Opinions of the United
2005 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-23-2005
Santiago v. Apker
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-2301
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Recommended Citation
"Santiago v. Apker" (2005). 2005 Decisions. Paper 659.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2005/659
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HPS -129 (July 2005) NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-2301
________________
JOSE M. SANTIAGO,
Appellant
vs.
CRAIG APKER, Warden
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00285)
District Judge: Honorable Malcolm Muir
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
JULY 29, 2005
Before: CHIEF JUDGES SCIRICA, WEIS AND GARTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed : August 23, 2005)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM.
In 1991, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania Jose Manual Santiago was convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal
1
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.1 He has filed a second petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge his conviction. Arguing that he
was innocent of the crime, he claimed that “his right to have a jury determine every fact
essential to punishment” had been violated because the elements of the continuing
criminal enterprise offense “were not charged in the indictment nor proven before the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Petition at 3. In support of his claim, he cited Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1991); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); and Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Adopting the Report & Recommendation of a Magistrate Judge, the District Court
dismissed Santiago’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that he could not file his
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was an adequate and effective
means for him to raise his claims. Santiago appeals and requests that the District Court’s
order be summarily reversed.
Because there is no substantial question on appeal, the District Court’s
order will be summarily affirmed. Santiago cannot bring his petition under 28 U.S.C. §
2241, because a motion to challenge his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be
considered “inadequate or ineffective.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2005). Section 2255 has been
considered inadequate and ineffective for a petitioner convicted and imprisoned for
1
Because the parties are familiar with the specifics of Santiago’s conviction and his
subsequent challenges thereto, we do not recount the details here.
2
conduct since deemed not to be criminal. See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d
Cir. 1997). However, § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective just because a petitioner is
unable to meet its stringent gatekeeping requirements. See id. Specifically, we have held
that § 2255 is not an inadequate or ineffective way to bring claims based on Apprendi.
See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 2002). Claims under Ring
and Blakely are not sufficiently distinguishable from a claim under Apprendi to meet the
In re Dorsainvil exception and permit Santiago to seek relief under § 2241. Cf. Okereke,
307 F.3d at 120-21. Likewise, Jones, in which the Supreme Court construed a statute
unrelated to this case, does not provide Santiago a basis for obtaining relief under § 2241.
For the reasons stated, the District Court’s order will be summarily
affirmed. Santiago’s motion for summary reversal is denied.
3