Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-16-2009
Roderick v. Comm Social Security
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 07-2667
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 07-2667
_______________
CHRISTY A. RODERICK
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
*Carol Roderick o/b/o Christy Roderick,
Appellant
*(Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.)
_______________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(Civil No. 06-cv-0517)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 19, 2008
Before: BARRY, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and COHILL,* District Judge.
(Filed: April 16, 2009)
__________________
*
The Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________
COHILL, Senior District Judge.
Christy Roderick appeals from a District Court order affirming the Commissioner
of Social Security’s denial of Child’s Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act
(“SSA”), for the period beginning on April 1, 1998 and continuing through January 3,
1999.1 Roderick argues that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) is not
supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.
I.
Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly
summarize the essential facts.
Roderick filed for social security benefits due to obesity, depression, severe sinus
problems, knee problems, circulation problems, and right hand numbness. She sought
Child’s Insurance Benefits from April 1, 1998 until she reached the age of 22 on January
4, 1999, and for Supplemental Security Income payments thereafter.
An administrative hearing was held on June 24, 2004, at which time Roderick
testified that she was 5' 6" tall and currently weighed 348 pounds. (App. 32.) She
testified that she weighed 310 pounds when she was in high school in 1995. (App. 32-33,
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Roderick passed away on January 14, 2007. (App. 29.)
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43.) She testified that her left knee pain was constant and severely limited her ability to
walk, stand, or sit. (App. 32, 33-34, 37, 39-40.) She also suffered related back pain,
shortness of breath, and general fatigue. (App. 34, 37.) Her knee pain began in 1998
following a car accident. She also indicated that she has suffered from depression since
high school, making it difficult to concentrate. (App. 34, 42.) She was diagnosed with
diabetes in January, 2004. (App. 36-37.) She does not leave her house, and sits in dark
rooms most of the time with migraine headaches. (App. 34-35.) She is unable to grip
items or lift certain items due to pain and numbness in her right hand. (App. 36, 40.)
She testified that she had never worked more than four hours in a day except when
she worked as a nanny. (App. 41-42.) She had other past work as a telephone operator
for an answering service, a cashier, one night as a security guard, and as a telemarketer.
(App. 38, 40-41, 42, 105.) She does not drive because of difficulty gripping the steering
wheel and because it requires her to be seated. (App. 44-45.) She rarely leaves the house,
other than for visiting the doctor about once a month. (App. 45-46.)
The ALJ determined that Roderick had the following severe impairments: obesity,
chondromalacia of her left patella, lumbosacral disc disease, and degenerative joint
disease in the left knee. (App. 17, 25.) The ALJ also found that Roderick had “medically
determinable chronic sinusitis, allergic rhinitis, diabetes, depressive disorder NOS and
anxiety, and has symptomatically been diagnosed with chronic gastritis and migraine
headaches.” (App. 25-26.) However, the ALJ concluded that Roderick’s medical
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impairments “do not meet or medically equal any of the listed impairments in” the
Impairments List. Id. The ALJ also determined that Roderick’s general credibility was
low. (App. 24, 26.) The ALJ then determined that “[b]ased upon the record as a whole,
despite the established medical impairments,” Roderick maintained the residual
functional capacity to return to her past work as a telephone operator for an answering
service. (App. 24-25, 26.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Roderick was not under a
“disability” as defined in the SSA at any time from April 1, 1998 through the date of the
decision, December 21, 2004. (App. 27.)
The District Court affirmed the ALJ’s denial of Child’s Insurance Benefits, and
remanded the matter for further proceedings as it related to the ALJ’s denial of
Supplemental Security Income payments because the ALJ failed to discuss the vocational
expert’s response to a hypothetical question that Roderick was currently unemployable.
(App. 1-13.) Thus the only issue on appeal concerns the denial of Child’s Insurance
benefits.
II.
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c). We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s decision under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s finding that Roderick was not disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c);
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). “‘Substantial evidence’ has
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been defined as ‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Smith v. Califano,
637 F.2d 968, 970 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)).
III.
