[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 8, 2011
No. 10-13312 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02019-TCB
ALEXANDER HARVIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HEALTHCARE FUNDING SOLUTIONS,
TRAUNER, COHEN & THOMAS,
GORDON C. TOMLINSON,
MICHAEL COHEN,
Defendant-Appellees,
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 8, 2011)
Before HULL, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alexander Harvin, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order
denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to reinstate his action against Healthcare
Funding Solutions (“HFS”); Trauner, Cohen & Thomas; Gordon C. Tomlinson;
and Michael Cohen (“defendants”). Harvin sued defendants for violating the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Georgia Fair
Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391, et. seq. After the parties agreed to
settle, Harvin voluntarily dismissed his case before the district court. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The parties stipulated that the dismissal was with
prejudice. Harvin later asked the district court to reinstate his case, alleging that
HFS fraudulently induced him to settle. The district court denied Harvin’s motion.
Harvin filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court also denied.
After thorough review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of
discretion. Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc. 205 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir.
2000). Rule 60(b) allows courts to “relieve a party . . . from a final judgment” for
multiple reasons, including “fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Relief under Rule 60(b)(3) requires
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) “the adverse party obtained the verdict
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through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct” and (2) “the conduct
prevented [the moving party] from fully presenting his case.” Waddell v. Hendry
Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003).
Harvin argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3) because HFS
induced him to settle through fraud or misrepresentations. Specifically, he argues
that HFS represented that, as a condition of the settlement, it would ask a credit
bureau to delete information about an alleged outstanding debt tied to a specific
account from Harvin’s credit report. Harvin claims that HFS then intentionally
listed the wrong account number in the settlement agreement. However,
“conclusory averments of . . . fraud made on information and belief and
unaccompanied by a statement of clear and convincing probative facts which
support such belief do not serve to raise the issue of the existence of fraud.”
Booker v. Dugger, 825 F.2d 281, 283 (11th Cir. 1987) (quotation marks omitted).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harvin’s Rule
60(b) motion. Harvin offered mere conclusory allegations that HFS engaged in
fraud. HFS purchased two accounts on which Harvin allegedly owed money, and
the account number it inserted in the settlement agreement corresponded to one of
those accounts. Harvin’s complaint also referred to both account numbers. As the
district court noted, the error could have been a mere oversight. HFS did not
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conceal the contents of the settlement agreement from Harvin. Rather, the error
was present in the final version of the settlement agreement that Harvin signed.
Harvin provided no evidence that he was deprived of a chance to review the
agreement before signing it. We thus conclude that Harvin failed to provide clear
and convincing evidence that HFS engaged in fraud or made material
misrepresentations to induce him to settle.
AFFIRMED.
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