Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-12-2009
John Degrazia v. FBI
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-3301
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"John Degrazia v. FBI" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1748.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1748
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3301
___________
JOHN SEBASTIAN DEGRAZIA,
Appellant
v.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE;
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-01009)
District Judge: Honorable Mary L. Cooper
__________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 15, 2009
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 12, 2009)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
John DeGrazia, a litigant proceeding pro se, filed an action against the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and Department of Defense alleging that, at the age of four, he
was the victim of a government-run, Nazi-designed genetic experiment which caused his
body to combine with reptile DNA, and that he has since experienced harmful side effects
which pose a threat to others. DeGrazia paid the filing fee for his complaint. The District
Court dismissed DeGrazia’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This appeal followed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of a decision made
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is plenary. See Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., 542 F.3d 59,
63 (3d Cir. 2008). We may affirm on any grounds supported by the record. See Hughes
v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).
The District Court liberally construed DeGrazia’s pro se complaint, but concluded
that it is frivolous because it relies on “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). However, the standard for dismissal of a complaint
as “frivolous” under the in forma pauperis statute, as articulated in Neitzke, does not
apply to DeGrazia’s complaint because he paid the filing fees and did not proceed in
forma pauperis. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 & n.10 (3d Cir.
2002). Rule 12(b)(6), the basis for the District Court’s dismissal of DeGrazia’s
complaint, merely “authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue
of law,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. It “does not countenance [] dismissals based on a
judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations. District court judges looking to
dismiss claims on such grounds must look elsewhere for legal support.” Id. at 327.
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Nevertheless, we conclude that dismissal was appropriate. A federal court may
sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations within the complaint “are so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, . . . wholly insubstantial,
. . . obviously frivolous, . . . plainly unsubstantial, . . . or no longer open to discussion.”
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted). There is no question that DeGrazia’s claims meet this standard, as they rely on
fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis. On appeal, DeGrazia’s sole
argument is that the matter should be remanded to the District Court because the order
and opinion dismissing his case was the product of undue influence exerted by attorneys
for the Appellees. This alleged conspiracy – which DeGrazia offers no credible evidence
to support – only serves to bolster the District Court’s conclusion. Because the appeal
does not present a substantial question, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. IOP 10.6. The motion to remand is denied.
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