Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
8-4-2008
Harris v. Brody
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-3016
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"Harris v. Brody" (2008). 2008 Decisions. Paper 723.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3016
___________
ALAN HARRIS,
Appellant
v.
ELI BRODY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 07-CV-01146)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 28, 2008
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2008)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Alan Harris appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, which granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss Harris’
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We will affirm the District Court’s
order.
We need not repeat the details of the underlying dispute as they are well-known to
the parties and are summarized in the District Court’s memorandum. In short, Harris
submitted his mother’s will for probate, and Eli Brody, the defendant in the instant case,
filed a caveat. The parties reached a settlement at a case management conference on
October 6, 2004. A few months later, Harris filed a motion to vacate the judgment, but
the judgment was eventually upheld by the state courts. When Harris did not abide by the
judgment, he was removed as executor of the will and costs were assessed against him.
The New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and the New Jersey Supreme
Court denied Harris’ petition for certification. Harris’ motion for reconsideration and
clarification was denied. Harris then filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York. That court transferred the case to the federal
district court in New Jersey. The District Court determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine, and Harris appealed.2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary
review of the District Court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Turner v.
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine refers to principles set forth by the Supreme Court in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1993).
2
Harris also filed a motion for reconsideration in the District Court, which the District
Court denied on October 22, 2007. Harris did not file an amended appeal from that
decision, so it is not before us. Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
2
Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). We also
exercise plenary review over the dismissal of a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). See In re Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 2000).
In some circumstances, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district
court of jurisdiction to review a state court adjudication. Turner, 449 F.3d at 547. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Here, Harris’
complaint seeks to have the District Court declare the state court consent decree void or
“void as it applies to ‘Wein Malkin’, the $10,000 and furniture, and as well to the denial
of plaintiff’s right to represent the estate as executor, which is guaranteed by the will.”
The complaint further seeks to have the District Court order a new trial between the
parties, and to have the District Court enter judgment in his favor, “recovery of
misappropriated funds, costs, expenses, and any other relief the court deems just and
proper.”
Although Harris disputes the District Court’s conclusion that his claims are barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Harris clearly believes he is the “state-court loser,” and
he complains about putative injuries caused by a state court judgment. Thus, the District
Court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over these claims. See Holt v. Lake
3
County Bd. of Comm’rs, 408 F.3d 335, 336 (7th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s action barred by
Rooker-Feldman because “[plaintiff’s] injury was caused by the state court judgments . . .
[and] absent the state court’s judgment . . . [plaintiff] would not have the injury he now
seeks to redress”) (per curiam) (cited in Turner, 449 F.3d at 547).
Moreover, to the extent that review of any of Harris’ claims is not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, review is barred by res judicata because he is attempting to
relitigate issues previously determined by the New Jersey courts. Under New Jersey law,
res judicata requires the following elements: (1) the final judgment in the prior action
must be valid, final, and on the merits; (2) the parties in the later action must be identical
to or in privity with those in the prior action; and (3) the claim in the later action must
grow out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim in the earlier one. See
McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Comm’n of the State of N.J., 828 A.2d 840, 859
(N.J. 2003). There is no question that all three elements are present here; therefore, res
judicata precludes federal court review of any of the claims presented in this case.3
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
3
Harris’ brief complains about the manner in which defendant’s attorney filed the
motion to dismiss in the District Court, and suggests that her actions are sanctionable. It
does not appear that Harris moved for sanctions in the District Court, and in any event,
we do not find any sanctionable behavior. Harris seems to believe that the Motion to
Dismiss was a “fraud” and “time-barred.” However, even without a motion, the District
Court was required to determine its jurisdiction and was required to dismiss the complaint
if jurisdiction was lacking. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir.
2003) (subject-matter jurisdiction is non-waivable and court can raise sua sponte
subject-matter jurisdiction concerns).
4