FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 1, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
LORI J. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 12-6012
(D.C. No. 5:11-CV-00139-W)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner (W.D. Okla.)
of the Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HOLMES, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and EBEL,
Circuit Judge.
Lori J. Mitchell appeals from a district court order affirming the
Commissioner’s denial of Social Security disability and Supplemental Security
Income benefits. We affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Ms. Mitchell’s protected filing date was January 28, 2009. She alleged
disability due to diabetes, a bipolar condition, and difficulties with her ankle,
hearing, back, and thyroid. In her administrative hearing, the administrative law
judge (ALJ) applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines—or “grids”—and found that
while Ms. Mitchell could not return to her previous work in a call center or as a pizza
delivery employee, she did retain the ability to perform work that was available in the
national economy and, accordingly, was not disabled at step five under the grids. See
generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining
five-step analysis in detail); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 – 416.920. The Appeals
Council denied Ms. Mitchell’s request for review, and she sought review of the
Commissioner’s final decision in the district court. The district court conducted a de
novo review, adopted the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and
affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits. Ms. Mitchell appeals.
“We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether the correct
legal standards were applied.” Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1140 (10th Cir.
2010). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ms. Mitchell raises one issue on appeal: whether the Commissioner can
conclusively rely on the grids, without vocational expert testimony, where the ALJ
specifically found that Ms. Mitchell’s ability to perform light work was limited by
-2-
severe mental impairments. Generally, the grids may not be used conclusively if the
claimant has nonexertional impairments that limit the ability to do the full range of
work within a classification. See Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1488
(10th Cir. 1993). “Moreover, resort to the grids is particularly inappropriate when
evaluating nonexertional limitations such as pain and mental impairments.” Hargis
v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991).
However, it is equally clear in our circuit that “[t]he mere presence of a
nonexertional impairment does not preclude reliance on the grids.” Thompson,
987 F.2d at 1488. The nonexertional impairment “must interfere with the ability to
work.” Id. Use of the grids is foreclosed only where the “nonexertional impairments
are significant enough to limit [the claimant’s] ability to perform the full range of
jobs” available. Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 577, 583 (10th Cir. 1984). In fact, the
grids may be used for claimants with nonexertional impairments “whenever the
claimant can perform a substantial majority of the work in the designated [residual
functional capacity] category.” Evans v. Chater, 55 F.3d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1995).
While an ALJ may determine that a nonexertional impairment has only a negligible
effect on the range of jobs available, he “must back such a finding of negligible
effect with the evidence to substantiate it.” Talbot v. Heckler, 814 F.2d 1456, 1465
(10th Cir. 1987). And “once a mental impairment is considered to be severe, it must
be included in the residual functional capacity assessment, the fifth step in the
sequential evaluation process.” Hargis, 945 F.2d at 1488.
-3-
In this case, the ALJ found that Ms. Mitchell had the following severe
impairments: major depressive order and diabetes mellitus. However, the ALJ also
found that neither impairment met or was medically equal to a listed impairment in
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ noted that, according to the
medical evidence, Ms. Mitchell has only “moderate difficulties” in social
functioning, concentration, persistence, and pace. Aplt. App. II at 21. The ALJ then
proceeded to step five and stated:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds
that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light
work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except with
nonexertional limits. Claimant can perform simple tasks with routine
supervision; can relate to supervisors and peers on a superficial work
basis; and cannot relate to the general public. Claimant can adapt to a
work situation.
Id. at 22. The ALJ specifically referenced Ms. Mitchell’s mental impairment in the
residual functional capacity (RFC) determination and noted it was based on the
opinions of the state agency psychologists, which were “consistent with the record
when viewed in its entirety, including the mental consultative examination.” Id.
at 22-23. Although he found Ms. Mitchell’s mental impairment was severe, he noted
the medical testimony supported the position that the impairment “[did] not prevent
her from performing light work with some nonexertional limitations.” Id. at 23.
The ALJ then considered Ms. Mitchell’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, and found there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national
economy that Ms. Mitchell could perform. The ALJ cited Social Security Ruling
-4-
85-15 for a definition of the basic mental demands of unskilled work: “the abilities
(on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and remember simple instructions; to
respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations; and to
deal with changes in a routine work setting.” SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4
(1985). The ALJ concluded that “[Ms. Mitchell] retains the mental skills for
unskilled work.” Aplt. App. at 24. The medical evidence and record supports the
ALJ’s finding that Ms. Mitchell could perform substantially all of the work available
in the unskilled light work category because Ms. Mitchell “retains the capacity for
work with routine supervision and work-related contact.” Id. We agree with the ALJ
that Ms. Mitchell is not disabled.
The authority Ms. Mitchell cites to support her position that an ALJ’s use of
the grids is inappropriate where the claimant has severe mental impairments is
misplaced. In the cases Ms. Mitchell cites, many of which are unpublished, the ALJ
either failed to adequately consider the claimant’s nonexertional limitations, or failed
to support a grid-based decision in the record. See, e.g., Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1491
(“The ALJ . . . ignored completely [claimant’s] pain throughout the rest of his
analysis.”); Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he ALJ
ignored the many additional physical and mental restrictions that he found qualified
[claimant’s] RFC and simply applied the grids . . . .”); Lopez v. Barnhart,
78 F. App’x 675, 679 (10th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (“The ALJ’s conclusion
that claimant could perform most light work jobs was not supported by the
-5-
[vocational expert’s] testimony or any other source.” (emphasis added)); Wadford v.
Chater, No. 95-7147, 1996 WL 421988, at *1 (10th Cir. July 26, 1996) (unpublished
opinion) (“Because there is nothing in the record to satisfy the Secretary’s burden . .
., we cannot say the ALJ’s grid-based decision is supported by the requisite
substantial evidence.”).
In this case, though, the ALJ supported his use of the grids with a discussion
of Ms. Mitchell’s mental impairment, its effect on job performance under SSR 85-15,
and Ms. Mitchell’s continuing ability to perform a substantial majority of light
unskilled work. And while Ms. Mitchell is correct that the Eighth Circuit seems to
require vocational expert testimony at the mere existence of severe mental
impairments, see Brock v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1062, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012), our precedent
differs.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-6-