Hopkins v. Cockrell

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 01-11385

BOBBY RAY HOPKINS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

JANIE COCKRELL, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

March 20, 2003
Before JOLLY, DeMOSS, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Bobby Ray Hopkins, is currently confined on death

row pursuant to a conviction of capital murder on May 25, 1994.

After exhausting his state direct appeal and habeas corpus

remedies, petitioner initiated a federal habeas corpus proceeding

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was filed on June 17, 1999, after the

effective date of AEDPA. On September 28, 2001, the district court

entered judgment denying habeas relief.

Hopkins asked this Court to grant a COA, raising three
Constitutional issues. This Court granted Hopkins’ application for

a COA on all three issues.

BACKGROUND

On July 31, 1993, in the early evening, the bodies of 18-year-

old Sandi Marbut and her 19-year-old cousin Jennifer Weston were

discovered by Marbut’s parents. According to Marbut’s father, the

girls’ bodies were found in their apartment, which was across the

street from Marbut’s parents’ house.

On the evening of July 30, 1993, Marbut and Weston had some

friends over at their apartment, and Marbut drove the last guest

home about 4:00 a.m. the next morning. It was alleged that between

4:00 and 5:00 a.m., Bobby Ray Hopkins entered the apartment and

attacked Marbut, who was in the downstairs living room sleeping on

the couch, stabbing and cutting her approximately 40 times.

Weston came downstairs while Hopkins was attacking Marbut.

Hopkins saw Weston and proceeded to attack her at the foot of the

stairway. Weston apparently tried to flee upstairs but was

overpowered. She died at the landing at the top of the stairs

after suffering 66 stab wounds.

According to the police, Hopkins began to search the bedrooms

for money. Hopkins entered the bathroom and tried to clean the

blood off his body. He took some towels to try to stop the

bleeding from his wounds. He then walked down the stairs and

exited the apartment. Later that evening, Marbut’s father found

2
her on the living room floor and discovered Weston at the top of

the stairs.

Texas Ranger George Turner testified that on the evening the

bodies were found, July 31st, he questioned several bystanders at

the scene outside the apartment and, as a result, went in search of

Hopkins. Apparently, Hopkins had been in the girls’ apartment

approximately two weeks before the murders. Hopkins was there with

two other men and got in an argument with Marbut over money that

was missing from her purse. Marbut thought Hopkins had taken the

money and asked him to leave and not come back.

Ranger Turner interviewed Hopkins on July 31st, and noticed

that Hopkins had cuts on his hands and arms. Turner also noticed

what appeared to be blood on Hopkins’ boots. Hopkins allowed

Turner to take the boots. Subsequent tests showed the blood on the

boots was consistent with the blood of Weston, Marbut and Hopkins.

On August 5, 1993, the police searched the area around the

apartment and found two blood stained towels in a culvert between

the girls’ apartment and the house where Hopkins lived with his

parents. The towels belonged to the girls and were given to them

by Marbut’s parents. The blood on the towels was consistent with

the blood of Hopkins. Blood on hairs found on the towels was

consistent with the blood types of Marbut, Weston and Hopkins. On

August 22, 1993, a knife was discovered in the weeds outside the

apartment on a route between the girls’ apartment and Hopkins’

home. The blood on the knife was consistent with the blood of

3
Hopkins, Marbut and Weston.

Serology testing of the blood stains in the apartment

indicated that the blood was consistent with Hopkins’ blood. His

blood was located in numerous areas in the apartment, including on

a light switch plate in the living room, the living room wall, a

sock, a bathroom rug and faucet, a shoe and a magazine in Weston’s

bedroom, a newspaper article in Weston’s purse, the top of the

stairway landing, and one drawer of a chest in Marbut’s bedroom.

DNA testing of Hopkins’ blood indicated that it was consistent with

the blood found on various items throughout the apartment.

Further, Hopkins’ boot matched the footprint of a boot left in the

blood on the carpet in Weston’s bedroom.

In the weeks following the discovery of the bodies, while the

State was developing the above evidence, Hopkins was held in

isolation. Hopkins was held after being arrested pursuant to a

felony probation revocation warrant alleging non-reporting and non-

payment. Apparently, it is unusual to hold such a violator in

isolation. After fifteen days in isolation and eight

interrogations by law enforcement officers (none of which resulted

in a confession), the State called in Detective Tony Knott from New

Mexico to just “talk” to Hopkins.

