[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-14087 APR 22, 2011
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:10-cr-80056-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAGDALENO GONSALES CAMPOS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 22, 2011)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Magdaleno Gonsales Campos appeals his 36-month sentence, imposed after
he pled guilty to illegal reentry after previously being deported in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). Campos argues that he should not have received a
16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) for having previously been
deported after a felony conviction for a drug trafficking offense. He argues that
his prior state conviction was not for a “drug trafficking offense,” as defined by
the Sentencing Guidelines, because “intent to distribute” is not an element of the
North Carolina statute under which he was convicted.1
The district court properly held that Campos’s objection to the 16-level
enhancement was foreclosed by this Court’s decision in United States v. Madera-
Madera, 333 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 3002), in which we expressly rejected the
argument that § 2L1.2’s definition of “drug trafficking offense” requires that
intent to distribute be an element of the statute of conviction, and held that
“federal law [] permits an inference of intent to distribute from a defendant’s
possession of a significantly large quantity of drugs.” Id. at 1233 (citation
omitted). See also United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying
1
We review “questions of law arising under the Sentencing Guidelines de novo.” United
States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). “Federal law, not
state law, controls the application of the Sentencing Guidelines.” Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d
1228, 1231 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003).
2
on Madera-Madera to hold that intent to distribute can be inferred from the
defendant’s possession of between 200 and 400 grams of cocaine).2
Campos was previously deported after a felony conviction for “trafficking
in cocaine” by possessing “200 grams or more, but less than 400 grams,” in
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3)(b). Accordingly, under Madera-
Madera and James, the district court did not err in applying a 16-level
enhancement to Campos’s guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b).
AFFIRMED.
2
We recognize that the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits disagree with our analysis
in Madera-Madera. However, Madera-Madera and James are binding precedent in this Circuit,
which we are bound to follow unless and until they are overruled en banc or by the Supreme
Court. See United States v. Smith, 122 F.3d 1355, 1359 (11th Cir. 2000).
3