[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15516 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 11, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 3:00-cv-01297-HWM-MCR
MICHAEL G. HARRIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee,
PRISON REALTY TRUST INC.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 11, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael G. Harris, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his motion for
relief from a void judgment, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), and the
denial of his motion for reconsideration, filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The Rule 59(e) motion requested reconsideration of the district court’s denial of
the Rule 60(b)(4) motion. All Harris’s current claims turn on the issue of whether
his former employer, the Corrections Corporation of America (“CCA”), timely
moved for judgment as a matter of law after the entry of judgment in the jury trial.
Harris argues that the motion was not filed before the filing deadline and that the
CCA’s attorneys perpetrated a fraud upon the court. We note that Harris has
raised two prior appeals in this case, Harris v. Corrections Corp. of America
(Harris I), 139 Fed. Appx. 156 (11th Cir. June 15, 2005) (per curiam), and Harris
v. Corrections Corp. of America (Harris II), 332 Fed. Appx. 593 (11th Cir. June
16, 2009) (per curiam).1 Harris II was, like the instant appeal, a challenge to the
timeliness of the CCA’s earlier motion for judgment as a matter of law. We
denied Harris’s appeal in that case, explicitly holding that we were barred from
further consideration of the timeliness issue by the law of the case doctrine.
Harris II, 332 Fed. Appx. at 595.
1
Harris also filed an appeal between Harris I and Harris II that we dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. See Harris II, 332 Fed. Appx. at 594. In Harris II, we referred to the
dismissed appeal as “Harris II.” However, we do not adopt that terminology here.
2
We review the denial of a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) de
novo. Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2001). We also review the
application of the law of the case doctrine de novo. United States v. Bobo, 419
F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005). Finally, we review the denial of a Fed. R. Civ.
P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Mays v. United
States Postal Serv., 122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
A district court may relieve a party from a final judgment pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) if “the judgment is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). “Generally,
a judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) if the court that rendered it lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law.” Burke, 252 F.3d at 1263 (quotation
omitted).
However, “[u]nder the law of the case doctrine, both the district court and
the court of appeals are bound by findings of fact and conclusions of law made by
the court of appeals in a prior appeal of the same case unless (1) a subsequent trial
produces substantially different evidence, (2) controlling authority has since made
a contrary decision of law applicable to that issue, or (3) the prior decision was
clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice.” United States v. Stinson, 97
F.3d 466, 469 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
3
A Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion for reconsideration cannot be brought solely
to relitigate issues already raised in an earlier motion. See Michael Linet, Inc. v.
Vill. of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005). “The only grounds for
granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of
law or fact.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(alteration in original) (quoting Kellogg v. Schreiber (In re Kellogg), 197 F.3d
1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999)).
In the instant case, all Harris’s arguments turn on the question of whether
the CCA timely filed its post-trial motion in 2003. In Harris II, we held that
Harris’s timeliness argument was foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine. Our
holding from Harris II, rejecting the timeliness argument, is now itself the law of
the case. Harris has not argued, and has presented no evidence to suggest, that any
of the three exceptions to the law of the case doctrine apply. Likewise, his motion
for reconsideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) sought to relitigate the
matters already addressed with respect to the underlying Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
motion, and presented neither newly-discovered evidence nor manifest errors of
law or fact.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Harris’s motions under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
4
AFFIRMED.2
2
We deny Harris’s request for oral argument as moot.
5