[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 13, 2011
No. 10-15832
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 4:10-cv-00060-HLM
DEXTER WARD PRESNELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAULDING COUNTY, GEORGIA,
PAULDING COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
No. 11-10316
________________________
DEXTER WARD PRESNELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(December 13, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and LAWSON,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This case involves two separate appeals deriving from a single district court
case.1 As a result of a misidentified fingerprint linking him to a crime scene,
Plaintiff Dexter Presnell was indicted for murder, arrested, and spent sixteen
months in jail awaiting trial. When the fingerprint examiner was reviewing the
evidence in preparation for trial, he realized the mistake, the charges were dropped,
and Plaintiff was released. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia against Paulding County, Georgia; the Paulding
County Sheriff’s Department; the Georgia Bureau of Investigation; and an
unnamed John Doe defendant. The complaint included various 42 U.S.C. §1983
claims as well as state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and
*
Honorable Hugh Lawson, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
1
We sua sponte consolidate the two appeals and dispose of both in this opinion.
2
malicious prosecution. The district court ultimately dismissed the claims against
the GBI pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and granted judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) in favor of Paulding County and the
Paulding County Sheriff’s Department.2 After the statute of limitations had run,
the district court also denied as futile Plaintiff’s motion to amend to add a claim
based upon the Fourth Amendment, and to add two new parties, the director of the
GBI and Tim Schmall. Schmall was the GBI employee whom Plaintiff had finally
identified as the fingerprint examiner to whom the mistake was allegedly
attributable. Despite the unfortunate events of this case, established law indicates
that the district court correctly held in favor of the Defendants. Accordingly, we
affirm. But we address in turn the several issues in this appeal.
I. APPEAL NO. 11-10316: PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST GBI;
PLAINTIFF’S ATTEMPT TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT TO ADD
A FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIM AGAINST GBI AND TO ADD
TWO GBI EMPLOYEES AS NEW PARTY DEFENDANTS
A. The Original § 1983 Claims and State Law Claims Against the GBI
The district court correctly dismissed the § 1983 claims and the state law
claims against the GBI pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. That Amendment
provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
2
The district court also dismissed Defendant John Doe. However, Plaintiff has not
appealed that decision.
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to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been construed to
also bar suits against a state by that state’s own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 13-19 (1890). “A State may waive its sovereign immunity at its
pleasure, and in some circumstances Congress may abrogate it by appropriate
legislation. But absent waiver or valid abrogation, federal courts may not entertain
a private person’s suit against a State.” Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1638 (2011) (citation and footnote omitted). “Congress,
in passing § 1983, did not intend to override the immunity guaranteed to the states
by the Eleventh Amendment.” Robinson v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 966 F.2d 637,
640 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979)). Thus,
Plaintiff can sue the GBI only if Georgia has waived its sovereign immunity.
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Georgia has not waived the immunity from
suit in federal court which Georgia enjoys under the Eleventh Amendment. The
Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), O.C.G.A. §50-21-20, et seq., is an Act of the
General Assembly that waives the state’s sovereign immunity “for the torts of state
officers and employees while acting within the scope of their official duties or
employment.” O.C.G.A. §50-21-23(a) (2009). However, the GTCA expressly
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provides that:
[t]he state waives its sovereign immunity only to the extent and in the
manner provided in this article and only with respect to actions
brought in the courts of the State of Georgia. The state does not waive
any immunity with respect to actions brought in the courts of the
United States.
O.C.G.A. §50-21-23(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, the GTCA does not waive
Georgia’s immunity from suit in federal courts.
Plaintiff also argues that the Georgia Constitution contains a waiver of
sovereign immunity applicable in this case. Plaintiff relies upon general language
in paragraph IX(d) of the Georgia Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, §2,
para. IX(d). However, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that, later in paragraph IX, the
Georgia Constitution expressly provides: “No waiver of sovereign immunity under
this Paragraph shall be construed as a waiver of any immunity provided to the state
or its departments, agencies, officers, or employees by the United States
Constitution.” Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. I, §2, para. IX(f).
Thus, the State of Georgia has not waived its sovereign immunity from suit
in federal court. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed both the §1983
claims and the state law claims against GBI on sovereign immunity grounds.
B. The District Court Properly Denied the Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend
We review the denial by the district court of a plaintiff’s motion to amend his
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complaint under an abuse of discretion standard. Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166
F.3d 1157, 1160-61 (11th Cir. 1999). “[W]hen employing an abuse-of-discretion
standard, we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear
error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” U.S. v. Frazier, 387
F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
The applicable statute of limitations for a §1983 claim arising in Georgia is
two years. Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff does not dispute that the statute of limitations had run when Plaintiff
moved to amend his complaint.
Because Georgia law provides the applicable statute of limitations in this
case, if a proposed amendment relates back under Georgia law, then “that
amendment relates back under [Rule 15(c)(1)(A)] even if the amendment would not
relate back under federal law rules.” Saxton v. ACF Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d 959, 963
(11th Cir. 2001). Thus, we look to Georgia law to determine whether Plaintiff’s
amendment should relate back to the time of filing the original complaint, such that
the statute of limitations bar is avoided.
