FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JAN 11 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LAWTIS DONALD RHODEN, No. 09-15420
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08-CV-00100-LJO-
DLB
v.
STEPHEN W. MAYBERG, Director of MEMORANDUM *
the California Department of Mental
Health; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence J. O’Neill, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 15, 2009 **
Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
LSS/Research
Lawtis Donald Rhoden appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the defendants have
impermissibly detained him pending proceedings to determine whether he should
be civilly committed under California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.
1998) (order). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Rhoden’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief so as not to interfere with ongoing state proceedings. See
Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). These state
civil commitment proceedings are judicial in nature, implicate important state
interests, and afford Rhoden an adequate opportunity to litigate his federal claims.
See id. (outlining circumstances under which abstention under Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971), is appropriate).
However, Rhoden’s claims for money damages should have been stayed
until the state court proceedings are completed. See id. at 981 (“[W]hen damages
are sought and Younger principles apply, it makes sense for the federal court to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction temporarily by staying its hand until such time
as the state proceeding is no longer pending.” (italics omitted)). Heck v.
LSS/Research 2 09-15420
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not require otherwise because Rhoden has
not been civilly committed. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393–94 (2007)
(recognizing that Heck applies only when there exists “a conviction or sentence
that has not been . . . invalidated,” and explaining that it is common practice for
district courts to stay civil actions while related criminal charges are pending)
(emphasis and alteration in original); see also Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d
1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to civil commitment under the SVPA).
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for entry of
an order staying Rhoden’s action for damages until the state proceedings are no
longer pending. We affirm the dismissal of Rhoden’s claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief.
Rhoden’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
Rhoden shall bear his own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
LSS/Research 3 09-15420