Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-20-2007
Wells v. King
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-2860
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"Wells v. King" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 1237.
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BLD-85 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-2860
RODNEY WELLS,
Appellant
v.
ROGER KING, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OFFICE PHILA. COUNTY; PHILA POLICE DEPARTMENT;
LAWRENCE GERRARD, BADGE #9189; LYNNE ABRAHAM DISTRICT
ATTORNEY; SYLVESTER JOHNSON, POLICE COMMISSIONER
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 06-cv-01710)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
December 29, 2006
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: April 20, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Rodney Wells appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights
complaint as frivolous. For the following reasons, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
In 1986 Rodney Wells was prosecuted on charges of murder, corrupt
organizations, conspiracy, aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument of a crime.
Wells was convicted and is serving a life sentence. In February 2004 Wells filed the
present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(2)-(3), § 1986, and numerous amendments
to the federal constitution against the Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted him, the
District Attorney, the Philadelphia Police Department, the Police Commissioner, and an
individual police detective. Although Wells’ allegations are less than precise, review of
the complaint along with the attached exhibits makes clear that Wells is challenging the
events leading up to (and including) his conviction. Among his allegations, Wells claims
that the Assistant District Attorney’s “disdain . . . for young black men caused him to
Discriminate against plaintiff and falsely arrest and charge him [with] a Bogus Charge,”
and that “the defendants Falsely Arrested, Falsely Imprisoned plaintiff and Maliciously
Abused the process of the Judicial System.” Complaint at 4, 9. In the attached exhibits,
Wells contends that he did not receive a fair trial, and that the Assistant District Attorney
“maliciously had me arrested, charge[d], [and] found guilty by a jury.” Complaint at
Exhibit B. In its May 17, 2006, order, the District Court concluded that Wells’ claims
were barred by prosecutorial immunity or not yet cognizable under Heck v. Humphrey,
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512 U.S. 477 (1994), and dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Wells now appeals.1
Because civil tort actions are not the proper vehicle to challenge a criminal
conviction, a prisoner cannot bring a constitutional tort suit which would challenge the
validity of his conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has first been
invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. However, Heck only bars claims which
“seek[] to recover damages for an unconstitutional conviction, imprisonment, or other
harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the conviction or sentence
unlawful.” Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 173 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 1079.
Though Wells cites a laundry list of constitutional rights, the majority of Wells’
claims clearly pertain to – and challenge – his conviction, and accordingly, may not be
raised at this point. Significantly, Wells’ complaint also includes accusations that he was
falsely/unlawfully arrested, and that he was falsely imprisoned. Because the success of
such claims may not necessarily invalidate a conviction, the claims are not necessarily
subject to the Heck bar. Compare Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1998) (“claims for false arrest and false imprisonment are not the type of claims
contemplated by the Court in Heck which necessarily implicate the validity of a
1
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).
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conviction or sentence.”), with Gibson v. Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 451-52 (3d Cir.
2005) (finding Heck rule applies because only evidence supporting conviction was found
pursuant to constitutional violation that was subject of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim).
However, review of the complaint reveals that the actual claim underlying these bare
assertions is the challenge to his conviction: that every aspect of Wells’ prosecution and
conviction – including his arrest and imprisonment – were unlawful precisely because the
Assistant District Attorney was biased against him, and maliciously prosecuted him.2
Even if any of Wells’ claims survive the Heck bar, they are meritless. The basis
for Wells’ allegations is that the corrupt organization charge was not “recommended by
Philadelphia County Investigating Grand Jury,” and that the defendants “forged” it.
Complaint at 1, 7. To the extent that the claim is directed against the Assistant District
Attorney, prosecutorial immunity applies. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431
(1976) (prosecutor absolutely immune for initiating a prosecution and for presenting the
State’s case) see also Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 490 n.6 (noting that “there is
widespread agreement among the Courts of Appeals that prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability under § 1983 for their conduct before grand juries”). To the extent
that the claim alleges that the police detective who filled out the warrant charging Wells
2
Ideally, the District Court would have made an explicit determination with regard to
each claim whether it – if successful – would imply the invalidity of the conviction or
sentence. See Gibson v. Superintendent, 411 F.3d 427, 447-49 (3d Cir. 2005). However,
as the imprecise and sweeping nature of Wells’ claims would have made such an inquiry
difficult, we cannot fault the District Court for not doing so.
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lied, such a claim is best understood as a challenge to the detective’s determination that
probable cause existed for the charge. Wells has the burden of showing that the detective
“knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false
statements or omissions . . . that create a falsehood in applying for an arrest warrant.”
See Merkle v. Upper Dublin School District, 211 F.3d 782, 789 (3d Cir. 2000). Wells’
complaint falls well short, providing only bare conclusory allegations regarding the
“forged” warrant charge. The District Court need not accept such clearly baseless facts or
fanciful allegations. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).
We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, the appeal is without legal merit and we will dismiss it pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).
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