Hopkins considered Knott a friend and apparently the two have

known each other for quite some time. Knott and Hopkins were taken

to a small room on August 19, 1993, which Hopkins alleges was under

the guise of letting the two of them “catch-up on old times.”

4
Prior to speaking, Knott claims to have read Hopkins his Miranda

rights, though Hopkins claims not to remember this and the reading

was not taped as required by Texas law.1 During this talk, Knott

made many statements to Hopkins indicating that he wanted Hopkins

to tell him about the murders and that the talk was just between

the two of them. During the course of this four-hour talk, Hopkins

made incriminating statements, and Hopkins gave a videotaped

interview to Knott. In this interview Hopkins stated that he went

over to Marbut’s and Weston’s apartment around 4:00 or 5:00 a.m.

He and Marbut began to argue, Marbut got a knife, a struggle

ensued, and he ultimately stabbed her. Hopkins admitted that he

was cut during the altercation and bled in the apartment.

On May 13 and 14, 1994, the trial court held a Jackson v.

Denno hearing to determine whether the confession should be

admitted. The court found, amongst other things, that: Knott had

given Hopkins the required warnings before both the first and

second tapes of the interview and that Hopkins voluntarily waived

those rights; Hopkins did not request an attorney prior to or

during his confession; and, under the totality of the

circumstances, the statement was voluntary. The trial court also

determined that Hopkins desired to terminate the interview on page

1
Hopkins later claimed that it wasn’t until the beginning of
a second tape that he was read these warnings, but he also later
indicated that he was aware of the consequences of speaking to
Knott.

5
203 of the transcribed statement, and ruled that any subsequent

statement was inadmissible. A jury trial was subsequently held and

Hopkins was found guilty.

Hopkins challenged the admissibility of his confession on

direct appeal. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the

trial court did err in admitting the first tape because the Miranda

warnings were not on the tape as required by Texas law. However,

the court found that this error was harmless because the references

Hopkins made to the crime on the first tape would only raise issues

of self-defense or temporary insanity and were presented or

directly inferred through other evidence presented. Also, the

court found that the record supported the trial court’s findings

that Hopkins voluntarily waived his rights on the second tape and

that Hopkins’ confession was neither coerced not involuntary.

Hopkins then brought this habeas action, which was filed on

June 17, 1999, after the effective date of AEDPA. On September 28,

2001, the district court entered judgment denying habeas relief.

Hopkins timely filed a notice of appeal, but on November 5, 2001,

the district court denied Hopkins a COA. Hopkins then asked this

Court to grant his application for a COA.

This Court granted Hopkins a COA on all three issues raised:

1. Whether his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to remain

silent were violated by a law enforcement officer repeatedly

coercing and lying to him;

6
2. Whether his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights

were violated when incriminating statements were obtained from

him involuntarily; and

3. Whether his trial counsel was ineffective in representing him

in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

DISCUSSION

Were Hopkins’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to remain
silent violated?

Hopkins claims that Knott’s conduct violated his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent in that Knott procured a

confession from Hopkins involuntarily. Though Hopkins also claims

that Knott’s conduct violated his due process rights, this is

really a restatement of his Fifth Amendment claim, and claims that

are covered by such specific constitutional provisions must be

analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision

and not under the rubric of substantive due process. Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).

This Court reviews a district court’s findings of fact for

clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.

Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1998). Furthermore,

under AEDPA, an application of habeas corpus shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

7
 established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). With regard to questions of fact,

§ 2254(e)(1) requires federal courts to presume that the factual

findings of the state courts are correct unless the petitioner

“rebut[s] the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Essentially, Hopkins alleges that his confession was

involuntarily made because he was deceived and coerced by Knott.

He points to many instances in the record where it is clear that

Knott was trying to use his relationship with Hopkins to get him to

talk.2 He also points out that he was placed in solitary for

fifteen days, without being charged with the murder, and was

questioned eight different times before Knott was called in. He

also argues that, assuming his Miranda rights were read to him,

that he still was deceived by Knotts’ assertions to him, likening

2
Hopkins also indicates, though never argues, that he was
trying to invoke his right to remain silent when he told Knott he
did not want to talk about the murder, but apparently Hopkins was
willing to continue to talk about other topics. Also, Hopkins
never explicitly invoked his right to remain silent, and, in light
of this Court’s recent decision in Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588
(5th Cir. 2002), it is doubtful that such an argument would warrant
much merit even if raised.

