[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 30, 2011
No. 10-14373
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cr-60119-WPD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JONATHAN KEITH CORY,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 30, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jonathan Cory pled guilty of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to prison term of 18
months. He appeals his sentence, presenting one issue: whether his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. See under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261,
125 S.Ct. 738, 765-66, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (the question on appeal of a
sentence is whether the sentence is “unreasonable.”) We find that it is not
unreasonable and therefore affirm.
Cory’s sentence is at the bottom of the sentence range, 18 to 24 months,
prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. He argues that his sentence is
nonetheless substantively unreasonable because the nature and circumstances of
the offense and his personal history—a traumatic home life—and mental
impairment warranted a downward variance. Moreover, since his criminal history
does not indicate a need for his incarceration to protect the public, the sentence he
received is greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
Whether a sentence is reasonable is guided by the sentencing factors set out
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 188-89. Those
factors include:
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1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid
unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution
to victims.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). “[T]he weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is within the sound
discretion of the district court and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing
the relevant factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1248 (11th Cir.) (en
banc). A sentence is substantively reasonable if, under the totality of the
circumstances, it achieves the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a). Pugh, 515 F.3d
at 1191.
Cory has not shown that the sentence he received is substantively
unreasonable. It is at the low-end of the Guidelines sentence range, and well
below the statutory maximum sentence for the crime he committed, 20 years’
imprisonment. The district court explained its rationale in sentencing Cory to
18 months’ imprisonment, expressly stating that it had considered all of the
aggravating and mitigating factors, including the quantity and value of the cocaine
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smuggled in on his person, as well as his lack of equity interest in the cocaine.
The court also stated that it had considered the testimony presented by the expert
psychologist who testified on Cory’s behalf and taken into account Cory’s mental
impairment.
AFFIRMED.
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