Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-22-2006
In Re: Banks
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-1829
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Recommended Citation
"In Re: Banks " (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 27.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/27
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DLD-61 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NOS. 06-1829, 06-1830, 06-1831, 06-1832, 06-1833,
06-1834, 06-1835, 06-1836, 06-1848, 06-1850
________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
WILLIAM T. BERGER; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
__________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
RICHARD P. HERBERT; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
___________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
WALTER BYRD; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
_______________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
DON V. WELLS, JR.; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
2
v.
MONKEY KARAOKE; VIOSOFTWARE; KATRINA
MCELROY; JIMMY DO; WARREN DO; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
___________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
RAY RUSSELL, JR.; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
_______________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
TIM DAVIS; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
________________
3
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
NATHAN ANGELUS SOFTWARE PROVISIONS;
U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
_________________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
v.
PETER J. CALABRESE; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
_______________
IN RE: FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Debtor
FREDERICK H. BANKS,
Appellant
4
v.
THOMAS FREUND; U.S.
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. Nos. 05-00594, 05-00595, 05-00596, 05-00597, 05-00598,
05-00599, 05-00600, 05-00601, 05-00613, & 05-00615)
District Judge: Honorable Joy Flowers Conti
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 30, 2006
Before: BARRY, AMBRO AND FISHER, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: December 22, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
On November 1, 2001, Frederick H. Banks filed for bankruptcy protection under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The appointed trustee in bankruptcy filed a report of
no assets. In 2005, Banks filed many adversary actions, including the ten at issue in these
related appeals.1 The United States unsuccessfully moved in the Bankruptcy Court to
intervene in some of them. The Bankruptcy Court, holding that it lacked subject-matter
1
Banks chose as Defendants in these actions victims and witnesses of crimes for
which the United States prosecuted him.
5
jurisdiction over these adversary actions (and others that we do not presently consider)
because they related only to post-petition acts unrelated to the administration of Banks’
bankruptcy case, dismissed them. Banks appealed to the District Court. The United
States did not appeal from the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying its motion to intervene,
but moved to intervene or to file an amicus curiae brief in the District Court. The District
Court denied the motion to intervene, but allowed the United States to file a brief. The
District Court affirmed the order dismissing the adversary actions.
Banks appeals. The United States does not appeal from the order denying the
motion to intervene. However, the United States and the United States Attorney’s Office,
neither of whom were parties in the District Court, but the latter of whom is named as a
party on appeal, filed a motion for summary action, seeking affirmance of the order
dismissing the adversary actions,2 and a motion to stay the briefing schedule pending the
resolution of the motion for summary action. The Clerk granted the motion to stay the
briefing schedule. Banks opposes the motion for summary action, moves for
reconsideration of the order granting the motion to stay the briefing schedule, and moves
to strike both motions.
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and we have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s
order under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) & 1291. We exercise the same standard of review as the
2
In their motion, they also ask us to affirm a separately appealed-from order in another
case brought by Banks. We do not presently consider that request.
6
District Court, subjecting the Bankruptcy Court’s legal determinations to plenary review
and reviewing its factual findings for clear error. See In re United Healthcare Sys., 396
F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2005).
We consider first the pending motions. More specifically, we must decide whether
the United States and the United States Attorney’s Office have standing to advance their
pending motion. Although the United States Attorney’s Office is nominally a party to
these related appeals, the appealed-from order does not affect its rights or the United
States’ rights. Accordingly, they lack standing to argue the merits of these appeals.
See Marshall v. Sun Petroleum Products Co., 622 F.2d 1176, 1188 (3d Cir. 1980)
(concluding that nominal parties on appeal have no standing to defend the merits of a
decision); In re St. Clair & Karen M. St. Clair, 251 B.R. 660, 670 & n.11 (D.N.J. 2000).
We therefore deny the motion for summary affirmance insofar as it relates to the appeals
listed above. We do not grant reconsideration of the order staying the briefing schedule,
however. Nor do we grant Banks’ motion to strike the Government’s motions.
Even though we deny the Government’s motion for summary affirmance, we will
summarily affirm because no substantial question is presented on appeal. See L.A.R.
27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. The Bankruptcy Court indeed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
the ten listed adversary actions.3 Two statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157, provide the
3
Although Banks took issue in the District Court with the Bankruptcy Court’s action
to dismiss his adversary actions sua sponte, as the District Court explained, the
Bankruptcy Court was obligated to evaluate its jurisdiction and dismiss the actions over
which it lacked jurisdiction.
7
source of a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. See Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 372
F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2004). Under these statutes, and relevant to our analysis here, a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over those cases “‘at least “related to” the bankruptcy.’”
In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
Litigation is related to a bankruptcy if its outcome could “conceivably have any effect on
the estate being administrated in bankruptcy.” See Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984,
994 (3d Cir. 1984); see also In re Marcus Hook Dev. Park, Inc., 943 F.2d at 264 (stressing
the term “conceivably”). More specifically, an action is related to bankruptcy if its
outcome “could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either
positively or negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and
administration of the bankruptcy estate.” See Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994. The ten adversary
actions were unrelated to bankruptcy because, as Banks plainly alleges in all of his
complaints, the supposed wrongs occurred in 2002 or beyond. Accordingly, they are not
property of the bankruptcy estate such that their resolution would affect the handling or
administration of the estate. See In re Bobroff, 766 F.2d 797, 803 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing
11 U.S.C. § 541 for the proposition that “the only property interests of a debtor that
become part of the estate are those existing ‘as of the commencement of the case.’”)
In sum, because the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we will
affirm the order insomuch as it dismissed the ten listed adversary actions. As we noted
above, the motions of the United States, the United States Attorney’s Office, and Banks
are denied.
8