UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 01-11305
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
OSCAR LUTHER RAGER and
MONICA TICER PETERS,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
Lower Docket No. 3:01-CR-7-1-L
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February 13, 2003
Before JONES, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Oscar Luther Rager and Monica Ticer Peters appeal their
convictions of conspiracy to commit tax evasion and tax evasion in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. After carefully
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
considering the appellants’ position in light of the briefs and
pertinent portions of the record, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
We first reject Rager’s challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence presented at trial. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find Rager
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to commit tax
evasion and tax evasion. See United States v. Menesses, 962 F.2d
420, 426 (5th Cir. 1992).
We similarly reject the appellants’ argument that the
district court abused its discretion in instructing the jury on the
necessary intent to commit tax evasion. “A district court has
broad discretion in framing the instructions to the jury and this
Court will not reverse unless the instructions taken as a whole do
not correctly reflect the issues and law.” United States v.
McKinney, 53 F.3d 664, 676 (5th Cir. 1995). Although the district
court did not employ the exact language desired by the appellants,
the jury instruction on willfulness adequately reflected the law
and issues in this case.
The appellants next argue that the district court erred
in admitting certain evidence concerning the appellants’ lifestyle
and personal use of business assets. This court “affirm[s]
evidentiary rulings unless the district court abused its discretion
and a substantial right of the complaining party was affected.”
United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 748 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Contrary to the appellants’ contentions, the evidence complained of
was relevant, and the district court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting it. Furthermore, any error would have been harmless
because other overwhelming evidence established the appellants’
guilt.
Peters argues that the district court erred in excluding
the testimony of a witness regarding her own issues with the
Internal Revenue Service. Based on information elicited during a
voir dire examination of the witness, however, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony.
Peters also argues that the district court erred in
failing to reduce her total offense level for a mitigating role
pursuant to sentencing guideline § 3B1.2. “This Court reviews the
district court’s interpretation or application of the sentencing
guidelines de novo and its factual findings . . . for clear error.”
United States v. Huerta, 182 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1999). Because
the evidence at trial established that Peters played a substantial
role in the tax evasion and conspiracy to commit tax evasion, the
district court did not err in denying Peters a decrease in offense
level as a minimal participant.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
3