8
his case to Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).3

There are two inquiries to determine whether an accused has

voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment privilege

against self-incrimination. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421

(1986); Soffar, 300 F.3d at 592. First, the waiver of the right

must be voluntary in that it was not the product of intimidation,

coercion, or deception. Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Second, the

relinquishment must be made with a full awareness of the nature of

the right being waived. Id. A trial court does not err in

admitting a defendant’s confession into evidence if the defendant

ambiguously asserted his right to remain silent nor does a police

officer violate that right when he attempts to clarify whether a

defendant wishes to remain silent and that defendant chooses to

continue to speak about the offense. Barnes v. Johnson, 160 F.3d

218, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1998). Also, the Supreme Court has held that

the admission of an involuntary confession is trial error subject

to a harmless error analysis. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,

310 (1991). In order to grant federal habeas relief, the trial

error must have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 637 (1993). Therefore, even if this Court were to find that

3
As to this point, it is also worth noting that Knott admitted
in the pre-trial hearing and in his trial testimony that he lied to
Hopkins at times during the confession.

9
Hopkins’ Fifth Amendment rights were violated, this Court must also

find that admission of the confession was not harmless in

determining the jury’s verdict.

If not for the overwhelming amount of evidence presented to

the jury indicating Hopkins’ guilt, we might be persuaded by

Hopkins’ argument. Hopkins argues that his confession was the

result of deception and coercion on the part of the police and

Knott. In order for a defendant to establish that his confession

was involuntary, he must demonstrate that it resulted from coercive

police conduct and it is essential that there be a link between the

coercive conduct of the police and the confession of the defendant.

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1986). The Supreme

Court has stated that “[a]ny evidence that the accused was

threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show

that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.”

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). In Spano, the

Supreme Court held that a confession that was obtained after many

hours of constant interrogation, at a very early hour, violated the

defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. 360 U.S. at 321-23. The

Spano Court considered the totality of the circumstances to reach

this conclusion, including the fact that Spano had requested, but

been refused, an attorney, and that the police brought in an old

friend to deceive Spano and to help get him to talk. Id. at 232.

However, this Court recently held that trickery or deceit is only

10
prohibited to the extent that it deprives the defendant of

knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his

rights and the consequences of abandoning them. Soffar, 300 F.3d

at 596. “Neither mere emotionalism and confusion, nor mere

trickery will alone necessarily invalidate a confession.” Self v.

Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations

and citation omitted).

It is clear from the context of the confession itself and its

surrounding circumstances that Knott’s conduct went beyond mere

emotionalism, trickery or confusion and passed the line into the

sort of lying that deprives a defendant “of the knowledge essential

to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the

consequences of abandoning them.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

424 (1986). During the first taped confession, Knott assured

Hopkins that their conversation was confidential telling Hopkins,

“This is for me and you. This is for me. Okay. This ain’t for

nobody else.”4 This assurance came after Hopkins indicated to

Knott that he didn’t want to talk too loudly for fear that the

officers outside of the room might hear them discussing the murder.

Knott also reassured Hopkins throughout the confession that they

were “friends” and that he just wanted to know the truth. During

the interview, Knott also assured Hopkins that he would not tell

4
State’s Exhibit 213, p. 56. Later in the interview, Knott
also told Hopkins that “you ain’t got absolutely nothing to hide
from me.” Id. at 77.

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Hopkins’ mother about details of the murder or Hopkins’ confession.

After obtaining the confession from Hopkins, however, Knott

informed Hopkins that if he was subpoenaed, he would have to tell

the truth about their conversation because Knott’s family depended

on him to bring home a paycheck.

These comments as well as the circumstances under which

Hopkins was interviewed, i.e., after being in isolation for fifteen

days, being interviewed eight previous times, being interviewed a

ninth time by someone Hopkins considered a “close friend,” leads to

a very Spano-like situation. The totality of the circumstances,

especially in light of Knott’s comments to Hopkins that their

conversation was confidential, leads this Court to believe that

portions of the Hopkins’ admitted confession were indeed

involuntary. An officer cannot read the defendant his Miranda

warnings and then turn around and tell him that despite those

warnings, what the defendant tells the officer will be confidential

and still use the resultant confession against the defendant. Yet

Knott and the prosecution did exactly that.