The SSA gives the Commissioner authority to pay social security benefits to
disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382. In order to be entitled to Child’s Insurance
benefits as a disabled adult, a claimant must show that she is the child of an insured
person who is disabled and is dependent on the insured, is unmarried, and was under a
disability as defined in the SSA before she attained the age of 22. 42 U.S.C. §§
402(d)(1), 423(d)(1)(A). Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). An individual is not disabled unless “his physical or mental impairment or
impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner applies a five-step test to determine whether a claimant is
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disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The first two steps require the
claimant to demonstrate that she is not currently engaging in substantial gainful activity,
and that she is suffering from a severe impairment. Id. A failure of proof at step one or
step two renders the claimant ineligible for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
If, however, the claimant progresses to step three, then the question becomes
“‘whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of Listed Impairments
[articulated in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1] that the Commissioner acknowledges
are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.’” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78,
84 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987)); see also 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s specific impairment is not a Listed
Impairment, the ALJ must consider whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments is “medically equivalent” to a Listed Impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1526(a).
An impairment or combination of impairments is “medically equivalent” to a
Listed Impairment if it is “at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any
[L]isted [I]mpairment.” Id. In other words, the claimant’s impairment “‘must meet all of
the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria,
no matter how severely, does not qualify.’” Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990)(emphasis in
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Zebley)). A claimant who satisfies step three “is conclusively presumed to be disabled.”
Knepp, 204 F.3d at 84. A claimant who fails at step three must continue to steps four and
five.
At step four, the question is “whether the claimant retains the residual functional
capacity to perform her past relevant work.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. It is the
claimant’s burden to establish an inability to return to her past relevant work. See id. A
failure of proof at step four dooms the claimant’s case. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If, however, the claimant satisfies this burden,
then the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner to show, at step five, that “there
are other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant
can perform, consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past work
experience, and residual functional capacity.” Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. This step
requires the ALJ to consider the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education,
and past work experience to determine whether the cumulative effect of all of the
claimant’s impairments renders her capable of working. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).
IV.
On appeal, Roderick argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. She specifically challenges the ALJ’s determination that Roderick did not
suffer a severe psychiatric impairment. She also argues that the ALJ erred in failing to
address the vocational expert’s response that Roderick was not capable of working; that
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is, Roderick argues that the error identified by the District Court that resulted in the
District Court’s remand of the matter as it related only to denial of Supplemental Security
Income, also requires a remand as it relates to the denial of Child’s Insurance Benefits.
The District Court affirmed the denial of Child’s Insurance Benefits noting that the
few medical records that exist for the relevant time period of April 1, 1998 to January 3,
1999, do not “conclude or remotely corroborate the contention that [Roderick] can not
work at any job.” (App. 8.) We agree.
With regard to a psychiatric impairment, Roderick’s primary physician diagnosed
depression based solely on Roderick’s self-report. (App. 193.) He did not rely on any
objective evidence to support the diagnosis, did not refer her to a mental health
professional, and noted that Roderick refused to take anti-depressants. (App. 193, 197.)
In addition, Roderick’s primary physician’s observations of her mental status and
activities support a finding that Roderick was not suffering from a debilitating psychiatric
impairment. (App. 198, 200.) There is no other medical evidence to support a psychiatric
diagnosis for the relevant time period. Roderick underwent a consultative mental
examination on July 9, 2003, well after she reached the age of 22 on January 4, 1999.
(App. 205-209.) At that time the examining psychologist diagnosed Roderick with
depressive disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, and generalized anxiety disorder.
(App. 208.) The examining psychologist also noted that Roderick had no history of
psychiatric hospitalizations or outpatient psychiatric treatment, and no current psychiatric
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treatment. (App. 205.) The examining psychologist’s diagnoses also were based on
Roderick’s self-reports, which were contradicted by the psychologist’s observations.
(App. 207-208.) For the time period in question there is no medical evidence to support a
finding that Roderick is disabled.
Given the lack of medical evidence to support a finding of “disabled” prior to
January 4, 1999, the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert necessarily
included limitations that were not supported by the objective medical record for the
relevant time period. A hypothetical must only include impairments that are supported by
the medical record. Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 554. Thus, we find no error with the ALJ’s
failure to address the vocational expert’s response as it relates to the denial of Child’s
Insurance Benefits.
Thus, we find that the ALJ properly calculated Roderick’s residual functional
capacity and sustained his burden at step four of the sequential evaluation.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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