FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 21, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 11-2040
v. (D.C. No. 1:09-CR-02626-WJ-1)
(D. New Mexico)
NATHAN DON JACK,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, SEYMOUR and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Nathan Don Jack was convicted of one count of second degree murder in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(a), 1153 and 3147(1). On appeal, he argues the
district court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury that the
government had the burden to prove the absence of heat of passion as an
additional element of the murder charge. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
“[T]he only difference between second degree murder and voluntary
manslaughter in the homicide hierarchy is that voluntary manslaughter is
committed in the heat of passion, and the presence of this mitigating factor negates
the malice that would otherwise attach given an intentional or reckless mental
state.” United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656, 665 (10th Cir. 2005). “Heat of
passion” is defined as “‘a passion of fear or rage in which the defendant loses his
normal self-control as a result of circumstances that would provoke such a passion
in an ordinary person, but which did not justify the use of deadly force.’” Id. at
664-65 (quoting United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 552 (5th Cir. 1989)); see
also Tenth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions No. 2.54, at 184 (2011)
(nearly identical definition). Significantly,
[t]here are four obstacles for the defendant to overcome before he can
have his intentional killing reduced from murder to voluntary
manslaughter: (1) There must have been a reasonable provocation.
(2) The defendant must have been in fact provoked. (3) A reasonable
man so provoked would not have cooled off in the interval of time
between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow. And (4),
the defendant must not in fact have cooled off during that interval.
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2(a), at 494 (2d ed. 2003).
“[T]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when
the issue is properly presented in a homicide case.” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 704 (1975); see also United States v. Lofton, 776 F.2d 918, 920 (10th Cir.
1985) (“[A] defendant in a federal murder case who has sufficiently raised a heat
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of passion defense is entitled to instructions informing the jury of the theory of
defense and of the Government’s duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of heat of passion in order to obtain a murder conviction.”); Tenth Circuit
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions No. 2.53, at 182 (2011) (noting that “if there is
evidence that the defendant acted upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,” an
additional element should be added to the second degree murder instruction). A
district court commits plain error when it fails to provide such an instruction
where the issue is properly presented. Lofton, 776 F.2d at 922.
Mr. Jack contends the evidence shows he killed the victim, Jessica Shorty,
with whom he shared a child, in a fit of enraged passion because he thought Ms.
Shorty had been cheating on him. Courts have held that “a reasonable man may be
provoked upon suddenly being told of his wife’s infidelity.” LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 15.2(b)(5), at 498 (emphasis added). Courts have also held “that a
reasonable though erroneous belief on the part of the husband that his wife is
committing adultery” is sufficient to establish adequate provocation. Id.
(emphasis added); see also id. § 15.2(b)(9), at 503 (“It would seem that the
provocation is adequate to reduce the homicide to voluntary manslaughter if the
killer reasonably believes that the injury to him exists, though actually he has not
been injured.”). Having thoroughly reviewed the record, however, we conclude
there was insufficient evidence to support a heat of passion defense in this case.
See United States v. Scafe, 822 F.2d 928, 932-33 (10th Cir. 1987).
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While there is evidence in the record that Mr. Jack was accusing Ms. Shorty
of cheating on him the evening of the murder, the evidence does not begin to
establish when any alleged cheating occurred, nor when Mr. Jack first learned
about the alleged infidelity. Thus, a jury had no evidence on which to find there
was a “sudden” and “reasonable provocation” 1 for Mr. Jack’s rage. “Evidence of a
string of prior arguments and a continuing dispute, without any indication of some
sort of instant incitement,” does not constitute sufficient evidence to show heat of
passion. United States v. Bordeaux, 980 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Even assuming there was a reasonable provocation, there is no evidence
suggesting a “reasonable man so provoked would not have cooled off in the
interval of time between the provocation and the delivery of the fatal blow.” See
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 15.2(a), at 494. Instead, the evidence at trial
established that while Mr. Jack engaged in a violent argument with Ms. Shorty
about her alleged cheating just hours before killing her, he “actually cooled off by
the time he commit[ted] his deadly act.” See id. § 15.2(e), at 509. The record
1
Notably, Mr. Jack was drunk when he became enraged and killed Ms.
Shorty. A defendant “does not qualify for the voluntary manslaughter treatment
where, because of intoxication, he easily loses his self-control; that is to say, he is
to be judged by the standard of the reasonable sober man.” LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 15.2(b)(10), at 504. See also United States v. Soundingsides, 820
F.2d 1232, 1242 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that intoxication does not negate the
general intent to kill necessary to support a conviction for second-degree murder
or voluntary manslaughter).
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reflects that Mr. Jack’s stepfather helped Mr. Jack calm down after the argument.
He testified:
I was outside talking to Nathan, trying to calm him down. I told him,
you know, “It’s going to blow away. Don’t worry about it. I went
through it. Things happen. Maybe it didn’t happen.” And I tried to
talk some sense into him to calm down, and we talked for about
probably about a good 30 minutes, and he finally – he finally calmed
down. He listened to me, and he started crying.
I hugged him and I gave him a good hug and told him, you
know, “Everything will be okay, not – not just right now, but you
know, just we’re drinking right now, and it’s not a good time. Wait
till the morning. Everything will – everything will be fine in the
morning, and you know, just get some sleep and, you know, just don’t
bother them. Let them sleep.” So he finally calmed down.
Rec., Vol. III, at 211-12. It was not until much later in the night that Mr. Jack
returned and killed Ms. Shorty. Although it is theoretically possible some new
event rekindled Mr. Jack’s passion after he calmed down but before he killed Ms.
Shorty such that he was reasonably provoked anew, see LaFave, Substantive
Criminal Law § 15.2(d), at 508, there is no evidence in the record about any such
event. “It is well established that if the defendant had enough time between the
provocation and the killing to reflect on his or her intended course of action, ‘then
the mere fact of passion would not reduce the crime below murder.’” Bordeaux,
980 F.2d at 537-38 (quoting Collins v. United States, 150 U.S. 62, 65 (1893)).
For all of these reasons, a jury could not have reasonably concluded that Mr.
Jack was suddenly and reasonably provoked at the time he killed Ms. Shorty.
Because Mr. Jack did not produce sufficient facts for a reasonable jury to conclude
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that he was adequately provoked into a sudden rage by having learned of Ms.
Shorty’s alleged cheating, the district court did not plainly err by failing to
instruct the jury on a heat of passion defense to the second degree murder charge.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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