FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 04 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL EDWARD HOFFMAN, No. 09-55019
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00489-BTM-
NLS
v.
IMPACT CONFECTIONS, INC., a MEMORANDUM *
Corlorado corporation; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M.SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Carl Edward Hoffman appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying
his Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from judgment against him in his trade secret
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
IL/RESEARCH
09-55019
misappropriation lawsuit. Hoffman contends that defendant’s summary judgment
motion went unopposed as a result of his attorney’s negligence and misconduct by
counsel for defendant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
for abuse of discretion, Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir.
2004), and we affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hoffman’s motion
because he did not demonstrate any viable ground for relief under Rule 60(b). See
id. at 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(1) motion that was
based on alleged attorney malpractice and explaining that Rule 60(b)(3) requires
“clear and convincing evidence that the [judgment] was obtained through fraud,
misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented
the losing party from fully and fairly presenting” its case); Latshaw v. Trainer
Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
mistakes resulting from attorney negligence “are more appropriately addressed
through malpractice claims” than under Rule 60(b)(1) and that Rule 60(b)(6) “is
used sparingly” and “only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party
from taking timely action”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Hoffman’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
IL/RESEARCH
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