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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15520
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00176-WS-B
NICKOLAS JURICH,
JESSE GANN,
and others similarly situated,
CHARLES WOOD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
COMPASS MARINE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 13-15526
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00501-WS-B
WILBUR SMITH,
and others similarly situated,
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Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SEAPORT MARINE, INC.,
ODYSSEA MARINE, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(August 22, 2014)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This consolidated appeal arises out of a claim for wages brought under the
general maritime law by four seamen — Nickolas Jurich, Jesse Gann, Charles
Wood, and Wilbur Smith. The seamen asserted their claims against two maritime
employment agencies — Compass Marine, Inc., and Seaport Marine, Inc. — that
they retained to help them find jobs. Smith also asserted the same claim against
Odyssea Marine, Inc., a maritime transport company that hired him based on a
referral from Seaport Marine.
When the seamen retained the employment agencies’ services, they signed a
series of agreements assigning to the agencies the right to collect a portion of their
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first six to ten paychecks if they accepted a job as a result of the employment
agencies’ efforts. One of the documents they signed, a “Paycheck Mailing
Agreement,” provided that each seaman would have his employer send his
paychecks directly to the employment agency while his debt was still outstanding.
Under the agreement, the agency would take its agreed upon share of the wages
and forward the balance of the paycheck to the seaman. Once the debt had been
fully repaid, the employer would begin sending the seaman his paychecks directly.
The agreement also stated that it was “irrevocable” until the seaman’s debt had
been repaid.
Compass and Seaport Marine eventually found jobs for the four seamen, and
those two agencies collected a portion of their wages, following the procedure
agreed upon in the Paycheck Mailing Agreements. It is undisputed that the
agencies fully performed under the contracts and that they obtained their fees
through the assignment of the seamen’s wages made under the Paycheck Mailing
Agreements.
The four seamen eventually brought suit, asserting a claim for wages under
the general maritime law. In their complaints, they alleged that the wage
assignments they had signed were invalid under 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b), which
states that a seaman’s “assignment . . . of wages . . . made before the payment of
wages does not bind the party making it.” 46 U.S.C. § 11109(b); see also Wilder
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v. Inter-Island Steam Navigation Co., 211 U.S. 239, 247, 29 S.Ct. 58, 61 (1908)
(interpreting the predecessor statute to 46 U.S.C. § 11109). Based on that statutory
provision and the special protection that courts typically afford seamen under the
“wards of admiralty” doctrine, they claimed that they were entitled to a full refund
of the wages that had been collected under the Paycheck Mailing Agreements by
Compass and Seaport Marine. After discovery, the district court granted the
defendants summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claims, and the seamen now
appeal those decisions.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 1999).
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
After reviewing the record, reading the parties’ briefs, and hearing oral
argument, we affirm the judgment of the district court for the reasons set out in its
two well-reasoned and well-written orders, which were filed on November 4, 2013,
and November 7, 2013. See Smith v. Seaport Marine, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 2d 1188
(S.D. Ala. 2013); Jurich v. Compass Marine, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-00176-WS-B, 2013
WL 5960899 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 7, 2013). We adopt those orders as our opinion with
the same effect as if we had written them ourselves. In doing so, we emphasize
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that Compass’ and Seaport’s inclusion of the word “irrevocable” in the Paycheck
Mailing Agreements was improper and contrary to the plaintiffs’ clear statutory
right under § 11109(b), which provides that the seamen were not bound by those
agreements.
As a final point, we note that the district court’s summary judgment orders
addressed only the plaintiffs’ claims for wages that were brought under the general
maritime law and predicated on a violation of § 11109(b). The dismissal of any
other claims before those two summary judgment orders was not appealed to this
Court, and we express no opinion on the validity of those claims or of any claim
other than one for wages brought under the general maritime law and based on a
violation of § 11109(b). That means that if Compass and Seaport continue using
the word “irrevocable” in their Paycheck Mailing Agreements, they may do so at
their eventual peril.
AFFIRMED.
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