FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RODNEY BERNARD BARNO, No. 09-55646
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-CV-01373-WMC
v.
MEMORANDUM *
STUART RYAN, Warden of Calipatria; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
William McCurine, Magistrate Judge, Presiding **
Submitted September 13, 2010 ***
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Rodney Bernard Barno, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deliberate indifference to his safety and due process violations arising out of his
alleged classification as a sex offender. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We review de novo, Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2001), and
we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Barno’s deliberate indifference claim
because Barno failed to allege that he suffered any injury or threat of harm other
than the allegedly erroneous classification itself, possible loss of a prison job, and
temporary restrictions on visitations with minors. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. 126, 136-37 (2003) (visitor restrictions on inmates charged with substance
abuse did not violate Eighth Amendment); Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973
(9th Cir. 2004) (there is no Fourteenth Amendment liberty or property interest in
prison employment); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982)
(“[M]isclassification does not itself inflict pain within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment.”).
The district court also properly dismissed Barno’s due process claim because
the alleged classification error did not result in any deprivations or changes in the
conditions of confinement that constituted an “atypical and significant hardship . . .
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” so as to give rise to a protected
liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995); Neal v. Shimoda, 131
2 09-55646
F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997) (inmate’s sex offender classification implicated a
liberty interest only because applicable regulations required that sex offenders
participate in a mandatory treatment program before being eligible for parole).
Barno’s request to vacate his expedited motion for an order requiring prison
officials to return legal documents is granted. In response to his voluminous letters
requesting a copy of the docket report confirming receipt of his reply brief, we note
that Barno’s reply brief was filed and considered.
Barno’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
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