Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-11-2007
Brooks-McCollum v. State of Delaware
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4219
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 05-4219
__________
CATHY D. BROOKS-MCCOLLUM,
Appellant
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE;
DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT;
VICE CHANCELLOR DONALD PARSONS,
Chancery Court
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01419)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
__________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 15, 2006
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and McKAY, * Circuit Judges.
(Filed: January 11, 2007)
__________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________
*
The Honorable Monroe G. McKay, United States Circuit Judge for the
Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
In proceedings before Vice Chancellor Donald Parsons in the Delaware
Court of Chancery, Appellant pursued claims against present and former members
of the board of directors of Emerald Ridge Service Corporation. In that forum,
she filed a Motion to Compel Indemnification, which the court of chancery
interpreted as a motion for advancement and for a declaration that she was
entitled to indemnification. The court of chancery denied her motion as to
advancement, and dismissed without prejudice her request for a ruling on
indemnification “on the grounds that it is premature and seeks an impermissible
advisory opinion.” Brooks-McCollum v. Emerald Ridge Serv. Corp., No. Civ. A
147-N, 2004 WL 1752852, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 29, 2004). The Delaware
Supreme Court rejected her attempted interlocutory appeal for failure to satisfy
procedural and substantive requirements, Brooks-McCollum v. Shareef, 871 A.2d
1127 (table), 2004 WL 2239713 (Del. Sept. 30, 2004). Appellant subsequently
filed the instant action in the United States District Court for the District of
Delaware.
In her lengthy district court complaint, Appellant primarily reiterated her
grievances against the defendants in the chancery court litigation and her claim
that she is entitled to indemnification. To the extent that she made claims against
Appellees, she alleged that the chancery court “erred in its opinion” and that the
opinion “clearly [went] against all State Laws, and US and Federal Laws.”
2
(Compl. at 26.) Appellant made similar allegations throughout her complaint.
(Compl. at 9-10, 13-14, 16-18, 21, 25.) As relief, she requested that the district
court order the indemnification she seeks in the chancery court, “not allow the
Chancery Court and State of Delaware attempt to have [the chancery court] case
dismissed,” and otherwise grant her declaratory and injunctive relief. (Am.
Compl. at 32.)
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Vice Chancellor
Parsons and the court are immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial
immunity; that Appellees are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; that Appellant’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the
Anti-Injunction Act, and the Younger abstention doctrine; that Appellees are
immune under the Eleventh Amendment; and that Appellant failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion, basing
its decision on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and this appeal followed. We
exercise plenary review, see Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169,
176 (3d Cir. 2000), and affirm on alternative bases supported by the record, see
Erie Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (3d Cir. 1988).
To the extent that Appellant directed her allegations against the chancery
court and the State of Delaware, she did not assert actionable claims because the
chancery court and the State have sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment
of the United States Constitution protects an unconsenting state or state agency
3
from a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens, regardless of the
relief sought. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The State has not waived its
immunity from suit in federal court, see Space Age Products, Inc. v. Gilliam, 488
F. Supp. 775, 780 (D. Del. 1980), and although Congress can abrogate a state’s
sovereign immunity, it did not do so through the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
under which Appellant ostensibly proceeds, 1 see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
345 (1979).
Any claims for monetary damages against Vice Chancellor Parsons are
barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. Vice Chancellor Parsons, presiding
over a dispute properly brought in chancery court, retains judicial immunity even
if “the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). Therefore, he cannot
be held liable for damages for any of the alleged errors. See id. at 359-60.
To the extent that Appellant seeks injunctive or declaratory relief from
Vice Chancellor Parsons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
on the alternative ground of Younger abstention. 2 In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
1
She meets another obstacle through this avenue, as neither the State of
Delaware nor its chancery court may be considered “persons” under the statute.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989).
2
While the district court dismissed the entire complaint based on lack of
(continued...)
4
37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
federal courts must abstain from interfering with pending state criminal
prosecutions. The Court based its decision on “the longstanding public policy
against federal court interference with state court proceedings.” Id. at 43. While
the Younger case involved a state criminal prosecution, “the national policy
against enjoining pending state court proceedings has since been extended to
noncriminal judicial proceedings.” Zahl v. Harper, 282 F.3d 204, 208 (3d Cir.
2002).
Abstention is appropriate under Younger where “(1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate
important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate
opportunity to raise the federal claims.” 3 Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d
2
(...continued)
subject matter jurisdiction, Younger abstention “represents the sort of ‘threshold
question’ we have recognized may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.”
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (2005). Thus, because we hold that Younger
abstention applies, we do not need to consider whether the district court had
subject matter jurisdiction over these claims.
3
An exception to Younger exists where “(1) the state proceedings are being
undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment or (2) some other
extraordinary circumstances exist, such as proceedings pursuant to a flagrantly
unconstitutional statute, such that deference to the state proceeding will present a
significant immediate potential for irreparable harm to the federal interests
asserted.” Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). Since Appellant
herself brought the state proceedings and she does not claim that any of the
statutes invoked in the state court proceedings are unconstitutional, neither of the
(continued...)
5
Cir. 1989). The first prong is clearly satisfied in this case, as the chancery court
proceeding is judicial in nature and is still pending. The third prong is also
satisfied, as state appellate review is available to determine whether the chancery
court ruling indeed violated Appellant’s federal constitutional and civil rights. 4
The second prong of the test asks whether the state proceedings implicate
important state interests. In considering this prong of the test, we held in Schall
that where the other elements of the test are met, neither injunctive nor
declaratory relief will be available “in cases in which the federal relief would
render the state court’s orders or judgments nugatory.” 885 F.2d at 108. So far
as we can tell from reading Appellant’s rambling pleadings, she is essentially
requesting that the district court require Vice Chancellor Parsons to change his
ruling. Any relief that could be granted by the district court would directly
impact Delaware’s interest in protecting the authority of its judicial system, as the
relief would necessarily be predicated on a determination that Vice Chancellor
Parsons’s ruling was wrongly decided. Were the district court to make this
determination, it would in essence be “substitut[ing] itself for the State’s
3
(...continued)
exceptions apply here.
4
Although Appellant’s attempted interlocutory appeal was refused for
procedural and substantive defects, Appellant will have the opportunity to appeal
the chancery court’s ruling to the Delaware Supreme Court once a final judgment
has been rendered.
6
appellate courts,” Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 609 (1975), which would
“result[] in duplicative legal proceedings” and could “readily be interpreted ‘as
reflecting negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional
principles,’” id. at 604 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974)).
Thus, the state proceeding implicates the important state interest of
preserving the authority of the state’s judicial system. 5 Because all elements of
the three-prong test for Younger abstention are met, we hold that the district court
properly dismissed any claims for injunctive or declaratory relief against Vice
Chancellor Parsons.
In conclusion, all of Appellant’s claims either are barred or should be
dismissed under the Younger abstention doctrine. Therefore, we will affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint.
5
Other important state interests may be implicated as well. For instance,
Vice Chancellor Parsons’s ruling dealt with state corporate law issues, which may
very well constitute an “important state interest” under the three-prong test. See
Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 396 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Corporate law
. . . often reveals state interests important in Younger analysis.”); see also O’Neill
v. Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 792 (3d Cir. 1994) (collecting cases; holding that
the regulation of on-street parking is an “important state interest” for purposes of
Younger abstention).
7