[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-13552 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 9, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:11-cv-14149-JEM
GEORGE MANNING,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff–Appellant,
versus
JUDGE DAVID HARPER,
Deceased, Trial Judge of Estate,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant,
JUDGE DAN VAUGHN,
Appellate,
JUDGE ELIZABETH METZGER,
Appellate Administrative,
JUDGE KATHLEEN ROBERTS,
County Court,
JUDGE BARBARA BRONIS,
Appellate,
JUDGE LARRY SCHACK,
Appellate,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants–Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 9, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After losing a civil action that he brought in Florida state court, George
Manning filed suit pro se in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that
the judges who presided over his state case and its appeal deprived him of his right
to due process. The district court determined that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over some of his claims based upon the Rooker-Feldman doctrine1 and
dismissed the remainder as barred by absolute judicial immunity. For the reasons
that follow, we dismiss in part, affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand with
instructions.
I.
Manning sued the company he hired to monitor the removal of mold from
1
The doctrine derives from two Supreme Court decisions: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923), and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983).
2
his property.2 Judge David Harper heard Manning’s case in Florida Small Claims
Court in 2008, ruled against him, and ordered him to pay attorneys’ fees. Manning
appealed to a three judge Florida Circuit Court panel, which affirmed Judge
Harper’s ruling. The appellate panel also denied Manning’s request for rehearing.
Appellate Judge Elizabeth Metzger ordered Manning to pay attorneys’ fees for
filing the rehearing request and remanded the case to Judge Kathleen Roberts for a
determination of the fee amount.
Manning sued in federal court, claiming that the Florida judges deprived
him of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the following
ways:
Manning alleged that Judge Harper3 would not look at his evidence, falsely
said that he did not answer questions, forced false evidence into the record, was
generally biased, and awarded attorneys’ fees in violation of Florida law.
Manning further alleged the three appellate judges refused to recognize that Judge
Harper had manipulated the evidence, wrongly determined that they did not have a
settled record, wrongly found that attorneys’ fees were justified,
2
Because we address a facial dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state a claim, the facts are derived from solely Manning’s complaint. See McElmurray
v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
3
Before Manning filed suit, Judge Harper died . Therefore, Judge Harper’s Estate was
named in the complaint as a defendant.
3
“misapprehended” his claim that Judge Harper should have written an opinion
explaining the dismissal of his case, and otherwise failed to acknowledge the
substantial errors he claimed the Small Claims Court had made. Manning also
alleged the appellate panel overlooked the issues he identified and denied his
request for a rehearing. Thereafter, according to Manning, Judge Metzger
wrongly ordered him to pay attorneys’ fees for failing to supply the information
required to justify rehearing, refused to reconsider that decision, and did not
permit Manning a hearing to determine if he had been properly served with his
opponent’s intention to seek fees. Finally, Manning alleged that Judge Roberts
prevented him from arguing that he was not properly served, failed to follow
discovery rules, refused to respond to his questions about the legitimacy of her
order because it was not signed, ruled that she could issue an order on the
opposing attorneys’ stationary, held him in contempt, and declined to explain how
she had calculated the fees.
All defendants except the Estate of Judge Harper moved to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court
determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider several of
Manning’s claims because the claims could only succeed if the court held that the
state courts had wrongly decided the issues. The remainder of Manning’s claims
4
against those defendants, the court found, were barred by absolute judicial
immunity and thus failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. And,
finding that Manning had never served the Estate of Judge Harper, the district
court dismissed all of Manning’s claims against Judge Harper. This is Manning’s
appeal.
II.
We review a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo.
Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). Likewise, we review
de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims as barred by absolute
immunity. Long v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999). In both instances,
we accept the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. McElmurray v.
Consol. Gov’t of Augusta-Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007).
And, because Manning proceeds pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. Albra
v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
III.
First, we observe that, although the district court discussed some of them in
the order from which Manning appeals, Manning’s claims against the Estate of
Judge Harper are not properly before us. The district court dismissed Manning’s
claims against the Estate for failure to perfect service after Manning had already
5
filed this appeal. Manning did not file a new notice of appeal or amend his
existing notice of appeal to identify that order. Although we liberally construe
notices of appeal filed by a pro se litigants, our jurisdiction is restricted to the
orders an appellant specifies. See Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.2
(11th Cir. 2011). We are generally not at liberty to infer an appellant’s intent to
designate in his notice of appeal an order that was not entered until after the notice
of appeal was filed. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986).
We therefore dismiss Manning’s appeal with respect to his claims against the
Estate of Judge Harper because we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider them.
Second, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
several of Manning’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that
doctrine, “a federal district court has ‘no authority to review final judgments of a state
court in judicial proceedings.’” Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1272 (quoting D.C. Ct. of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983)). Federal district courts may not hear
“cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting
district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Rooker-Feldman applies both to
claims actually raised in the state court as well as those that are “‘inextricably
6
intertwined’” with the state court judgment. Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16). “A claim is inextricably
intertwined if it would effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only
to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
After careful review, we agree that Rooker-Feldman prevented the district
court from assuming jurisdiction over the claims that the court identified in its
dismissal order as barred by the doctrine. Ruling on those claims would
necessarily have required the court to determine that the Florida state courts
wrongly decided the issues before them in Manning’s prior suit. Manning’s
assertion that, without recourse to federal courts, he would be deprived of a venue
in which to air his constitutional grievances misunderstands the nature of our dual
system of courts. And Manning’s appeal does not present an irreconcilable
conflict between vindication of his constitutional rights and jurisdictional doctrine.
