Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_____________________________
No. 12-10712
Non-Argument Calendar
_____________________________
D. C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00752-AT
DALE M. IRVING,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BANK OF AMERICA,
f.k.a. Countrywide Home Loans,
and all corporate entities operating as
subsidies or assignees of Bank of America
and/or Countrywide Home Loans,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________________________
(November 19, 2012)
Before JORDAN, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 2 of 6
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff Dale Irving -- proceeding pro se -- appeals the district court’s grant
of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint included facts and allegations related to the loss
in value of a Georgia property Plaintiff purchased with a mortgage and security
note obtained from what is now a part of Bank of America, N.A. (together with
BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, “the Defendants”).1 Based on the facts in the
complaint, Plaintiff raised claims for breach of the implied contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing, for fraud, and also a derivative claim for punitive
damages.2
1
Plaintiff initially filed this action in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County, Georgia. A
short time later, the action was properly removed to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia.
2
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint may include additional claims, but other claims have since been
abandoned. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir. 2003). It is only
because we treat pro se filings with leniency that we choose to address Plaintiff’s fraud claim; a
claim Plaintiff did not press before the district court in his response to Defendants’ motion to
2
Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 3 of 6
Briefly stated, Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Defendants caused a large
drop in the value of the pertinent property -- a loss large enough to make the
property worth less than the value of the purchase loan -- by engaging in
aggressive home loan practices that later resulted in a waive of foreclosures and a
national housing crisis. Plaintiff makes no allegations of an unfair or aggressive
lending practice being committed in the issuance of his particular loan. Instead, he
alleges that Defendants caused his home to lose value when Defendants engaged
in the identified practices in dealings with other borrowers in Georgia and across
the country.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, with prejudice.
The district court noted in particular that Plaintiff had not sufficiently identified a
cognizable breach of contract or how the identified lending practices were a
proximate cause of the decline in value of Plaintiff’s property in particular.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a district court’s dismissal of a case pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo. Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260,
dismiss.
3
Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 4 of 6
1264 (11th Cir. 2011). We review a district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend
a complaint for abuse of discretion, but we review the legal conclusion that
amendment would be futile de novo. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802
(11th Cir. 1999).
A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974
(2007)). To state a plausible claim for relief, Plaintiffs must go beyond merely
pleading the “sheer possibility” of unlawful activity by a defendant and so must
offer “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
DISCUSSION
As the district court correctly noted under Georgia law, a claim for breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing cannot stand as an independent cause of
action apart from an underlying claim for breach of contract. See, e.g., Onbrand
Media v. Codex Consulting, Inc., 687 S.E.2d 168, 174 (Ga Ct. App. 2009); Alan’s
of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1429 (11th Cir. 1990).
4
Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 5 of 6
Plaintiff has identified no breach of a contractual provision in this case.
Instead, Plaintiff proposes that a requirement be read into the pertinent contractual
terms like this one: Defendants must act to preserve the value of the property.
Absent the identification of an actual, specific contractual provision that was
breached in this case (or case law specifically supporting the reading of some
implied contractual duty of valuation preservation into the pertinent contractual
terms), Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter (even when
accepted as true) to state a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing claim
that is plausible on its face.
In Georgia, “[t]he tort of fraud has five elements: a false representation by a
defendant, scienter, intention to induce the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting,
justifiable reliance by the plaintiff, and damage to the plaintiff.” Baxter v.
Fairfield Fin. Servs., Inc., 704 S.E.2d 423, 429 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting
Serchion v. Capstone Partners, Inc., 679 S.E.2d 40, 43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
Concealment of material information can support a fraud claim, but a party can
only be held liable under such a theory if the party has a duty to disclose or
communicate the material information. See Id. Georgia courts have specifically
noted that no such duty generally exists between a lender and a borrower in a
5
Case: 12-10712 Date Filed: 11/19/2012 Page: 6 of 6
mortgage transaction. See, e.g., Id.; Arp v. United Cmty. Bank, 612 S.E.2d 534,
538 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
Plaintiff has failed to identify with particularity a materially false
representation made by Defendants or a valid ground upon which the Defendants
could be held liable for concealing material information. Absent the proper
identification of a false representation made by Defendants, Plaintiff’s complaint
does not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a fraud claim
that is plausible on its face.
Absent a sufficiently-pleaded underlying tort, Plaintiff’s derivative claim for
punitive damages must also be dismissed. See, e.g., Lilliston v. Regions Bank,
653 S.E.2d 306, 311 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d
1291, 1304 (11th Cir. 2009).
On the facts of this case, it was not error for the district court to deny
Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint; amendment would be futile.
AFFIRMED.
6