IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-20909
Summary Calendar
THEOTIS LEE HODGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COREY S. STEPLES; THOMAS MERCHANT;
MICHAEL MURRAY; PHONZO RAYFORD; W. SWINBURN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-02-CV-2418
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February 18, 2003
Before DAVIS, DUHÉ, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Theotis Lee Hodge, Texas state prisoner # 504582, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his pro se, in forma pauperis 42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights lawsuit for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The district court is required to dismiss a prisoner’s in
forma pauperis civil rights suit if it determines that the
1
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
prisoner’s complaint fails to state a claim. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Hodge’s arguments that the district court
erred focus on procedures employed in his disciplinary proceedings,
the evidentiary record, and the punishment resulting from the
finding that he was guilty of extortion. These arguments imply
that his disciplinary conviction is invalid and are not cognizable
in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action until the disciplinary conviction has
been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Clarke v.
Stalder, 154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Hodge also seeks equitable relief in the form of a declaratory
judgment that the extortion regulation upon which is conviction was
based is unconstitutional, and he seeks an injunction prohibiting
the defendants from enforcing the extortion regulation. This
argument also is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action until
the disciplinary conviction has been reversed, expunged, or
otherwise declared invalid. See Martinez v. Texas Ct. of Crim.
Appeals, 292 F.3d 417, 420 (2002) (state prisoners may not obtain
equitable relief under § 1983 when the federal habeas corpus
statute is the exclusive remedial mechanism for obtaining the
requested relief). Additionally, Hodge’s conclusional allegations
of future retaliation do not set forth a claim for relief pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th
Cir. 1999). Finally, Hodge does not argue that his confinement in
administrative segregation presents extraordinary circumstances.
Thus, Hodge has failed to set forth a claim for deprivation of a
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constitutionally cognizable liberty interest. See Martin v. Scott,
156 F.3d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1998).
Hodge also argues that the district court erred when it did
not convert his complaint to a habeas complaint. The district
court declined to redesignate or convert the case to a federal
habeas corpus application because the record did not indicate
whether Hodge was eligible for mandatory supervision and thus the
record did not indicate whether Hodge’s claims directly concerned
the duration of his confinement, as opposed to the conditions of
his confinement. Hodge now argues that he was eligible for
mandatory supervision. However, because Hodge failed to present
this argument to the district court it will not be considered by
this court. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir.
1993).
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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