[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 28, 2011
No. 10-11128 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 1:09-cv-20975-PCH &1:06-cr-20449-PCH-1
JOHNNY EDWARD KING,
lllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllll ll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 28, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johnny Edward King, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. We granted a certificate of appealability to address the question of
whether the district court erred in determining that the actual-innocence exception
to the procedural-default rule does not apply to King’s claim that his non-capital
sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(1), violated his right to due process. King acknowledges that he
procedurally defaulted his claim that he was illegally sentenced under the ACCA
by failing to raise it on direct appeal, but he contends that the district court’s
failure to address his claim resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice
because he was ineligible for, and, therefore, actually innocent of, the ACCA
sentence enhancement. He argues that the actual-innocence exception to the
procedural-default rule should be extended to apply to challenges to non-capital
sentences because death is not different from non-capital sentences for purposes of
enforcing habeas corpus rules.
“When reviewing the district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review
findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de novo.” Rhode v. United
States, 583 F.3d 1289, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009). A prisoner who fails to raise an
issue on direct appeal is procedurally barred from raising that claim in a § 2255
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motion, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. Jones v. United States, 153 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 1998). A
petitioner may show a fundamental miscarriage of justice by demonstrating that “a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1234 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has recognized that a petitioner who is guilty of an offense
and sentenced to death can show a fundamental miscarriage of justice by
demonstrating that, but for a constitutional error, he is actually innocent of the
capital sentence. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2517,
120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). A petitioner may establish actual innocence in the
capital-sentencing context by demonstrating that, “but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found [him] eligible for the death penalty under the
applicable . . . law.” Id.
In light of the Government’s concession on appeal that the actual-innocence
exception should be available to petitioners raising procedurally defaulted claims
challenging non-capital sentences enhanced under the ACCA, we remand King’s
case to the district court for a determination of whether King is actually innocent
of the ACCA sentence enhancement.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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