FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 12 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES SKINNER, No. 09-16848
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:09-cv-01363-SMM
(LOA)
v.
ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF MEMORANDUM *
CORRECTIONS; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 13, 2010 **
Before: SILVERMAN, CALLAHAN, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
James Skinner, an Arizona state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district
court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process and
First Amendment violations related to the loss of his personal property. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Resnick v. Hayes, 213
F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2008). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed all of Skinner’s claims against the
Arizona Department of Corrections as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (neither state nor state agency
may be sued in federal court without its consent under the Eleventh Amendment).
The district court properly dismissed Skinner’s due process claims against
the remaining defendants because the random and unauthorized intentional
deprivation of personal property does not give rise to a due process claim where, as
here, a meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available under state law. See
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Moreover, the district court properly
concluded that Skinner’s dissatisfaction with the settlement amount that defendants
offered him as reimbursement for the loss of his books did not render the post-
deprivation remedy inadequate, especially since he could have filed a tort action in
Arizona state court. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-821 et. seq.
Though not expressly addressed in the district court’s order, Skinner’s First
Amendment claim was properly dismissed because the confiscation of his books
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was random and unauthorized, and not based on their content. See Thornburgh v.
Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 415-16 (1989) (inmates’ First Amendment claims for denial
of access to publications are reviewed for whether access was limited by content-
based regulations and their relationship to legitimate penological interests).
The district court properly dismissed the complaint without leave to amend
because the defects could not be cured by amendment. See McKesson HBOC v.
New York State Common Ret. Fund, Inc., 339 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED.
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