Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-20-2006
USA v. Wingfield
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3792
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"USA v. Wingfield" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 177.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 05-3792
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RONALD LENWOOD WINGFIELD,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 04-cr-00096
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 7, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 20, 2006)
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania sentenced Ronald
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Lenwood Wingfield to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a
firearm with an obliterated serial number. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Wingfield now appeals
his conviction and sentence. Specifically, Wingfield contends that (1) the District Court
improperly determined that the search of his rental car, which uncovered the firearm in
question, was consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (2) Congress exceeded its power
under the Commerce Clause when it passed 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (punishing felons in
possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers); and (3) the District Court erred in
increasing his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. We have jurisdiction to
hear Wingfield’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We conclude that Appellant’s
arguments lack merit and, accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
I.
The parties are familiar with the facts and proceedings in the District Court, so we
will only briefly revisit them here. Wingfield, on parole for a prior firearms charge,
reported to the offices of the Pennsylvania Parole Board for a required urine test on
February 10, 2004. Upon entering the office, Wingfield emptied his pockets and prepared
to step through the Parole Board’s metal detector. As Wingfield passed through the metal
detector, State Parole Agent Tom Wolfe witnessed a cell phone clip dislodge from
Appellant’s belt and tumble to the floor. Agent Wolfe immediately suspected that
Wingfield had committed a parole violation because individuals on supervised release are
generally barred from using cell phones, pagers and beepers. Wolfe reviewed Wingfield’s
records and confirmed that his parole agreement prohibited the use of a mobile phone.
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Wolfe then detained Wingfield and conducted a thorough investigation as to whether he
possessed a cell phone. Agent Wolfe searched Wingfield and discovered an Enterprise
Rent-a-Car key ring, which included the license plate number and description of a car.
Thinking that Wingfield may have stashed the phone outside, Agent Wolfe located the car
in the parking lot, searched the glove compartment and found a cell phone, a bag of
marijuana, and a semiautomatic handgun with an obliterated serial number.
In the District Court proceedings, Wingfield moved to suppress the gun. After his
motion was denied, Wingfield pleaded guilty, but preserved the right to appeal the denial
of his motion to suppress and to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Wingfield, however, waived his right to appeal his sentence.
II.
The first issue Wingfield raises on appeal is whether the District Court correctly
denied his motion to suppress. Specifically, Wingfield claims that his rights under the
Fourth Amendment were violated when Wolfe detained him and searched his rental car.
We examine the District Court’s findings of facts for clear error and review its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
Ruling case law has described the contours of a parolee’s expectation of privacy
while on supervised release:
The State has found the parolee guilty of a crime against the people. That
finding justifies imposing extensive restrictions on the individual’s liberty.
Release of the parolee before the end of his prison sentence is made with the
recognition that with many prisoners there is a risk that they will not be able
to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts.
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United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902, 909 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 483 (1972)). Put simply, this Court has decided that a parolee’s expectation of
privacy is less than an average citizen’s. Id. at 910. With this principle in mind we have
held that officers do not need probable cause to search an individual on supervision,
rather, we require “no more than reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Williams, 417
F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001)).
In deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, “courts must look at the totality of
circumstances of each case” and decide whether an officer had a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting a violation of the law. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002) (citations omitted).
Applying this test to the facts at hand, we are satisfied that the District Court did
not err in upholding the validity of the search. Agent Wolfe did not act on “hunch” alone.
He observed that Wingfield wore an empty cell phone clip on his belt, and verified that
Wingfield’s parole prohibited him from carrying a portable phone. Based on these facts
we find that Agent Wolfe reasonably suspected that Wingfield possessed a cell phone in
violation of his parole. Accordingly, the resulting detention and search met constitutional
requirements. See Hill, 967 F.3d at 909 (holding that it is reasonable to allow a parole
officer to conduct a search whenever he reasonably believes that is necessary to perform
his duties, as long as the search is based on specific facts). Put another way, we find it
reasonable to suspect that a cowboy wearing a holster might have a gun up his sleeve.
III.
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Wingfield also asks us to hold 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon in possession of a
firearm) unconstitutional. According to Appellant, Congress exceeded its power under the
Commerce Clause when it decided to punish felons in possession of firearms. The
difficulty with this point of view is that it completely ignores our holding in United States
v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g) under the Commerce Clause). At this time, we have no authority or inclination to
disturb the precedent established in Singletary. See Internal Operating Procedures of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit § 9.1 (2002) (stating that only an en
banc panel should overrule the holding in a published opinion).
IV.
We next turn to Wingfield’s claim that the District Court erred in sentencing him
as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Armed Career Criminal Act
[“the Act”] often enhances the statutory minimum sentence for defendants who are
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and have three prior convictions for violent felonies
or serious drug offenses. Wingfield cites Apprendi v. New Jersey for the proposition that
any fact which increases a penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He then argues that under the teachings
of Apprendi the District Court could not increase his sentence under the Act because his
previous convictions were not submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even if we set aside Wingfield’s agreement not to appeal his sentence, this claim has no
merit and misstates the law.
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In Almendarez-Torres v. United States the Supreme Court determined that the fact
of prior convictions need not be alleged in the indictment or proved beyond a reasonable
doubt to form the basis for a sentence enhancement. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). Despite
Appellant’s best attempts to muddy the waters, in Apprendi the Supreme Court
specifically declined to overrule Almendarez-Torres, and the case remains good law. See
530 U.S. at 489-490. See also United States v. Ordaz, 398 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2005)
(holding that Almendarez-Torres rejected the argument that the fact of a prior conviction
must be found by a jury). Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the District
Court.
***
We have considered all contentions presented by the parties and conclude that no
further discussion is necessary.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
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