FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 29 2009
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 09-35250
COMMISSION,
D.C. No. 6:09-cv-06056-HO
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. MEMORANDUM *
ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY; et al.,
Appellants,
v.
TENANTS IN COMMON COMMITTEE;
et al.,
Intervenors - Appellees,
v.
SUNWEST MANAGEMENT, INC.; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
CAPMARK FINANCE, INC.; et al.,
Movants - Appellees,
__________________________
MICHAEL GRASSMUECK
Receiver - Appellee.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE No. 09-35859
COMMISSION,
D.C. No. 6:09-cv-06056-HO
Plaintiff - Appellee,
PLAINSCAPITAL BANK,
Intervenor - Appellant,
and
ING USA ANNUITY AND LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY; et al.,
Intervenors,
v.
SUNWEST MANAGEMENT, INC.; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees,
__________________________
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MICHAEL GRASSMUECK
Receiver - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon
Michael R. Hogan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 2, 2009
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, THOMAS, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
A group of secured creditors, not parties in the proceedings below
(“Appellants”), appeal 1) the district court’s denial of their motion for recusal and
2) the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction barring all legal claims
against a number of corporate entities associated with Jon Harder and Sunwest
Management. We also have before us three motions dealing with the record in this
case: 1) Appellants’ motion to strike, 2) Appellants’ motion to supplement
appellate record, and 3) Appellee Michael Grassmueck’s request for judicial
notice. Because the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of
this case, we do not recite them here.
I. Appellants’ Motion for Recusal
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motion
for recusal. Recusal motions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Preston v.
United States, 923 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “An abuse of
discretion is a plain error, discretion exercised to an end not justified by the
evidence, a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are
found.” Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, we cannot reverse the district court “unless we
have a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing the relevant factors.” SEC v.
Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2001).
Recusal is appropriate when a judge has “a personal bias or prejudice”
against a party, 28 U.S.C. §144, the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or the judge has “personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts,” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). Appellants only speculate that, because
Judge Hogan was also involved as a mediator in a related bankruptcy proceeding,
he cannot act impartially in this matter. There is no authority for the proposition
that judges must recuse themselves if they served as mediators in a related
proceeding.
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In reaching this result, we assume—without finding—that Appellants had
standing to bring this motion below and that this panel has pendant jurisdiction to
rule on this motion as part of this interlocutory appeal of the preliminary
injunction.
II. The Preliminary Injunction
District courts have authority to issue injunctions such as this one. We have
previously upheld the appointment of a receiver in a securities fraud case brought
by the SEC. See SEC v. Wenke, 622 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1980). We have
also upheld the authority of the district court to bar all actions against receivership
entities (including actions brought by non-parties). See id. at 1369; accord SEC v.
Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003). This authority stems from the district
court’s broad in rem jurisdiction over receivership assets. Wencke, 622 F.2d at
1369, 1370 n.11. Finally, district courts may stay foreclosure proceedings in an
SEC enforcement action, SEC v. Universal Fin., 760 F.2d 1034, 1037–39 (9th Cir.
1985), enjoin bankruptcy proceedings, SEC v. Lincoln Thrift Ass’n, 577 F.2d 600
(9th Cir. 1978), and sell receivership assets outside of bankruptcy proceedings, See
SEC v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007).
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However, Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
district court to “state the findings and conclusions that support its action” when
granting or denying a preliminary injunction.
The district court abused its discretion in granting the preliminary
injunction, because it entered the preliminary injunction without findings and
conclusions that support its action. On its face, the preliminary injunction only
states that there is “good cause” to issue the injunction. Further, the record
contains no other findings to support the grant of the injunction. Thus, on this
record, there is no basis for us to determine that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by applying an incorrect legal standard or basing its ruling on clearly
erroneous findings of fact. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,
559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
We therefore remand to the district court to make adequate findings.
However, the injunction will remain in force for sixty days in order to allow the
district court to make these findings and enter a new order granting or denying the
motion for a preliminary injunction.
III. Pending Motions
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Finally, we deny Appellants’ motion to strike and grant both Appellants’
motion to supplement and Appellee Michael Grassmueck’s request for judicial
notice.
Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
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