FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION APR 09 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 08-30314
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:07-cr-00114-SEH-1
v.
MEMORANDUM *
JOHN FITZGERALD BIG LEGGINS, Jr.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Sam E. Haddon, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 5, 2010 **
Seattle, Washington
Before: GOODWIN, HAWKINS and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
John Big Leggins, Jr., appeals his 405-month sentence for aggravated sexual
abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2241(a)(1). Big Leggins argues
that the district court erred, first, in refusing to seal a psychosexual report
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
submitted by the defense for consideration at sentencing, and, second, by imposing
an unreasonable sentence. We review for abuse of discretion both the district
court’s decision whether to seal records, Kamakana v. City and County of
Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006), and its sentencing decisions,
United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). We affirm.
The district court did not err in refusing to seal the report. “In this circuit,
we start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). A party
seeking to overcome that presumption “must ‘articulate[] compelling reasons
supported by specific factual findings’ that outweigh the general history of access
and the public policies favoring disclosure[.]” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178-79
(quoting Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135). Big Leggins requested that the psychosexual
report be filed under seal because “[i]t contains confidential information
concerning the defendant and the victim.” The district court, noting the
presumption in favor of access, responded that Big Leggins could either withdraw
the report or resubmit it in redacted form with identifying information about the
victim removed. Given that “[t]he mere fact that the production of records may
lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation
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will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records,” Kamakana, 447 F.3d
at 1179, that decision was not an abuse of discretion.
Nor did the district court impose an unreasonable sentence. Big Leggins
argues that the sentence was unreasonable because he was only 18 years old at the
time of the assault and because most of his criminal history consists of juvenile
tribal charges. The court, however, imposed a sentence at the high end of the
applicable Guidelines range for several reasons: because Big Leggins picked up
and moved the victim and physically restrained her; because Big Leggins had a
history of violent criminal conduct and had been convicted of arson; because he
had denied accountability for the assault; and because he had made efforts “to try
to degrade further the victim” following the assault. Given the nature of the crime
and the other factors that the court properly considered, we cannot say that the
district court abused its discretion in imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. See
Carty, 520 F.3d at 994 (noting that, although there is no presumption to that effect,
a within-Guidelines sentence is usually reasonable).
AFFIRMED.
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