[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-11407 MARCH 22, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:07-cv-00163-WTH-GRJ
DARRYL MAURICE YOUNG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 22, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Darryl Maurice Young, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial
of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition.
“The district court’s grant or denial of habeas corpus relief is reviewed de
novo,” while the court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Sims v.
Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 1998). Before we review a district
court’s denial of a section 2254 petition, the petitioner must obtain a certificate of
appealability by making a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)–(2). The scope of our review is limited to the
issues specified in the certificate of appealability. Murray v. United States, 145
F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). On appeal, Young asserts that
the district court erred by not providing him an opportunity for discovery or for an
evidentiary hearing. But we granted a certificate of appealability only to
determine:
[w]hether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones,
960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992), by failing to address
Young’s claim that he was improperly treated as ineligible
to earn gain time for six months following his disciplinary
infraction, pursuant to Fla. Admin. Code § 33-
601.101(6)(a)(2)–(3) (1998).
In Clisby we exercised our supervisory power over the district courts and
instructed them “to resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to [section 2254], regardless whether habeas relief is
granted or denied.” 960 F.2d at 936. A “claim for relief” is “any allegation of a
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constitutional violation,” and two separate allegations of a constitutional violation
“constitute two distinct claims for relief, even if both allegations arise from the
same alleged set of operative facts.” Id. If a district court fails to address all of
the claims in a habeas petition, we “vacate the district court’s judgment without
prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining claims . . . .” Id.
at 938.
The district court properly addressed Young’s argument that he was
erroneously treated as ineligible to earn gain time for six months following his
disciplinary infraction. First, the court reviewed and upheld the state court’s
decision, which addressed the issue of ineligibility to earn gain time. The state
court held that Young failed to show a violation of his due process rights, and the
district court determined that this was not an unreasonable application of federal
law.
The district court also found that Young “received the degree of fairness in
the disciplinary proceeding to which he was entitled.” The court properly
analyzed Young’s claim as a due process claim, rather than assessing whether it
was proper under state law, because only claims that a person has been held in
custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law are cognizable in section
2254 habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The court did not err under
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Clisby, so the denial of Young’s habeas petition is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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