Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
9-20-2006
USA v. Dean
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4648
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 05-4648
_________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
MICHAEL DEAN,
Appellant
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. Crim. No. 04-106)
District Judge: Honorable Kent A. Jordan
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 15, 2006
___________
Before: SLOVITER, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: September 20, 2006)
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_________
OPINION
_________
Garth, Circuit Judge:
Michael Dean appeals his sentence as unreasonable. We have jurisdiction pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (authorizing the appeal of sentences “imposed in violation of
law”). See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 327-28 (3d Cir. 2006).1 For the reasons
stated below, we will affirm.
I
On April 22, 2005, Dean pleaded guilty to the two indicted offenses of distribution
of more than five grams of cocaine base (crack cocaine). App. 6, 8-9; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
A United States Probation Officer subsequently prepared a Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”). The PSR discussed both Dean’s personal background, including a history of drug
and alcohol abuse and the fact that his IQ indicated he “functions in the borderline range of
intelligence,” see PSR ¶¶ 71-73, 78, as well as his extensive criminal record, comprised
mostly of narcotics convictions, see PSR ¶¶ 24-57, and recommended a sentence pursuant
to the sentencing guidelines. PSR ¶ 96. According to the PSR, Dean was subject to a base
offense level of 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. PSR ¶ 13. After a three-point adjustment for
1
The government’s argument that we lack jurisdiction to review a sentence for
unreasonableness is foreclosed by our opinion in Cooper.
2
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Dean’s adjusted offense level was
29. PSR ¶¶ 19-20. However, because he qualified as a Career Offender under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1 due to prior drug trafficking convictions, his offense level ultimately rose to 31. PSR
¶¶ 21-23. With a Criminal History Category of VI, the PSR calculated the guideline range
to be 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. PSR ¶ 86.
Dean offered several arguments to the District Court in favor of a sentence shorter
than that recommended in the PSR. First, he submitted a sentencing letter and the report and
testimony of Dr. Allen Tepper, a psychologist, chronicling in more detail the disadvantages
Dean faced in his childhood and adolescence, including a teenaged mother, no contact with
his father, an early addiction to drugs and alcohol, and illiteracy resulting from learning
disabilities, limited education, and borderline mentally retarded intelligence. Letter 1-3;
Report 7-8; App. 12-30. Dean emphasized that his criminal history was almost entirely non-
violent and was in large part due to a longstanding drug addiction for which the criminal
justice system had not provided treatment in any of his previous periods of incarceration.
Letter 9.
Second, Dean maintained that the “100-to-one ratio” for offenses involving powder
cocaine versus crack cocaine produced unwarranted sentencing disparities, as repeatedly
noted by the Sentencing Commission.2 Letter 5-9.
2
The “100-to-one ratio” is shorthand for the fact that one hundred times more powder
cocaine than crack cocaine is required for an equivalent mandatory minimum sentence. See 21
U.S.C. § 841.
3
Third, Dean argued that his sentence should not be calculated using the Career
Offender provisions, because (i) several years had passed between the convictions qualifying
him for Career Offender treatment and the present conviction, App. 37; (ii) the purity of the
drugs involved here was relatively low, App. 36; and (iii) Dean was, he contended, not a “big
drug dealer,” App. 36. Finally, Dean asserted that the fact that he was over forty years old
merited leniency. App. 48.
At a sentencing hearing on October 3, 2005, the District Court judge sentenced Dean
to 188 months’ incarceration. App. 53.
II
This Court’s inquiry into the reasonableness of a criminal sentence proceeds in two
parts. See United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-32 (3d Cir. 2006). First, we ask
whether the sentencing court gave “meaningful consideration” to the factors enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 329 (citation omitted). While it is not necessary for the sentencing
court to “make findings as to each of the § 3553 factors if the record makes clear the court
took the factors into account in sentencing,” a mere “rote statement” of the sentencing factors
is insufficient in the event that a party has presented the court with a “‘ground of recognized
legal merit (provided it has a factual basis).’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 429
F.3d 673, 679 (2005)).
The second step of our inquiry is to ask whether the sentencing court, having
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considered the relevant factors, reasonably applied them to the circumstances of the case. Id.
at 330. A great deal of deference to the sentencing court is appropriate here. See id. (“‘[T]he
question is not how we ourselves would have resolved the factors identified as relevant by
section 3553(a) . . . Rather, what we must decide is whether the district judge imposed the
sentence he or she did for reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in
section 3553(a).’”) (quoting United States v. Williams, 425 F.3d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 2005)).
It is the party challenging the sentence that bears the burden of showing unreasonableness.
Id. at 332.
The record here reveals that the District Court did give “meaningful consideration”
to the § 3553(a) factors. First, as required by § 3553(a)(4), it calculated the sentencing range
established by the guidelines. App. 43 (stating that the guidelines range is 188 to 235 months’
incarceration). The District Court then acknowledged that it was not obligated to impose a
sentence within that range. App. 43-44 (“I’m sure based on what you have told me already
that you will argue for 188 months or fewer. And I’m prepared to hear whatever you want
to say on that front.”).
The District Court proceeded to consider and then formally reject Dean’s arguments
concerning the sentencing disparity for powder and crack cocaine offenses and the
application of the Career Offender provisions, reasoning that because of Dean’s lengthy
“record of repeated offenses,” it was appropriate in this case to defer to the policy judgments
made by Congress as reflected in the Career Offender sentencing range. App. 43. The District
Court continued to tailor the sentence to this particular defendant by sentencing him to the
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shortest sentence within the guidelines range, because of Dean’s “redeeming qualities” and
troubled background, and Dr. Tepper’s testimony that Dean functions best “within the
institutional setting.” App. 50-51. The District Court further noted that he would recommend
that the Bureau of Prisons make educational and vocational programs available to Dean,
giving him the opportunity to lead a “meaningful and productive” life upon his release from
prison. App. 51.
Having concluded that the District Court did exercise its discretion here, we further
find that it exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner, that is, that the sentence was
imposed “‘for reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section
3553(a).’” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 330 (quoting Williams, 425 F.3d at 481).
III
For the above reasons, we will affirm the sentence.
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