Case: 13-11044 Date Filed: 01/31/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11044
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A072-453-654
WEN BIN ZENG,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(January 31, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Wen Bin Zeng, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of her motion to reopen her removal
proceedings based on changed country conditions. Specifically, Zeng sought to
reopen her removal proceedings on the basis that, beginning in 2011, Chinese
officials increased their persecution of members of unregistered churches in
Liaoning Province. On appeal, Zeng argues the BIA’s conclusion that she failed to
demonstrate materially changed country conditions was arbitrary and that the BIA
failed to consider much of the evidence she submitted in support of her motion to
reopen. After review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
deny the petition. 1
The BIA’s conclusion that Zeng failed to establish changed country
conditions in China was not arbitrary or capricious. The 2002 and 2003 Country
Reports, the 2004 International Religious Freedom Report, and the 1998 Asylum
Profile indicated that prior to and during 2004, the Chinese government subjected
unregistered churches and their members to threats, repression, harassment,
detention, and, at times, physical abuse. Nothing in the record supports Zeng’s
assertion that, because these reports did not explicitly discuss the treatment of
members of unregistered churches in Liaoning Province, no persecution of
1
We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Jiang v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 568 F.3d 1252, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009). “Our review is limited to determining whether the
BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” Id.
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members of unregistered churches occurred in that province at the time of her 2004
hearing.
The evidence Zeng submitted in support of her motion to reopen, moreover,
did not establish that the Chinese government’s treatment of unregistered churches
and their members materially changed between 2004 and 2011. See Zhang v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that to obtain
reopening of her removal proceedings, an alien must demonstrate changed country
conditions with evidence that is material and was not available and that would not
have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding). In light of China’s
longstanding restrictions on religion and sustained practice of harassing and
detaining unregistered religious groups, the fact that Chinese officials in 2011
conducted at least one raid on a house church in Liaoning Province does not
demonstrate that conditions for members of unregistered churches materially
changed in that locale.
The BIA also adequately considered all of the evidence Zeng submitted in
support of her motion. In its decision, the BIA listed the evidence Zeng submitted
and explained that it viewed those documents in conjunction with the record
evidence at the time of Zeng’s 2004 hearing. Based on those documents, the BIA
concluded that the Chinese government continues to restrict religious groups and to
repress unregistered churches and their members. Finally, the BIA’s decision to
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afford reduced weight to the letters from Zeng’s in-laws and friends was not
arbitrary or capricious. The letters describe two raids on church gatherings and
bible studies, but, as the BIA noted, none of the letters provide the locations of
those gatherings. As such, the letters were of minimal probative value.
Zeng failed to establish materially changed country conditions with respect
to the treatment of unregistered churches and their members, and her motion to
reopen was therefore untimely. See Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 568 F.3d 1252,
1256-57 (11th Cir. 2009); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2)(ii). Accordingly, the BIA did
not abuse its discretion in declining to reopen her removal proceedings.2
PETITION DENIED.
2
Because we conclude Zeng failed to establish changed country conditions, it is
unnecessary for us to consider the BIA’s alternative holding that Zeng failed to establish a prima
facie case for relief.
4