FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAR 05 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EVA M. KEISER, Nos. 08-15423
08-16078
Plaintiff - Appellant,
D.C. No. 05-CV-02310-MJJ
v.
LAKE COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, MEMORANDUM *
employer and a government entity; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Martin J. Jenkins, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 16, 2010 **
Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Eva M. Keiser appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging wrongful termination of her employment with
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes these cases are suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
EN/Research
the Lake County Superior Court in violation of state and federal law. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s
dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim, Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish,
382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004), and grant of summary judgment, Davis v. Yageo
Corp., 481 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2007). We review for abuse of discretion the
district court’s dismissal for failure to prosecute. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d
1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Keiser’s intentional misrepresentation
claim because defendants enjoyed governmental immunity for exercising their
discretion regarding personnel decisions. See Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2 (“[A] public
employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act
or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether
or not such discretion be abused.”); Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2(b) (“[A] public entity
is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the
public entity where the employee is immune from liability.”)
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Keiser’s due
process claims because she failed to raise a triable issue as to whether she was
provided with adequate due process prior or subsequent to her termination. See
Cleveland Bd. of Ed. v. Louderville, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (pre-deprivation due
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process rights entitle certain public employees to notice and opportunity to be
heard); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 71650(d)(2) (provisions of Trial Court
Employment Protection and Governance Act do not apply to “confidential
employees”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the claims
against the remaining defendant for failure to prosecute in light of Keiser’s
unpreparedness to proceed at trial, the resulting prejudice to defendant, and the
court’s need to manage its docket. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61.
We do not review any determinations of the district court regarding which
Kaiser failed to develop argument on appeal. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d
139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992) (issues raised in pro se litigant’s brief but not supported
by argument are deemed waived).
Keiser’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
EN/Research 3 08-15423