Opinions of the United
2008 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
1-10-2008
Smith v. DE Cty Ct
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-4262
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CLD-94 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 07-4262
BRUCE CHRISTOPHER SMITH,
Appellant
v.
DELAWARE COUNTY COURT;
DELAWARE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE;
DELAWARE COUNTY PROBATION & PAROLE OFFICE
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-02815)
District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due To a Jurisdictional Defect, and Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit
LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 4, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 10, 2008)
OPINION
PER CURIAM
On July 24, 2007, Bruce Smith, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against a
variety of defendants alleging denial of due process following his arrest and criminal
conviction; harassment by probation authorities following his conviction; and the
placement of false information on the NCIC system which has caused him problem with
legal authorities. The District Court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”). However, on September 7, 2007, it dismissed Smith’s complaint as legally
frivolous, finding that the limitations period on his claims had expired, and that absolute
immunity barred his claims against the defendant judges and prosecutors.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 Because Smith is
proceeding IFP, if the appeal lacks arguable merit in law or fact, we must dismiss it. 28
U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Civil rights claims are subject to the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions of the pertinent state. Thus, Pennsylvania’s two year statutory period applies to
Smith’s claims. See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 368 (3d Cir. 2000). The limitations
period begins when the plaintiff knows or had reason to know of the injury forming the
basis for the federal civil rights action. Gera v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 07-
361, 2007 WL 4248768, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2007).
Although we have not addressed the issue in a precedential decision, other
courts have held that although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district
court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint under §1915(e) where the defense is obvious
1
Smith filed his notice of appeal more than thirty days after the District Court
docketed its order. However, his appeal is nevertheless timely, because the District
Court’s order failed to comply with the separate-document rule under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(iii); see also, LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Comm. Ctr. Ass’n,
503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).
2
from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required. See Fogle v.
Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Erline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440
F.3d 648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006)(citation omitted)(finding that a district court’s screening
authority under §1915(e) “differentiates in forma pauperis suits from ordinary civil suits
and justifies an exception to the general rule that a statute of limitations defense should not
be raised and considered sua sponte.”).
We agree with the District Court that Smith’s complaint was untimely filed,
and that a limitations defense is evident from the face of his Amended Complaint. Smith
provides that he was denied due process in connection with his arrest and criminal
conviction before or during 1993. Moreover, he provides that he discovered the allegedly
false information on his NCIC report in 2001 when he was stopped for a traffic violation,
and when his employer conducted his background-check. In other words, Smith
expressly admits in his complaint that he learned of his injuries more than two years
before he filed this lawsuit on July 24, 2007.
Moreover, Smith had the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration
challenging the District Court’s dismissal of his complaint, but he did not. Accordingly,
his claims were properly dismissed as untimely.2 See, e.g., Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 54
(2d Cir. 1995).
Because we conclude that Smith’s appeal lacks an arguable basis in fact, or
in law, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. at 325, we dismiss it pursuant to §1915(e)(2)(B).
2
Thus, we do not need to reach the District Court’s alternative grounds for dismissal.
3