IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-60222
Conference Calendar
T. JAMES ANDERSON, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:02-CV-128-LN
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February 19, 2003
Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
T. James Anderson, Jr., filed in state court an action for
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the United
States of America, as the employer of United States District
Court Judge William H. Barbour. Anderson sought a declaration
that Judge Barbour was not impartial in his disposition of a
prior lawsuit by Anderson.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-60222
-2-
The United States filed a notice of removal to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1446. The United States then
filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing that it was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata because Anderson had raised the
same allegations in a previous unsuccessful action against Judge
Barbour in the district court. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss and imposed a $250 sanction against Anderson
based on his failure to heed a warning that had been issued with
respect to his prior frivolous lawsuit against Judge Barbour.
Although this court applies less stringent standards to
parties proceeding pro se than to parties represented by counsel
and this court liberally construes the briefs of pro se
litigants, pro se litigants must still brief the issues and
reasonably comply with the requirements of FED. R. APP. P. 28.
Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995); Yohey v.
Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Issues not briefed
are deemed abandoned. Evans v. City of Marlin, Tex., 986 F.2d
104, 106 n.1 (5th Cir. 1993).
Liberally construing Anderson’s brief, Anderson has
adequately briefed the following main issues for appeal: (1) that
the removal of the action to federal court was not appropriate
and did not comport with due process; (2) that the disposition of
the case did not comport with due process. To the extent that
Anderson intended to raise any issues other than those listed
No. 02-60222
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above, Anderson has waived those arguments by failing to
adequately brief them on appeal. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225.
The procedure for removal is set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
The United States complied with the requirements of § 1446, and
it certified that it mailed a copy of the removal notice to
Anderson.
With respect to Anderson’s argument that removal was
inappropriate, removal of Anderson’s pleading was not made based
on the substance of his claims, but rather because the United
States was named as the defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a).
With respect to Anderson’s argument that the proceedings in
the district court did not comport with due process, “[a] federal
district court has both specific and inherent power to control
its docket . . . .” In re United Markets Int'l, Inc., 24 F.3d
650, 654 (5th Cir. 1994). The rules are to be “construed and
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. The district
court did not deny Anderson due process. The judgment of the
district court is AFFIRMED. All outstanding motions DENIED.