Georgia’s law governing relation back is very similar to Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1), which governs relation back under federal law. Georgia’s relation back
rules are found in O.C.G.A. §9-11-15(c). That section provides as follows:
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Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arises out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted relates back to the date of the original pleadings if the
foregoing provisions are satisfied, and if within the period provided by
law for commencing the action against him the party to be brought in
by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake
concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.
O.C.G.A. §9-11-15(c).
With respect to Plaintiff’s attempt to amend to state a §1983 claim based
upon a Fourth Amendment violation against GBI, the claim would arise out of the
same transaction as set forth in the original complaint. Thus, that claim against
GBI would relate back so as to avoid any statute of limitations problem. However,
the district court properly denied the motion to amend because this claim against
GBI is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, just as were the original claims. See
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a
complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly
dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”);
Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that a district court
need not allow an amendment where the amendment would be futile).
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We next address whether Plaintiff’s attempt to amend to add the two new
parties can relate back so as to avoid the statute of limitations bar. We conclude
that the district court correctly held that the attempted amendment to add the two
new parties would not relate back. Therefore, the claims against the two new
parties would be barred by the statute of limitations, and the district court properly
held that the amendment was therefore futile.
As noted above, for an amendment seeking to add a new party, the plaintiff
must show that, within the statute of limitations period, the new party had received
such notice of the action that he will not be prejudiced, and that the new party knew
or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against him. O.C.G.A. §9-11-15(c). As
the district court noted, Plaintiff has wholly failed to show that either new party
received notice of the institution of this action such that he would not be
prejudiced. Indeed, the proffered amended complaint does not even make such an
allegation. Especially in light of the fact that the statute of limitations period
expired only three days after the filing of the original complaint, we cannot
conclude that the district court abused its discretion in holding that Plaintiff had
failed to show that either new party possessed the required knowledge of the
instant suit within the statute of limitations period. See Stephens v. McDonanld’s
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Corp., 536 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that amendment
adding new defendant did not relate back under O.C.G.A. §9-11-15(c) where there
was no evidence that proposed defendant had received actual notice of plaintiff’s
original complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiff’s
motion to amend to add the new parties, as the claims against the new parties
would have been barred by the statute of limitations, and thus the amendment was
futile.
II. APPEAL NO. 10-15832: PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST PAULDING
COUNTY AND THE PAULDING COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT
In this appeal, Plaintiff asserts the same §1983 claims and the same state law
claims against Paulding County and the Paulding County Sheriff’s Department.3
Turning first to the district court’s dismissal of the Paulding County Sheriff’s
Department, we affirm on the basis of Plaintiff’s concession that “the Paulding
County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to being sued.”
(Plaintiff’s brief in No. 10-15832, at 19). Accordingly, the district court properly
3
In his brief in this appeal challenging the district court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings in favor of Paulding County and the Paulding County Sheriff’s Department, Plaintiff
does not argue that the district court erred in denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Therefore, any
such argument is deemed abandoned.
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dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Paulding County Sheriff’s Department.
We turn next to Plaintiff’s claims against Paulding County. With respect to
Plaintiff’s §1983 claims, a county cannot be liable on the basis of respondeat
superior. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Rather, a
county can be liable only when the execution of a county policy or custom causes a
constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
The district court held that Plaintiff’s Complaint was “utterly devoid of any
allegations indicating that a custom or policy of Defendant Paulding County caused
Plaintiff’s alleged injuries.” (D. Ct. Order July 21, 2010, at 19). We agree.
Although Plaintiff suggests in his brief that the Sheriff might be a policymaker for
the County, Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to name the Sheriff as a defendant. Thus,
Plaintiff cannot rely on some act4 of the Sheriff as constituting a county policy on
the basis of which the County might be liable under §1983.5 Accordingly, the
district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s §1983 claims against Paulding
4
In addition, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to identify any improper act of the Sheriff,
or any policy made by the Sheriff, which injured Plaintiff.
5
Thus, we need not in this case decide whether, with respect to any function
relevant to this case, the Sheriff is a policymaker for the state or for the county, a matter which
the divided en banc court left unresolved in Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia, 335 F.3d 1326
(11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). There, a majority of the judges of the court held only that, with
respect to the particular function at issue in that case (a function different from any function
relevant to the instant case), the Sheriff was acting for the state, and not for the county.
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County.
Turning finally to Plaintiff’s state law claims against Paulding County, we
agree with the district court that Paulding County is protected from suit pursuant to
the sovereign immunity provided by the Georgia Constitution. The sovereign
immunity provided in the Georgia Constitution to the state or any of its
departments or agencies also applies to Georgia’s counties. Gilbert v. Richardson,
452 S.E.2d 476, 479 (Ga. 1994). This sovereign immunity “can only be waived by
an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign
immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver.” Ga. Const. of 1983,
Art. I, §2, para. IX(e). The GTCA “expressly excludes counties from the ambit of
[its] waiver,” Gilbert, 452 S.E.2d at 479, because the Act’s definition of “state”
specifically excludes counties. O.C.G.A. §50-21-22(5). Plaintiff has failed to
point to any other statute that waives Paulding County’s immunity. Accordingly,
the district court properly concluded that sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s state
law claims asserted against Defendant Paulding County, and the district court
correctly dismissed these claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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