259.
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BPS-13
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2369
RONALD CARLUCCI,
Appellant
v.
RONALD HOLT, Warden
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-2669)
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
______________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 14, 2005
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and BECKER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 3, 2005)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
PER CURIAM
Ronald Carlucci appeals pro se from an order of the District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania dismissing his petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. At the time he filed his habeas petition, Carlucci was incarcerated in the Federal
Correctional Institution at Schuylkill, serving a 120-month sentence for racketeering and
related firearms convictions. Carlucci’s petition challenges the Bureau of Prisons’
(“BOP”) interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), which governs the award of good time
credits to prisoners. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review is plenary. See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002). The Clerk
listed the case for possible summary action. In response, Appellee filed a motion for
summary affirmance, and Carlucci filed a motion in opposition.
Section 3624(b)(1) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more
than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration
of the prisoner’s life, may receive credit towards the service
of the prisoner’s sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54
days at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of
imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the
term . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). The BOP interprets this statute to allow 54 days of “good time”
credit for each year served by the prisoner. See 28 C.F.R. § 523.20. The BOP’s formula
for calculating good time credit accounts for the fact that the prisoner’s sentence is
incrementally shortened as good time credit is awarded each year. See White v. Scibana,
390 F.3d 997 at 1000-1001 (7 th Cir. 2004) (explaining the BOP’s formula), cert. denied by
White v. Hobart, 125 S. Ct. 2921 (June 13, 2005).
Carlucci contends that the Bureau of Prisons’ interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3624(b)(1) is contrary to “the unambiguous intent of Congress” that prisoners are
eligible to earn 54 days for each year of the prisoner’s sentence, because “term of
imprisonment” essentially means “sentence.” Alternatively, Carlucci argues that, even if
the statute is ambiguous, the “rule of lenity” should supersede any deference owed to the
BOP’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Carlucci asserts that the BOP’s interpretation of the statute
deprives him of good time credit to which he is entitled, in violation of his Equal
Protection and Due Process rights.
As noted in the District Court’s order, we have recently held that the phrase “term
of imprisonment” in this statute is ambiguous and that the BOP’s interpretation is
reasonable. See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2005) (per curiam), reh’g
denied (order entered October 4, 2005). Therefore, we apply Chevron deference to the
BOP’s interpretation of § 3624(b).
For the foregoing reasons, Carlucci’s arguments are foreclosed by our decision in
O’Donald. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Appellee’s motion for summary affirmance is
GRANTED. Appellant’s “Request for Leave For Supplemental Filing” is DENIED.
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