NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAR 25 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
KEVIN L. WILLIAMS, No. 09-35532
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:08-cv-00133-CI
v.
MEMORANDUM *
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Washington
Cynthia Imbrogno, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 10, 2010
Seattle, Washington
Before: FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges, and SNOW, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable G. Murray Snow, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
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Kevin Williams appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the Commissioner in a challenge under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. “[W]e
review de novo the district court’s order upholding a decision of the Commissioner
denying benefits to an applicant. The Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed
by us if supported by substantial evidence, and if the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190,
1193 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). We affirm.
1. There is substantial evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge’s
(“ALJ”) determination that Williams was not credible, namely Williams’
inconsistent statements concerning his substance abuse and the effects of his
impairment. Williams denied using alcohol, tobacco, or drugs on his first
emergency room visit and again denied drug use or a DUI arrest to Dr. Arnold.
Williams later told a doctor that he drank “several beers a day” and admitted past
marijuana and cocaine use, as well as participation in substance abuse treatment as
a result of being charged with a DUI. It was not erroneous for the ALJ to view
these inconsistencies as undermining Williams’ overall credibility. See Robbins v.
Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[C]onflicting or inconsistent
testimony concerning alcohol use can contribute to an adverse credibility
finding.”); Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding an
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adverse credibility finding where a claimant made inconsistent statements to her
doctors about her alcohol and drug use).
The ALJ also properly relied on the fact that Williams left his last long-term
job to care for his daughter, not due to his impairments. Moreover, Williams had
suffered petit mal seizures daily that were “exactly like all his past seizures” for
several months before he stopped working, during which he could “usually
function.” This evidence undermined Williams’ claim that his impairments now
preclude him from sustaining full time work.
2. The ALJ properly rejected the opinion of Dr. Arnold based on “specific
and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence,” Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). Dr. Arnold’s assessment of
Williams’ functional capacity was contradicted by the opinions of Williams’ other
doctors. Three doctors found similar cognitive limitations, but only Dr. Arnold
believed Williams’ limitations precluded him from working.
The ALJ also rejected Dr. Arnold’s functional capacity assessment as
inconsistent with his own observations that Williams displayed “adequate
functioning with regard to short and long term memory,” “marginal to adequate
concentration abilities,” and “at least low average intellectual functioning.”
Likewise, the ALJ found Dr. Arnold’s assessment of numerous marked limitations
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inconsistent with Williams’ ability to engage in “all tasks of daily living, other than
driving,” as well as his ability “to work in the past with his memory problems,
which are long term.”
Finally, Dr. Arnold’s diagnosis of dysthymic and somatoform disorders was
undermined by Dr. McKnight’s affirmative finding of “no indication of depression,
anxiety, or panic,” other examining or treating physicians’ failure to diagnose, or
even suspect, psychological disorders, and the fact that Williams “is not currently
receiving treatment or using medication for psychological symptoms.”
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Williams’ argument that the
hypothetical posed to the vocational expert failed to include relevant functional
limitations. As the ALJ relied on specific, convincing reasons for rejecting Dr.
Arnold’s residual function assessment, the hypothetical correctly incorporated all
the limitations included in Williams’ residual functional capacity as determined by
the ALJ and supported by the medical record. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094,
1100 (9th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
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