FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 05 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN ERICKSON; et al., No. 08-35962
Plaintiffs - Appellants, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00683-MJP
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CITY OF AUBURN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 15, 2009 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
John Erickson and Shelley A. Erickson appeal pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging various claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
EN/Research
against the City of Auburn in connection with their attempts to develop a parcel of
real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Hernandez v. Spacelabs Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003), and we
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City
because the claims against the City are time-barred. See Wash. Rev. Code
§ 4.16.080(2) (2006) (statute of limitations governing personal injury actions is
three years); Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara, 344 F.3d
822, 828 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The applicable statute of limitations for actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions.”); Mont. Pole & Treating Plant v. I.F. Laucks and Co., 993 F.2d
676, 678 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he critical determination of when an action accrues is
knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of action.”).
Appellants’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
The City’s February 9, 2009 Motion to Strike is granted.
AFFIRMED.
EN/Research 2 08-35962