However, as we stated above, even if this Court were to

exclude those portions of the confession that were obtained

involuntarily, Hopkins’ conviction must be affirmed if the error

was harmless. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310. In order to grant

federal habeas relief, the trial error must have a substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.

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Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. In light of the overwhelming amount of

circumstantial evidence present in this case, we hold that any

error in admitting Hopkins’ confession was harmless. The jury was

presented with evidence that blood consistent with the victims’

blood was found on Hopkins’ boots. Further, Hopkins’ boot matched

the footprint of a boot left in the blood on the carpet in Weston’s

bedroom. Blood consistent with Hopkins’ blood was also found

throughout the victims’ apartment. Numerous DNA tests of the blood

also indicated that it was Hopkins’ blood in the apartment. Also,

when Hopkins was interviewed the day after the murders, he had

noticeable cuts on his hands and arms. In addition, police found

two blood stained towels, belonging to the victims, in a culvert

between the victims’ apartment and the house where Hopkins lived

with his parents. The blood on the towels was consistent with the

blood of Hopkins and the victims. Finally, there also was

evidence that Hopkins had been in an argument over money with the

victims two weeks earlier.

At trial, the state relied heavily on this other

circumstantial evidence rather than relying solely on the

confession. The Hopkins’ confession was barely mentioned in the

opening argument, and though the taped confession was admitted as

evidence, a majority of the trial was taken up by expert testimony

as to the reliability of the DNA evidence as well as presenting the

other circumstantial evidence mentioned above. In the closing

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arguments, the state once again briefly mentioned the confession,

but the thrust of its argument was on the other circumstantial

evidence.5

In light of the overwhelming amount of circumstantial evidence

present in this case, as well as the state’s limited reliance on

the confession at trial, we hold that any error in admitting

Hopkins’ confession was harmless.

Was Hopkins’ trial counsel ineffective in representing him in
violation of the Sixth Amendment?

Hopkins contends that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel during the punishment phase of the trial because his

counsel failed to present evidence that Hopkins was functioning at

a below average intelligence level, received a serious head injury

as a child, and had abused alcohol and drugs.

Under the two-prong test enunciated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), Hopkins must show that his

counsel’s assistance was deficient and that the deficiency

prejudiced him. In evaluating the first prong, judicial scrutiny

of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential, and courts

5
The prosecution’s reluctance to use the confession too
aggressively may have stemmed from the fact that Hopkins stated
that he went over to the victims’ apartment that night to continue
an ongoing affair he was having with Marbut and that she attacked
him first when he told her that his girlfriend was returning to
town. If believed, this evidence may have had some sort of a
mitigating effect on the jury. In fact, the prosecution warned the
jury in its opening statement not to trust everything in the
confession.

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must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.

at 689. Hopkins must demonstrate prejudice by showing that his

attorney’s errors were so serious that they rendered the

proceedings unfair or the result unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). This Court has held that a tactical

decision not to pursue and present potential mitigating evidence on

the ground that it is double-edged in nature is objectively

reasonable. Kitchens v. Johnson, 190 F.3d 698, 703-04 (5th Cir.

1999).

After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we

conclude that Hopkins’ counsel did look into the possibility of

presenting the evidence Hopkins’ claims should have been presented,

but concluded that the evidence was weak and double-edged in

nature. Hopkins’ counsel had doctors examine him for head injuries

but found nothing conclusive or compelling. As for the alcohol and

drug abuse, this Court has repeatedly denied claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel for failure to present “double edged”

evidence where counsel has made an informed decision not to present

it. Boyle v. Johnson, 93 F.3d 180, 187-88 (5th Cir. 1996);

Kitchen, 190 F.3d at 702. We therefore conclude that the district

court’s decision should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully reviewed the parties’ respective briefs and

15
the record, we hold that the district court did not err in denying

Hopkins habeas relief. Though we are troubled by the state’s

methods by which it obtained Hopkins’ confession, ultimately, we

conclude that its admission was harmless in light of the

overwhelming amount of circumstantial evidence presented to the

jury and the state’s limited reliance on the confession. We also

are unpersuaded by Hopkins’ contention that his counsel was

ineffective. Hopkins’ counsel was operating under an objectively

reasonable trial strategy in selecting the type of mitigating

evidence that was presented. We therefore AFFIRM the district

court’s decision.

AFFIRMED.

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