Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-17-2006
USA v. Ransom
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 04-4009
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"USA v. Ransom" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 184.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 04-4009
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY WAYNE RANSOM,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 04-cr-00215
(Honorable R. Barclay Surrick)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2006
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 17, 2006 )
OPINION OF THE COURT
SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Defendant Anthony Ransom appeals his criminal sentence. Because we find
Ransom waived his right to appeal, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
affirm the judgment of sentence.
I.
On April 22, 2004, Ransom pled guilty to an Information charging him with one
count of bank robbery. In his guilty plea, Ransom “voluntarily and expressly waive[d] all
rights to appeal or collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter
relating to [his] prosecution.” The guilty plea contained three exceptions to Ransom’s
waiver of appellate rights. Ransom could appeal if the government appealed his sentence.
Alternatively, Ransom could appeal if his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or if
the district court erroneously departed upward from the applicable sentencing guideline
range. The District Court sentenced Ransom to ninety-two months’ imprisonment, at the
bottom of the calculated guideline range.
Ransom filed an appeal contending he is entitled to resentencing under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), because the District Court treated the sentencing
guidelines as mandatory. While conceding that Ransom would normally be entitled to a
new sentencing hearing, the government argued Ransom waived his right to appeal.
II.
“[W]aivers of appeals, if entered into knowingly and voluntarily, are valid.”
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). Ransom does not argue his
waiver of appellate rights was invalid. Indeed, he knowingly and voluntarily entered into
his plea agreement. The District Court confirmed Ransom knowingly and voluntarily
entered into his plea agreement by asking Ransom at his guilty plea hearing whether he
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understood he was limiting his appellate rights significantly. Ransom responded
affirmatively.
An error by a court amounting to a “miscarriage of justice may invalidate the
waiver.” Id. But, in United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 213 (3d Cir. 2005), we found
“[t]he waiver of an appeal will not be invalidated merely because unanticipated events
occur in the future.” Indeed, in Lockett we declined to vacate a sentence where the
defendant did not know at the time he pled guilty that the sentencing guidelines would
later be found to be advisory in Booker. Id. Like the defendant in Lockett, Ransom pled
guilty before the Supreme Court held the sentencing guidelines advisory. Accordingly,
Ransom's waiver does not amount to a miscarriage of justice.
III.
We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the judgment of
sentence.
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