[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 31, 2011
No. 10-14247 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:95-cr-00551-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID ARIAS,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 31, 2011)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Arias, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for “appropriate relief.” We affirm.
In 1996, Arias was convicted of federal firearm and robbery charges and
sentenced to a total of 408 months’ imprisonment. After we affirmed his sentence
on direct appeal, and his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for collateral relief was denied,
Arias filed a motion for a sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2)
based on a retroactive amendment to the Guidelines. Although the district court
denied the motion, we vacated and remanded for re-sentencing because we
determined that the amendment retroactively affected the guideline range
governing a portion of Arias’s sentence.
At re-sentencing, the district court re-calculated Arias’s guideline range for
the affected portion of his sentence, but nonetheless exercised its discretion,
denied the § 3582(c)(2) motion, and re-imposed the same sentence. The court,
however, failed to re-impose that sentence in a formal written judgment. On
appeal, we upheld the court’s sentence, but remanded with instructions to correct
the clerical error by entering a formal written judgment. The district court
complied with our mandate in 2003.
Approximately seven years later, Arias filed the instant pro se “motion for
appropriate relief,” challenging the district court’s authority to enter the amended
judgment. The district court denied the motion.
While we doubt that Arias’s belated motion was timely, let alone cognizable
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at all, we nonetheless agree with the district court that Arias’s motion was due to
be denied because the amended judgment was entered pursuant to a mandate
issued by this Court. As such, it is barred by the law of the case doctrine.
See United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 1520 (11th Cir. 1996). Arias’s
remaining arguments are not properly before us. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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