[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 26, 2011
No. 11-11497 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cv-00003-LGW-JEG
RAYMOND W. BROWN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LUKE COLEMAN,
Georgia Dept. of Corrections
State Probation Office, et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees,
CARL RENFROE,
Camden County Deputy Sheriff,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(August 26, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Raymond Brown appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 complaint against the defendants, in which he alleges that the defendants
unlawfully made him register as, and published in a newspaper that he was, a sex
offender based on his prior criminal conviction for aggravated child molestation.
Brown argues that the state failed to prove venue at his underlying criminal trial,
rendering his conviction invalid, and that the defendants violated his due process
rights when they did not investigate the validity of his underlying conviction
before classifying him as a sex offender.
The district court found that Brown’s § 1983 claims were barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that when
judgment in favor of a plaintiff seeking damages in a § 1983 suit “would
necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence,” the
“plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal
authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at 486-87. In
other words, “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate
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that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.
A judgment in favor of Brown on his § 1983 claim would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his underlying conviction for aggravated child molestation.
Because Brown has not provided any evidence that this conviction has already
been invalidated, the district court did not err in finding his claims barred by Heck.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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