[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10841 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 29, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cr-00187-ACC-GJK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DELFINO REYES-MIRANDA,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 29, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Delfino Reyes-Miranda was convicted of illegally reentering the United
States after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). The
district court sentenced Reyes-Miranda to 51 months imprisonment. He
challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence.
I.
“We review sentencing decisions only for abuse of discretion, and we use a
two-step process.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009).
First, we must “ ‘ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.’ ” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007)). If we find the sentence to be procedurally sound, the second
step is to review the “substantive reasonableness” of the sentence, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances, “including the extent of any variance
from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. “If the district
court’s sentence is within the guidelines range, we expect that the sentence is
reasonable.” United States v. Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d 720, 734 (11th Cir.
2010); see also United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005) (“After
Booker, our ordinary expectation [of reasonableness] still has to be measured
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against the record, and the party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of both that record and the
facts in section 3553(a).”).
Reyes-Miranda contends that the district court committed procedural error
by failing to adequately explain its 51-month, within the guidelines, sentence. We
disagree. The district court explained that it was imposing that sentence to
promote respect for the law because Reyes-Miranda’s had been deported
numerous times in the past and continued to illegally enter the United States. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). The court further explained that it was imposing a 51-
month sentence to discourage others from illegally entering this country. See id. §
3553(a)(2)(B). The court also stated, “After considering the advisory sentencing
guidelines and all the factors identified in Title 18, United States Code Section
3553(a)(1) through 7, the Court finds that the sentence imposed is sufficient but
not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing.”
The district court’s explanation of its sentencing decision was sufficient. See
United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2005).
Reyes-Miranda also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. He contends that his 51-month sentence is “greater than necessary,” see
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to achieve the purposes of sentencing. It is his position that a
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sentence below or at the low-end of the advisory guidelines range would have
afforded adequate deterrence. Given Reyes-Miranda’s history of deportations, a
51-month, within the guidelines, sentence is not outside the range of
reasonableness. See Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1238. The district court’s sentencing
decision was not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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