Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-5-2008
USA v. Reid
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3762
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008
Recommended Citation
"USA v. Reid" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 710.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/710
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-3762
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROHAN REID,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cr-00205)
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 2, 2008
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: August 5, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Rohan Reid violated the general conditions of his two-year term of
supervised release. The District Court sentenced Reid to 12 months’ incarceration for the
violations. Reid appeals from the judgment of sentence. For the reasons set forth below,
we will affirm.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On March 8, 2005, Reid was sentenced by the District Court to 27 months’
incarceration and two years’ supervised release for possession with intent to distribute
more than five grams of cocaine base. Reid’s term of supervised release commenced on
March 24, 2006. In November 2006, Reid was charged with two separate counts of
driving under the influence. On January 17, 2007, Reid was arrested for possession with
intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base. At a hearing on the
Government’s petition to revoke his supervised release, Reid admitted guilt to the above
violations. The District Court determined that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range
for the supervised release violations was 12 to 18 months’ incarceration. Following
revocation of supervised release, the District Court sentenced Reid to the advisory
Guidelines minimum of 12 months to be served consecutively to the 63-month sentence
he was then serving for a separate federal drug offense.
During the hearing, Reid’s counsel urged the District Court to apply his 12-month
sentence concurrently to his 63-month sentence. The District Court prompted Reid’s
2
counsel to explain the rationale for applying the sentence concurrently. Reid’s counsel
noted that Reid had participated in substance abuse programs at the detention center and
in filming a cable television video that encouraged young individuals to avoid gang
activity. Reid’s counsel next testified to a positive change in Reid’s demeanor and
character. Reid’s counsel also suggested that Reid may have intentionally violated the
terms of his supervised release in order to seek the safety of custody, after having been
the target of one or more violent attacks since his initial release.
The District Court then asked for the Government’s response. The Government
recommended a consecutive sentence, noting that Reid committed three violations within
one year of commencing supervised release and that the District Court had sentenced
Reid below the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range for his initial offense.
In explaining its decision, the District Court noted that it had given Reid a “break”
on his original sentence. The District Court found that Reid had demonstrated an inability
to adjust to supervised release, noting that he had gotten into trouble shortly after his
release and in a “major way” with respect to his drug violation. Thereafter the District
Court stated that it believed it “appropriate” to apply Reid’s sentence consecutively, while
acknowledging that Reid’s counsel’s comments were “very astute and very insightful.”
The District Court stated that “I don’t think I have any choice frankly but to sentence you
consecutively.” Elsewhere, the District Court explained that it applied Reid’s sentence
consecutively because he committed the same offense for which he was originally
3
incarcerated, stating that “[t]hat’s why I’m making it consecutive, that’s the reason, and I
think it’s the only thing that makes sense.” The District Court concluded that,
considering the Guidelines and “the factors contained in Title 18, U.S.C., Section
3553(a)[,] . . . this [is] an appropriate and reasonable sentence.” The District Court
concluded by sentencing Reid to the advisory Guidelines minimum of 12 months’
incarceration.
This timely appeal followed.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a). We review sentences imposed for violations of supervised release for
reasonableness under the statutory sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007). Our review of sentences is
“highly deferential,” and the challenging party bears the burden of proof in demonstrating
unreasonableness. Id. at 543.
III.
Reid appeals the District Court’s decision to apply his 12-month sentence for
violating the general terms of his supervised release consecutively, rather than
concurrently, to a sentence he is currently serving. In United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847
(3d Cir. 2006), we held that a district court had discretion to impose consecutive
sentences upon revocation of concurrent terms of supervised release based upon the same
4
violation conduct. Id. at 852. A fortiori, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), a district court
has the discretion to impose a sentence for a violation, which is consecutive to an
undischarged term of imprisonment for some entirely separate convicted offense. See
also U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f) (advising imposition of sentence for supervised release violation
to run consecutive to any sentence defendant is then serving).
Nonetheless, Reid challenges the reasonableness of his consecutive sentence on
three grounds. First, he argues that the District Court considered impermissible factors in
imposing its sentence. Specifically, he argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) prevents courts
that are imposing sentences for supervised release violations from considering factors set
forth in § 3553(a)(2)(A) (pertaining to the punitive purposes of sentencing) and
§ 3553(a)(3) (pertaining to the “kinds of sentences available”). Reid notes that the
District Court imposed a consecutive sentence after voicing its consideration of the
“sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” without the necessary qualification
purportedly required by § 3583(e)(3). Without deciding whether § 3583(e)(3) forbids
consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A), (3) as a matter of law, see Bungar, 478 F.3d at 543 n.2,
we find no indication in the record that the District Court considered an impermissible
factor in reaching its decision. While the District Court did not explicitly state which
§ 3553(a) factors it considered in contradistinction with which ones it did not, “[t]here are
no magic words that a district judge must invoke when sentencing, as long as the record
shows that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and any sentencing grounds
5
properly raised by the parties which have recognized legal merit and factual support in the
record.” United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Reid, therefore, reads too much into the District Court’s
reference to § 3553(a) as necessarily revealing that it considered any purportedly
forbidden factors.
Reid next argues that the District Court improperly imposed a consecutive
sentence under the mistaken belief that it was compelled to do so, citing a solitary
comment that “I don’t think I have any choice frankly but to sentence you consecutively.”
The record clearly indicates, however, that the District Court gave “meaningful
consideration” to the relevant § 3553(a) factors in reaching its conclusion. Bungar, 478
F.3d at 543. The District Court noted its leniency on Reid’s initial sentence, Reid’s
breach of trust, and the number and frequency of violations, considerations that would
have been superfluous had the District Court believed that it was compelled to impose a
consecutive sentence.
Finally, Reid argues that the District Court improperly applied a “reasonableness”
standard in determining the appropriate sentence, on the theory that reasonableness can
only be an appellate standard. This argument is unavailing. Never have we forbidden a
district court from characterizing its own sentence as reasonable under some (incorrect)
notion that appellate courts have a monopoly over using the word “reasonable.”
6
IV.
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
7