If Manning believed that the state judges were biased in their rulings against him,
he had the option to appeal those rulings to the Florida Supreme Court and, from
there, to the Supreme Court of the United States. Manning’s belief that doing so
would have been futile is immaterial. He chose not to take full advantage of
review in Florida’s courts and may not now attack in the federal courts adverse
7
state court rulings as unconstitutionally biased.
Yet, although the district court correctly identified several claims over
which it lacked jurisdiction as a result of Rooker-Feldman, the court’s list was
underinclusive.4 “Where dismissal can be based on lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court should dismiss on only the
jurisdictional grounds.” Boda v. United States, 698 F.2d 1174, 1177 n.4 (11th Cir.
1983). Even though the results are functionally similar, the district court erred in
dismissing some of Manning’s claims based upon judicial immunity because the
court lacked jurisdiction to reach the issue of immunity. It is necessary, therefore,
for us to vacate the dismissal of those claims and remand for the district court to
dismiss them for lack of jurisdiction rather than for failure to state a claim. See
DiMaio v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).
In addition to those claims that the district court correctly identified, the
district court was also precluded from considering Manning’s due process claims
4
The appellees argue that we should remand this case to permit the district court to
dismiss it in toto for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because all of Manning’s claims are
barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because Manning seeks only damages and none of the
alleged due process violations asserted in Manning’s complaint could have resulted in any
compensable injury, they argue, the district court’s determination that it had jurisdiction over
some of Manning’s claims was erroneous. We disagree. It is well established that courts may
award nominal damages for due process violations even where no actual injury occurred. See DA
Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, even
assuming none of the violations that Manning alleged could have resulted in an actual injury, that
would not have divested the district court of jurisdiction.
8
based on: (1) Judge Metzger’s refusal to reconsider her order awarding fees
against Manning; (2) the appellate judges’ determination that they had not
received a settled record; (3) Judge Roberts’s ruling that her order did not have to
be signed; and (4) Judge Roberts’s decision that it was not improper for her order
to be written on the opposing lawyer’s stationary. In each instance, the district
court could only have decided that these judicial actions violated Manning’s due
process rights by holding that the Florida judges wrongly decided the issues before
them or invalidating their rulings. For that reason, the district court lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims, and we remand with instructions that
they be dismissed on that basis.
Finally, the district court correctly dismissed as barred by judicial immunity
all of Manning’s remaining claims. “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial
immunity from damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Bolin v. Story,
225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356–57 (1978)). “This immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error,
malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction.” Id. “Whether a judge’s
actions were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether:
(1) the act complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events
9
occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved a
case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose immediately out of
a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070
(11th Cir. 2005).
Manning contends that the judges were not acting in their judicial capacities
and that the issue of immunity should have been submitted to a jury.5 But
“judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of
damages,” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991), and, accordingly, the Supreme
Court has urged that a defendant’s entitlement to immunity be resolved “at the
earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
As the district court determined here, the judges’ immunity was apparent from the
fact of the complaint. Manning also argues that the judges were acting “on their
own agenda,” and thus, in his view, were not properly performing their judicial
duties. But Manning’s allegations are based either on the rulings or actions in
open court of the judges who decided the case that Manning brought in the Florida
courts. Those actions were plainly “judicial in nature.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 12.
5
Manning also argues that the district court’s dismissal of his complaint deprived him of
his Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. This contention is meritless. As we have recently
explained, we are not at liberty to decide that dismissal of claims that fail as a matter of law
violates the Seventh Amendment and we would not, in any event, make such a decision.
Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008)
10
And it is irrelevant whether Manning is correct that those actions were unfair or
involved erroneous interpretations of Florida law or the facts of his case. The
judges’ actions were not undertaken in the absence of all jurisdiction. Rather,
each action that Manning challenges occurred in the context of presiding over a
case in which Manning had invoked the judges’ jurisdiction by filing and pursuing
his state court lawsuit. See id. at 12-13.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Manning’s appeal as it relates to any
of his claims against the Estate of Judge David Harper. Further, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of those claims to which the court
determined that Rooker-Feldman applied. We vacate the district court’s dismissal
of the following claims on the merits and remand with instructions that they be
dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: (1) Judge Metzger’s refusal to
reconsider her order awarding attorneys’ fees; (2) the determination of the
appellate judges that they had not received a settled record; (3) Judge Roberts’s
ruling that her order did not have to be signed; and (4) Judge Roberts’s ruling that
her order was not illegitimate because it was printed on the opposing counsel’s
stationary. Finally, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of all of Manning’s
remaining claims for failure to state a claim based on absolute judicial immunity.
11
DISMISSED in part, AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED AND
REMANDED in part.
12