[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-14617 APR 7, 2011
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cv-01467-DAB
MICHAEL DOEPKE,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 7, 2011)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Doepke appeals the district court’s order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Doepke makes two
contentions: first that the Administrative Law Judge erred when it found that his
previous jobs qualified as “past relevant work,” and second that the ALJ erred
when it found that Doepke could work full time.
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine if it is supported by
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Lewis v. Callahan,
125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)). “Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 125 F.3d at1439).
The ALJ was required to follow a “five-step sequential evaluation process . .
.to decide whether [Doepke was] disabled.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
The ALJ properly followed that process. Doepke argues, however, that the ALJ
erred at the fourth step in that process, where it was required to determine
“whether a claimant can perform past relevant work despite his or her
impairment.” Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).
One of the jobs that the ALJ found to be past relevant work was Doepke’s
job as a deli worker. Doepke fails to argue that his job as a deli worker would not
constitute past relevant work. Thus, the ALJ did not err in finding that Doepke’s
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job as a deli worker constituted past relevant work. See Access Now, Inc. v.
Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We will not
address a claim that has been abandoned . . . .”).
The ALJ then found that Doepke could perform unskilled or semi-skilled
work, which included his past job as deli worker. Therefore, the only question is
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Doepke can perform
his past relevant work as a deli worker. Doepke does not have any physical
conditions that would prevent him from being able to perform that work; one of
his treating physicians said that “[his] [t]hought content and form are productive,
goal directed, rational and coherent . . . [his] [i]ntellectual ability is above average
and shows no impairment of attention span . . . [and his] [j]udgment is not
impaired with respect to managing daily activities and making reasonable life
decisions”; another one of his physicians found that he is “able to function
satisfactorily” when dealing with “work pressures in a usual work setting,” and
that he can “[i]nteract appropriately with supervisor(s) . . . [and] co-workers”;
neither of the two state agency psychologists indicated that Doepke would be
unable to complete a normal workday; when the vocational expert was asked
whether Doepke could “maintain a 40 hour week,” he responded that Dopeke’s
impairment “certainly does not preclude the ability to function and sustain the
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pace, persistence, and concentration”; and Doepke agreed that he is “able to get up
and go to work” even when he does not want to“[b]ecause if [he] do[es not] then
[he will] get fired.” Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Doepke
can perform past relevant work.
AFFIRMED.
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