[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-10696 DECEMBER 19, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00195-HLA-TEM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JABARI HIRD,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 19, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
Jabari Hird appeals his concurrent sentences of 240, 240, and 324 months,
imposed upon re-sentencing pursuant to his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); armed bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2113(a), (d); and brandishing a firearm during the commission of a
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A). On appeal, Hird
argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable in light of the disparity
between the length of the sentences that he and his codefendant, Rasheed Silvera,
received.
We have held that “[i]t is a cardinal rule of appellate review that a party may
not challenge as error a ruling or other trial proceeding invited by that party.”
United States v. Ross, 131 F.3d 970, 988 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations and quotations
omitted). “The doctrine of invited error is implicated when a party induces or
invites the district court into making an error.” United States v. Stone, 139 F.3d
822, 838 (11th Cir. 1998). “Where invited error exists, it precludes a court from
invoking the plain error rule and reversing.” Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia,
289 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, Hird repeatedly requested a sentence in the
middle of the guidelines.1 He does not dispute that his guideline range was 294 to
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At the sentencing hearing, Hird’s counsel said, “I would like to ask the Court again
to consider the middle range of the guidelines, as . . . the outer end of the sentence, but even consider
lower than that.” Later, counsel said that a mid-range sentence “is so significant . . . that the
statutory purpose of a sentencing would be served” and that “if the Court was prepared to give a mid-
guideline range sentence, then it would certainly be appropriate now.”
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346 months. His imposed sentence of 324 months is only 4 months above the
precise middle of that guideline. Despite his exhortations that the district court
impose a middle-range sentence, Hird still objected to the 324-month sentence
when the district court announced it. He gave no reason as to why he was
objecting. He repeatedly requested a middle-range sentence, and he cannot seek
review when he received it. See United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1327
(11th Cir. 2005).
Even if we allow his later objection to overcome the invited error doctrine,
Hird has not shown that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We examine
whether a sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the record and the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586,
597 (2007). Normally, we review substantive reasonableness for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 2003).
However, where the party did not articulate a specific reason for the objection, we
review only for plain error. Id. “To find reversible error under the plain error
standard, we must conclude that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, and
(3) the error affected substantial rights.” Id.
The § 3553(a) factors include “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
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similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). However, a “[d]isparity between the
sentences imposed on codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for relief
on appeal.” United States v. Regueiro, 240 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2001).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing
unreasonableness, and ordinarily a sentence within the guideline range is
reasonable. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, Silvera cooperated with law enforcement and had a significantly
lesser criminal record than Hird. Accordingly, there existed appropriate bases for
sentencing Hird to a longer term than Silvera, and Hird’s sentence is not
substantively unreasonable. See Regueiro, 240 F.3d at 1325-26; United States v.
Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no unwarranted disparity
where one codefendant “provided substantial assistance to the government” and
received a lesser sentence than another codefendant who “did not provide any
assistance to the government”); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
AFFIRMED.
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